United States v. Stephan Korol-Locke

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 1, 2019
• Docket: 18-30148
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 01 2019 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-30148

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:17-cr-00062-BMM-1 v.

STEPHAN DUANE KOROL-LOCKE, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 24, 2019** Portland, Oregon

Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Waiver must be knowing and voluntary. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922

(9th Cir. 2004)). The record would support a finding that Korol-Locke’s waiver

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). was both, but in spite of that, we review his argument that a probation condition

prevents privileged conversations with counsel. Even if Korol-Locke did not waive

the right to appeal the denial of his motion to modify or clarify his probation

condition, the ordered monitoring technique does not involve a greater deprivation

of liberty than was reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C §

3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b); see also United States v. Wong, 687

Fed.App’x 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cuneo, 472 Fed.App’x 648,

649 (9th Cir. 2012). Nothing in the ordered monitoring technique violates a

constitutional right or runs afoul of the Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 U.S.C. §§

2510 et seq.

AFFIRMED.