United States v. Stever

222 U.S. 167, 32 S. Ct. 51, 56 L. Ed. 145, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1768
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 4, 1911
Docket448
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 222 U.S. 167 (United States v. Stever) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stever, 222 U.S. 167, 32 S. Ct. 51, 56 L. Ed. 145, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1768 (1911).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Lurton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to review a judgment quashing an •indictment as not stating an offense triable in the Western District of' Kentucky. The indictment contained two counts. The first is dráwn to bring, the offense within § 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended, and the second is based upon § 5480, Revised Statutes, and is for a conspir *170 acy to commit the offense charged in the first count. The Government now concedes that the latter count states no offense within the Western District of Kentucky and withdraws the. assignments of error relating to the-judgment quashing it.

The count to be considered charges, in substance, that the defendants, on April 20,1908, in the State of Iowa, devised a certain scheme for the purpose of obtaining money, etc., “by and under false pretenses,” from various persons, among others, certain persons named, residing at Colesburg, within the jurisdiction of the court, to be effected by means of the United States mail through correspondence with them. The scheme, summarily stated, was to be effected by inducing persons, who should read their advertisements offering high grade cattle for sale, to open correspondence with them. That then the defendants were, through the mail, to make false and fraudulent representations as to the character of the cattle they offered for sale, and thereby induce such correspondents to come and inspect the cattle at Fairfield, Iowa, and that after a sale of cattle so inspected, were to substitute inferior cattle in the place of those inspected and sold. It is then averred that the defendants succeeded in opening up correspondence with certain persons at Colesburg, Kentucky, and that in furtherance of said scheme and for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretenses they, the defendants, on April 20, 1908, “unlawfully did knowingly and fraudulently deposit and cause to be deposited in the mail ... at Fairfield, Iowa, and did then and there knowingly cause to be sent by said mail of the United States a certain letter to be conveyed and delivered by said mail of the United' States at Colesburg, in the State of Kentucky, and in the western district thereof,” to be delivered to persons there addressed and residing, which letter was calculated to accomplish the scheme intended, and which said letter the defendants are charged *171 as “having caused to be delivered by mail to the person addressed,”

For convenience we set out in the margin §§ 3894 and 5480, Revised Statutes, as amended. 1

*172 The last clause of § 3894 provides that an offense against any of the ¡provisions of the section “may be proceeded against ., . . . either in the. district at which the unlawful publication was mailed, or to which it is carried by mail for delivery according to the direction thereon, or at which it is caused to be delivered by mail to the person to whom it is addressed.”

The-claim is that an indictment lies in the Western District of Kentucky, because that is the district in which the defendants caused the letter mentioned “to be delivered by mail”, to the person addressed.

The. Government has suggested that there is a distinction at common law «between a false pretense and an in *173 dictable cheat os fraud. It may be conceded that at the common law a false pretense is not a promise, but a fraudulent and false representation of an existing or past fact, designed to induce one to part with money or goods. Bishop on Criminal Law, 6th ed., §§ 415, 419,- and cases, English and American, there cited.

Whether the facts averred in this count constitute a scheme to obtain goods or money by a common-law false pretense may admit of grave doubt. But whether that be so or not, it would require very subtle distinction to conceive of a use of the mail to promote a scheme to obtain property or money by means of false pretenses which would not also be a “scheme or artifice to defraud” within the plain meaning of § 5480. For the purpose of the present discussion it is not important whether the pleader has characterized the scheme described as a false pretense or as “a scheme or artifice to defraud,” since in either case a use of the mail prohibited by § 5480 is shown. That section was construed by this court, in Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 313, as “including everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or presenter suggestions and promises as to the future.”

If, then, this indictment is also maintainable under § 3894, it must be because we are forced to conclude that Congress, when it revised the statutes, intended to make the use of the mails to effect a scheme to defraud indictable and punishable under either of two distinct provisions, and that the.district attorney might elect as to which he would proceed under. Such a supposition is not to be lightly adopted. To so conclude would result in the anomaly of an offense created and punished by two distinct enactments. Under the one the accused may be proceeded against in a district where he could not be prosecuted under the other. The procedure under one differs in some' important particulars from that admissible under the other, and. the accused is subject to a-measure of pun *174 ishment under one not possible under the other. Thus, under § 3894 an indictment will lie in the district in which tljLe defendant caused the letter to be delivered by the mail, to the person addressed, That is' not the case under § 5480. Under section - 3894, one may be imprisoned not longer than one year, while under the other he juay be imprisoned for eighteen months. Under § 3894, he -is subject to indictment for any nuiiiber of violations. Under the other the indictment may only charge offenses to the number of three committed within the same six calendar months.

No such purpose can be fairly said to have actuated Congress. The two sections are intended to prevent the use of the mail for certain purposes. The one applies to the usé. of the mail for the purpose of promoting lotteries or other like schemes of chance. The other is intended to prohibit the use of the mail to carry on schemes of general fraud,'the language being “any scheme or artifice to defraud.” A scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses is, as we have seen, “a scheme or artifice to defraud,” within the plain meaning and purpose of this section. The general words, “or concerning schemes devised for the purpose of obtaining money or property under false pretenses,” found in § 3894, do .not harmonize with the genéral purpose of that section, if construed as urged by the learned Attorney General. So construed, they would trench upon the ground covered by § 5480. The words referred to follow particular words descriptive of schemes of gain dependent upon- chance, and are followed by further particular words relating to the same kind of lottery schemes. -

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Bluebook (online)
222 U.S. 167, 32 S. Ct. 51, 56 L. Ed. 145, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stever-scotus-1911.