United States v. Stapleton

730 F. Supp. 1375, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1542, 1990 WL 12302
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedFebruary 1, 1990
DocketCrim. 89-00111-B
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 730 F. Supp. 1375 (United States v. Stapleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Stapleton, 730 F. Supp. 1375, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1542, 1990 WL 12302 (W.D. Va. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.

This case is before the court on the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal after the discharge of the jury.

FACTS

On December 22, 1989, the defendant Harold Wayne Stapleton was found guilty by a jury of conspiring with Glenna Sue Stapleton to destroy a Jeep belonging to Glenna Sue’s husband, Greg Stapleton, and of possessing an unregistered explosive device. Glenna Sue Stapleton also was indicted, tried and convicted together with Harold Wayne Stapleton.

When Greg Stapleton attempted to start the engine of his Jeep on March 16, 1989, he was startled by a loud explosion. He inspected the Jeep and noticed wires connecting the rear wheel area to the gas tank. Police officers subsequently discovered a push button switch under the rear tire of the vehicle that was connected to a nine volt battery and electric blasting caps placed on the gas tank. The apparent purpose of this device was to cause an ignition of the blasting caps when the Jeep rolled over the switch and thereby cause the gasoline in the tank to explode.

Approximately one month after the bombing incident, Glenna Sue wrote what appears to be a draft of a letter (“Letter”) that she intended to write to a Jackie Mad-dle. 1 The Letter was never mailed but was subsequently found in a drawer of a dresser in Glenna Sue’s bedroom by a third party and was given to the police.

ANALYSIS

Admissibility of Co-conspirator’s Statement

The defendant, by a timely objection, asserts that the Letter was hearsay and therefore inadmissible at trial. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The Letter contains statements of Glenna Sue Stapleton that Glenna Sue and the defendant conspired to destroy the Jeep. The government introduced the Letter into evidence in order to prove the truth of those statements. Thus, it appears that the Letter is hearsay in regard to the defendant and, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 802, should not have been admitted to the defendant’s trial.

The government asserts that the Letter is not hearsay because it is a co-conspirator’s statement. A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is “a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed.R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

The defendant attacks the government’s assertion on two grounds. The first ground is that there is purportedly no evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy other than the Letter itself. The second ground is that the Letter was not made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Both grounds involve the determination of questions of fact preliminary to the admissibility of the Letter and such questions are to be answered by the court. Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). The court is to use the preponderance of proof standard in determining those questions of fact and may consider hearsay evidence and even the evidence being ruled upon in making its determinations. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 178-80, 107 S.Ct. *1377 2775, 2778, 2780-1, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). The second ground will be addressed by the court first since it is dispositive of the issue.

The defendant asserts that the writing of the Letter was not in the course of the conspiracy. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states that “[t]he rule is consistent with the position of the Supreme Court in denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives of the conspiracy have either failed or been achieved. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490, 83 S.Ct. 407, 418, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).”

The Letter was purportedly written a month after the chief objective of the alleged conspiracy, the destruction of the Jeep, had taken place. The government claims that the Letter was written in the course of the conspiracy because the conspiracy had a continuing subsidiary objective of diverting inquiring law enforcement officials.

The Supreme Court in Krulewitch rejected the argument that because conspirators always collaborate with each other to conceal facts in order to prevent detection after either the failure or the success of the primary objective of the conspiracy, the conspiracy is considered to have continued during the period of alleged concealment, for purposes of the co-conspirator hearsay rule, and that a statement made in the furtherance of concealment, which is otherwise hearsay, is admissible. 336 U.S. at 443-4, 69 S.Ct. at 718. Thus, the court concludes that the Letter was not written in the course of the alleged conspiracy.

In any ease, the court finds that the Letter was not written in furtherance of the conspiracy. Glenna Sue, in the Letter, offered the dubious altruistic reason for writing the Letter that she sought to warn its intended recipient of the potentially dangerous consequences of continuing to associate with the defendant. 2 The more plausible reason for the letter was that Glenna Sue, jilted by the defendant, sought to disrupt the relationship between the defendant and his new romantic interest, Jackie Maddle, even at the risk of being exposed as responsible for the bombing of her husband’s Jeep. 3

Neither reason why the Letter was written indicates that the Letter was written in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Furthermore, the government has not attempted to explain how the writing of the Letter could possibly have been intended to have been, or had the effect of being, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Simply because the Letter mentions a plan of concealment devised by the defendant and Glenna Sue, and a role for Jackie Mad-dle to play in that plan, it does not follow that the Letter was written in furtherance of that plan. Even if such a plan involving Miss Maddle existed, and the court concludes that it did not, Miss Maddle had already unwittingly played her part and there was no need for her to be informed of it. Because the court determines, under the preponderance of proof standard, that the Letter was written neither during the course nor in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, it concludes that the Letter was inadmissible at the trial of the defendant.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
730 F. Supp. 1375, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1542, 1990 WL 12302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-stapleton-vawd-1990.