United States v. Stevenson

274 F. Supp. 2d 819, 2002 WL 32123916
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 19, 2002
Docket4:01-cv-01312
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 274 F. Supp. 2d 819 (United States v. Stevenson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stevenson, 274 F. Supp. 2d 819, 2002 WL 32123916 (S.D. Tex. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELLISON, District Judge.

Defendant John David Stevenson has been charged with unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana. Pending before this Court is Defendant’s motion to suppress. He contests the existence of probable cause arising from a canine alert that led to the search and seizure of marijuana in his possession. For the reasons stated below, the motion to suppress is DENIED.

*820 I. Factual Background

On November 12, 2001, Defendant was driving a van on Highway 59 when he came to a stop at the Border Patrol checkpoint located about sixteen miles west of Freer, Texas. Defendant was the only visible occupant in a van that had an open interior. While Defendant was answering inquiries about his citizenship, Carlo, a canine used for detection of both human and narcotics odors, alerted to the door on the driver’s side. Border Patrol Agent Fernando Terrazas, Carlo’s handler, searched the van and discovered a large bag containing marijuana in the back of the van. Defendant was arrested and charged with knowingly possessing in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana.

II. Discussion

Defendant first seeks to challenge the constitutionality of Border Patrol immigration checkpoints. He argues that the primary or secondary purpose of such checkpoints is the interdiction of narcotics, an impermissible purpose under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). This Court, however, lacks the authority as well as the inclination to overrule the precedent adverse to Defendant’s position established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), and its progeny in the Fifth Circuit. Brief, suspicion-less seizures at fixed checkpoints designed to intercept illegal aliens are constitutional in today’s jurisprudence. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 447; United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 431 (5th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Waldron, 178 F.Supp.2d 738, 743 (W.D.Tex.2002) (affirming the primary immigration purpose of Border Patrol checkpoints and concluding that only a contrary opinion from a higher court can redesignate them as drug interdiction checkpoints).

Next, in order to challenge the canine’s alert as the basis of probable cause for the search, Defendant questions the training of Carlo. Defendant claims that, while United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27 (5th Cir.1995), held that a showing of a dog’s reliability is not required if probable cause is developed on site as result of a dog sniff of a vehicle, it did not resolve the issue of a dog’s training. See United States v. Hare, 932 F.Supp. 852, 853 (E.D.Tex.1996) (stating that “Williams left unanswered question of whether proof of dog’s training must be shown”). Defendant’s arguments make a distinction between a showing of the dog’s reliability, which is unnecessary under Williams, and a showing of trainings In Williams, the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt the Sixth Circuit standard, set in United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (1994), requiring that the government prove the training and reliability of a canine before an alert can give rise to probable cause to search. Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that a showing of a canine’s reliability is not required if probable cause is developed on site as result of the dog sniff of a vehicle. 69 F.3d at 28. The Williams opinion did not distinguish between training and reliability factors, and generally omitted any separate discussion of the training of canines.

Defendant urges this Court to follow the reasoning of two district court opinions that, according to Defendant, extrapolate from Williams’s, silence a rule that the government has a distinct and separate evidentiary burden to prove that a canine is trained to detect the odor of the contraband seized. In Hare, the district court emphasized references to “trained” dogs in canine alert case law, and concluded that “it appears that some showing of training must be made.” 932 F.Supp. at 853. Defendant also relies on United States v. Outlaw, 134 F.Supp.2d 807, 812 (W.D.Tex.2001), where the court interpreted case *821 law dealing with canine alerts to contain an implicit requirement that the canine and handler team “have completed a minimum level of drug detection training and that the team possess a certain level of reliability.” Specifically, Defendant argues that the government must prove that Carlo was trained to distinguish between the odor of Defendant, the only visible occupant in the van, and the marijuana hidden in the van. Since Carlo alerted to odors emanating from the driver’s door, Defendant contends that Carlo might have been responding to Defendant’s human odor rather than marijuana odor. Defendant argues, therefore, that if Carlo was alerting to Defendant’s human odor rather than the marijuana’s odor, Carlo’s alert can not establish probable cause to search his van.

Defendant misstates Williams for the proposition that “Williams requires that the government prove how the canine is trained to distinguish between one and the other, if at all.” Def.’s Mot. for Order at 8. In fact, Williams rejected this proposition by ruling that the dog’s alert provides probable cause for a search. 69 F.3d at 28. This Court has also previously confronted this issue and held that “there is no requirement that the government prove that a canine alert related specifically to the contraband eventually discovered on the defendant.” United States v. Kelly, 128 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1026 n. 6.

While this Court does not read Williams to foreclose legal challenges to a canine alert, this Court declines Defendant’s invitation to fashion the additional requirement that the government prove the canine’s training by producing certification documents and detailed training and field work records. The defendant in Williams unsuccessfully had argued in district court that a showing of the training and reliability of a drug dog was required prior to reliance on the dog’s alert. 69 F.3d at 28. In affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to follow the training and reliability standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Diaz. Instead, Williams held that “a showing of the dog’s reliability is not required if probable cause is developed on site as a result of a dog sniff of a vehicle.” Id. Even though Williams

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Bluebook (online)
274 F. Supp. 2d 819, 2002 WL 32123916, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stevenson-txsd-2002.