United States v. Stone & Downer Co.

175 F. 33, 99 C.C.A. 49, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4925
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedDecember 20, 1909
DocketNo. 834
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 175 F. 33 (United States v. Stone & Downer Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 175 F. 33, 99 C.C.A. 49, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4925 (1st Cir. 1909).

Opinion

PUTNAM, Circuit Judge.

This appeal depends on the construction of the following portions of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897 (Act July 24,1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule A, par. 2, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1626]):

“2. All alcoholic perfumery, including cologne water and other toilet waters and toilet preparations of all kinds, containing alcohol or in the preparation of which alcohol is used, and alcoholic compounds not specially provided for in this Act, sixty cents per pound and forty-five per centum ad valorem.”

Also on that portion of the sixth section which imposes a dluty of 10 per cent, ad valorem, which section is as follows:

“Sec. 6. That there shall be levied, collected, and paid on the importation of all raw or unmanufactured articles, not enumerated or provided for in this act, a duty of ten per centum ad valorem, and on all articles manufactured, in whole or in part, not provided for in this act, a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem.”

It is true that at bar the United States claimed to rest alternatively on that portion of the sixth section which imposes a duty of 20 per cent.' ad valorem; but the assignment of error on which it relies for this merely negatived the entire result in the Circuit Court. Therefore it was altogether too general under the settled practice in reference to such assignments, although, of course, if there had been a “plain er[35]*35ror” in this connection, we might have overlooked this defect. We, however, reach a satisfactory conclusion without regard thereto.

The decision o f the Circuit Court rested the case on the 10 per cent, ad valorem duty under section 6. That court, however, expressed no opinion itself on the topic, but merely followed the Circuit Court for the Second Circuit in Boericke & Runyon Company v. United States, 126 Fed. 1018. This it clearly was justified in doing, whether or not it fully approved that decision. On the other hand, being a decision only of the Circuit Court, it does not stand as an authority binding us.

The facts in reference to the nature of the importation were correctly and sufficiently stated by the Board of General Appraisers as follows:

“Upon the evidence taken it appears that 15 kilograms of alcohol, valued at marks 37.50, was placed in the kegs containing certain belladonna leaves and stalks cut up and 12 kilograms of alcohol valued at marks 30 in the kegs containing aconite leaves and stalks cut up, and that these values were included in the general value on the consular invoice; that the merchandise consists of green belladonna leaves and stalks and green aconite leaves and stalks imported for the purpose of maceration in alcohol and for the purpose of making tinctures and extracts; that the alcohol in which the leaves were first immersed was continued in use in the maceration in this country while it incidentally served as a preservation in the importation of said leaves by which the amount of alcohol so used lessened the quantity of alcohol required for complete maceration.”

It was agreed at our bar that the alcohol during the process of importation absorbed sufficient from the leaves and stalks described to poison it, and to prevent any profitable attempt to extract the poison from it, or to thus reduce it to its normal condition. Nevertheless the opinion of the learned judge of the Second circuit in the case cited, at page 1019 of 126 Fed., described the alcohol as a “mere vehicle” of no more importance than the cask in which packed. The opinion said alternatively that the importation consisted of the leaves and stalks and the alcohol “as the factors in a loose and temporary association for the purpose, as aforesaid, of maintaining- the stalks and leaves in tlicir natural condition, and fit to subserve their intended use.” Apparently these observations express a condition differing from the facts as they appear before us; because, if the alcohol had been a “mere vehicle,” if it formed with the leaves and stalks only a “loose and temporary association,” it would have come into the country as alcohol or spirits, subject to a duty of at least $2.25 a proof gallon according to paragraph 28!) of the act in question, with possibly an additional ad valorem duly on account of the leaves and stalks which were in the package with it. Of this there is no suggestion in any discussion concerning" this importation brought to our attention. Moreover, that in the case before us the alcohol was not a “mere vehicle” is evident from the use to which it was filially put. Unlike any ordinary vehicle, whether cask, carton, wrapper, or whatever it may be, or any ordinary preservative, there was usually no attempt to separate it from the leaves and stalks, but further alcohol was generally added to it for the purpose of completing the whole into a tincture. The whole process is described in substance and without question as follows: When the package is made up at the place of shipment, the leaves are chopped into fine pieces, and the alcohol commingled with [36]*36them. After importation the leaves are further manipulated in the way of maceration, and further alcohol added for the purpose of further extracting the virtue from them, until, as the result of the further maceration and the further addition of alcohol, the tincture, the attaining of which was the purpose for which the importation was made, is extracted, ready for the market or for use.

It is true that the testimony also shows that the tincture is not the only form in which the result of the importation is put on the market. Another result is a tablet as to which the alcohol is a hindrance, but it is admitted that the major portion is used in the tincture form. All this constitutes a process of either a chemical union or an atomic association, continuing from the beginning at the place of exportation until the tincture is complete, ready for the market. The fact that in some part the tablet takes the place of the tincture does not change the nature of the process which we have described; and its nature must be determined from all the uses to which the product resulting therefrom can be applied.

The topic of compounds with spirits, including alcohol, first came into the tariff statutes in Act July 28, 1866, c. 298, 14 Stat. 328. There it appears as follows:

“Oil all compounds or preparations of which distilled spirits is a component part of chief value, there shall be levied a duty not less than that imposed upon distilled spirits.”

This is repeated in Act March 3, 1883, c. 121, § 6, Schedule H, 22 Stat. 505. It also appears substantially in the act of 1897. It has no application here, because the alcohol in this importation was both by weight and measure a minor quantity. This word “compound,” however, quite early came under consideration. In Treasury Decisions 3,672, of July 27, 1878, a small percentage of alcohol mixed with cherry juice for the purpose of preventing fermentation was held not to establish the cherry juice as being an alcoholic compound. In that case “fruit juice” was specifically classified, so that, notwithstanding the addition of the alcohol, it was ruled that it still held that classification. The same rule might apply here if there had been a special classification of compounds of belladonna or aconite.

On April 27, 1883, by Treasury Decision 5,682 a more important ruling was made. The importation was therein described as an infusion.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

R. J. Saunders Co. v. United States
29 Cust. Ct. 204 (U.S. Customs Court, 1952)
State v. Wertheimer Bag Co.
43 So. 2d 824 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1949)
Glidden Co. v. United States
78 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Ohio, 1946)
Thompson Hayward Chemical Co. v. United States
16 Cust. Ct. 19 (U.S. Customs Court, 1946)
De Fremery v. United States
6 Cust. Ct. 167 (U.S. Customs Court, 1941)
United States v. H. P. Lambert Co.
6 Cust. Ct. 856 (U.S. Customs Court, 1941)
Arnold v. United States
20 C.C.P.A. 417 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1933)
Birn v. Du Pont Cellophane Co.
17 C.C.P.A. 122 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1929)
Watson v. York Metal & Alloys Co.
14 Ct. Cust. 449 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1927)
Aetna Explosives Co. v. United States
9 Ct. Cust. 298 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1919)
Walter Baker & Co. v. Gray
192 F. 921 (Eighth Circuit, 1911)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
175 F. 33, 99 C.C.A. 49, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4925, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stone-downer-co-ca1-1909.