United States v. Swan

100 F. App'x 727
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJune 4, 2004
Docket03-5199
StatusUnpublished

This text of 100 F. App'x 727 (United States v. Swan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Swan, 100 F. App'x 727 (10th Cir. 2004).

Opinion

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Christopher E. Swan pled guilty to one count of violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). He appeals the two-point upward departure he received at sentencing pursuant to United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”), § 2Q2.1(b)(2)(B) (Nov. 2001) for creating “a significant risk of infestation or disease transmission potentially harmful to humans” in connection with his receipt of paddlefish roe from other individuals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Swan made arrangements with Jim Wever for Wever to obtain paddlefish roe 1 in OMahoma and deliver it to Swan in *729 Arkansas, for a price of $25 per pound. Swan admitted that, at the time he made these arrangements with Weaver, he knew it was illegal under Oklahoma law to take paddlefísh roe out of Oklahoma, and he further admitted that he planned to sell the roe to various buyers outside of Arkansas.

Following an extensive investigation, Wever was found guilty of poaching paddlefísh roe, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 29, § 6-303.1, which prohibits the possession of more than fifty pounds of unprocessed paddlefísh eggs or five pounds of processed eggs, as well as the transportation of paddlefísh eggs, processed or unprocessed, outside the state. Swan was subsequently indicted for violating, and aiding and abetting Wever in violating the Lacey Act, which makes it illegal “to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate ... commerce [] any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). Swan pled guilty.

The probation office recommended in Swan’s presentence report that he receive a two-point upward departure under USSG § 2Q2.1(b)(2)(B) because Swan’s offense “created a significant risk of infestation or disease transmission potentially harmful to humans.” Swan objected, arguing that he was “properly licensed” and was following applicable regulations when he processed the paddlefísh eggs. R. Vol. 2, tab 1.

At sentencing, the government presented testimony from Christopher J. Hurst, a United States Food and Drug Administration investigator, that paddlefísh roe is an item subject to United States Food and Drug Administration regulations concerning Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (“HACCP”) plans. 2 He further testified that Wever and his wife, Swan’s source for paddlefísh roe, were considered processors of paddlefísh roe, and as such would also be subject to HACCP regulations and required to have an HACCP plan. Hurst then testified that the Wevers’ failure to have an HACCP plan in effect for their processing of roe rendered the roe adulterated under the Food and Drug Administration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4). See 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(g). 3 Hurst also testified about the types of health hazards posed by improperly processed paddlefísh roe, including contamination by botulinum brucella and listeria monocytogenes.

A second witness, Thomas McKay, also testified at Swan’s sentencing proceeding. McKay was an employee of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in Edmond, Oklahoma, with responsibility for the northern district of Oklahoma. He testified that he was the supervising agent in the case against the Wevers and was familiar with their case. McKay testified that he considered the Wevers’ roe processing methods “unsanitary,” that “they *730 had no refrigeration equipment,” and that the Wevers’ residence “was pretty dirty.” Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 29-30, Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 79-80. It is undisputed that the Wevers did not have an HACCP plan. Swan did, however, have an HACCP plan.

After listening to the above testimony and hearing arguments from counsel for both sides, the district court found “that the United States has adduced evidence establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that in fact such a risk [of infestation or disease] was created under these circumstances, therefore, the request that the offense level be further adjusted downward is denied.” Id. at 40. Swan was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and assessed a fíne of $10,000.

Swan argues that the district court erroneously imposed the two-point enhancement under USSG § 2Q2.1(b)(2)(B) because he should not be held accountable for the Wevers’ failure to have an HACCP plan, nor was there any evidence that the roe which he had received or which he planned to obtain from the Wevers was in fact harmful to humans. 4

DISCUSSION

‘We review de novo legal questions regarding the application of the sentencing guidelines. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, ‘giving due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.’ ” United States v. Martinez, 342 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1223, 123 S.Ct. 1338, 154 L.Ed.2d 1083 (2003)). Furthermore, “[w]e review for clear error a district court’s factual findings in support of a sentence enhancement.” Id. at 1208; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).

As the government points out, USSG § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) provides that:

specific offense characteristics ... shall be determined on the basis of the following:

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Related

United States v. Brown
314 F.3d 1216 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Martinez
342 F.3d 1203 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Roland Felix Eyoum
84 F.3d 1004 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
United States v. Henry Narte
197 F.3d 959 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Blue Ribbon Smoked Fish, Inc.
179 F. Supp. 2d 30 (E.D. New York, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
100 F. App'x 727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-swan-ca10-2004.