United States v. Stevens

715 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130186, 2009 WL 6525927
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided January 21, 2009·No. Criminal 08-231(EGS)·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

EMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

On January 16, 2009, 593 F.Supp.2d 177 (D.D.C.2009), the Court directed the Attorney General or his designee(s) to provide declaration(s) and supporting documentation related to the Department of Justice’s determination as to whether a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent alleging very serious and intentional law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct during the investigation and trial in this case was entitled to whistleblower protection, and when any such determination was communicated to the Office of Public Integrity (“OPI”). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will VACATE its January 16, 2009 Order in its entirety and instead ORDER that all communications to, from, or between anyone in OPI, and any other office within DOJ, including but not limited to the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), the Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Alaska, between November 15, 2008 and *2 the present regarding the complaint filed by Special Agent Chad Joy (“the Joy Complaint”), be filed under seal with the Court, with a copy provided to the defendant pursuant to the protective order already in place in this case, by no later than January 30, 2009. 1 The Court will also continue the Status Hearing previously scheduled for January 29, 2009 to February 2, 2009 at 3:00 p.m.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2008, the government filed under seal a copy of a complaint made by an FBI agent assigned to the investigation and trial of the defendant, Senator Ted Stevens. In the complaint, the agent states that as the co-case agent on the Stevens investigation, he “witnessed or learned of serious violations of policy, rules, and procedures as well as possible criminal violations.” The complaint alleges, among other things, that prosecutors on the case schemed to relocate a government witness, who had been subpoenaed by both the government and the defendant, in order to avoid having that witness testify at the trial;, attempted to conceal exculpatory information from the defendant; and mishandled evidence. The complaint also alleges that the lead FBI agent in charge of the investigation fostered an inappropriate relationship with the government’s main witness; intentionally redacted exculpatory information from a document turned over to the defendant, in order to make that document “fit” with information previously provided to the defendant; and violated numerous rules and regulations, including disclosing to a source that another source had testified before the Grand Jury.

In a motion to seal and a motion to file ex parte, the government sought to avoid revealing to the defense much, if not most, of the information in the complaint and to completely hide the existence of the complaint and the complaint’s allegations from the public. In support of its position that the complaint should not be made public, the government stressed that Agent Joy had filed his complaint as a whistleblower complaint and never intended for it to be made public, that publicizing the complaint could interfere or impede OPR’s internal investigation into the allegations made in the complaint, and that Agent Joy and the individuals named in the complaint had privacy interests that outweighed any competing interest in public disclosure. The defendant was strongly opposed to keeping the complaint sealed, arguing that the Sixth Amendment protected his right to a public trial and that the First Amendment protected the public’s interest in these proceedings and, accordingly, that the complaint must be made public. After expedited briefing, the Court held a sealed hearing on December 19, 2008 to hear arguments on the government’s motions to seal the complaint and to keep much of the complaint from the defendant.

From the outset of this case, despite a very busy docket, this Court has gone to great lengths to accommodate both parties, sensitive to their interests in the prompt resolution of any disputes or requests for relief. On countless occasions both before, during, and after the trial in this case, the Court has rearranged its schedule to hear from the parties in court, often at the government’s request, and often on the same day that the matter was first brought to the Court’s attention. *3 Consistent with the Court’s approach throughout these proceedings, the government’s motions related to the Joy complaint were given very prompt and careful consideration. In fact, despite the serious legal issues presented, the Court ordered briefing, heard arguments, and issued a 29-page Opinion and Order within just eight days of the government first filing its motions. And as recently as January 14, 2009, the Court scheduled an afternoon hearing in response to a request from the government made that morning. Further, the defendant is currently awaiting sentencing, and there are at least eight post-trial motions pending that must be resolved before this litigation can move to the next stage. These motions cannot be heard and resolved until the parties and the Court have the relevant information, the motions are fully briefed, and the Court has had time to consider the significant and complex issues presented.

A. The December 19, 2008 Hearing

At the sealed hearing, Brenda Morris, Deputy Chief of the Office of Public Integrity, spoke for the government. Ms. Morris first argued that the government had provided the complaint, in heavily redacted form, to the defendant “out of an abundance of caution,” rather than due to any legal obligation to do so. See Tr. at 9. In response to that argument, the Court questioned' Ms. Morris as to whether the complaint, which makes serious allegations of law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct in the investigation and trial of the defendant, was not in fact exculpatory information the government was obligated to produce to the defendant. Ms. Morris denied that the information was even relevant to the defense, based on a theory that any misconduct had previously been addressed by the Court before or during the trial. She also repeatedly refused to answer the Court’s questions regarding the government’s position as to any legal obligation to produce the complaint as Brady evidence, based on the grounds that she was, in her own words, both “a witness in this matter,” i.e., the investigation into the complaint, and “biased”:

THE COURT: If you were a defense attorney you’d want this information, wouldn’t you?
MS. MORRIS: Judge, you know, this is very difficult for me to say because I am a witness in this matter and I’m very sensitive—
THE COURT: You’re bringing up other issues now that we haven’t gotten to and I really don’t want to go down that road, you know, about who represents the government. I just want to deal with the hypothetical. If you were a defense attorney you’d be raising a storm about that information and you know it, don’t you? You can look me in my eye and tell me.
MS. MORRIS: It’s not about looking in your eye and telling you or not, Judge.
THE COURT: But, you know, it doesn’t—
MS. MORRIS: I’m biased in the situation, Judge.

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United States v. Stevens, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130186, 2009 WL 6525927 (D.D.C. 2009).

715 F. Supp. 2d 1 (United States v. Stevens) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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