United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California

495 F.2d 911, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9113
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 18, 1974
DocketNos. 72-1040, 72-1120 and 72-1121
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 495 F.2d 911 (United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 495 F.2d 911, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9113 (9th Cir. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Standard Oil Company of California (Standard) and the United States each filed petitions in the district court seeking exoneration from, or limitation of, liability for the results of a disastrous gasoline fire in San Francisco Bay. Jurisdiction in personam for these petitions was based on 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1970) providing for the limitation of a vessel owner’s liability, and the Admiralty Act, id. §§ 741-752 and Public Vessels Act, id. §§ 781-790 which afford the same remedies against the United States as against private carriers. Following a court trial on the Government’s petition, the district court, sitting in admiralty, issued a final decree determining both parties to be equally and mutually at fault in causing the fire. The United States appeals from this judgment, while Standard cross-appeals from a later decree denying it contribution from the United States for certain claims filed only against Standard. We affirm the district court’s determination of mutual liability, but reverse its decision denying Standard any right of contribution.

Facts

On the evening of September 26, 1966, Standard’s Barge No. 18 was loaded at the company’s refinery in Richmond, California with some 989,730 gallons of various grades of gasoline. Standard’s Tug No. 4 was then brought into position and secured to the stern saddle of the barge for departure from Richmond to Pier 64 in the Central Basin area of San Francisco Bay where the gasoline was to be off-loaded at the Standard storage area. Between 10:45 and 11:00 p. m. as the vessels arrived at Central Basin, Tug No. 4 had mechanical difficulty in reversing its engines which prevented it from navigating and stopping in the usual manner. This forced the master of the tug, Captain Autiere, to ground the barge on an abandoned launching ramp in the southwest corner of the basin. An angle iron and drift pins attached to pilings at the ramp [914]*914punctured the No. 1 port tank of the barge, and gasoline began to leak into the waters of the bay. The tug failed in its attempts to extricate the barge.

Sometime beween 11:00 and 11:30 p. m. that evening, the radio operator on duty at the United States Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port office heard a message over the “tug circuit” about a gasoline spill in the bay. The “tug circuit” is a private radio communications circuit utilized by various tug and barge operators i*n San Francisco Bay. The Captain of the Port has equipment to monitor this circuit, as well as to communicate over it in case of emergency to control vessels. This circuit is in addition to the Coast Guard’s own radio circuit which the Captain of the Port uses to communicate with other Coast Guard stations in the bay area. The radio operator reported the information concerning the spill to the Coast Guard duty officer, who took no action at that time.

About ten minutes later, the Captain of the Port’s office received a telephone call reporting a gasoline leak from Standard’s Tug No. 4 in the Central Basin. After the San Francisco Fire Department was notified, Chief Petty Officer Day, the duty officer representing the Captain of the Port, ordered Coast Guard patrol boat CG 40427, which was docked at a nearby pier, to go into the area to investigate. CG 40427, a 40-foot steel-hulled utility vessel equipped with two water cooled diesel engines, was under the operational command of the Captain of the Port. Arriving in the Central Basin about 12:05 a. m., Coxswain Bush, who was in command of the vessel, noticed that the Fire Department was already at the scene on Pier 64 with a fire truck and firemen spraying the surface in order to break up the gasoline. The concentration of gasoline was extremely heavy by then, with pronounced fumes and vapor rising like a fog some three feet from the surface. This situation was reported by radio to Officer Day, who then ordered CG 40427 to proceed to the nearby Bethlehem Shipyards and stop the continuing of any burning operations. When this was accomplished, Day ordered the patrol boat to investigate the cause and magnitude of the spill. CG 40427 proceeded over the gasoline-covered surface alongside the tug and barge. Coxswain Bush went aboard the barge, determined the amount of gasoline lost from the No. 1 port tank — eventually some 25,000 gallons — and that all other tanks appeared intact. After reporting these facts to Day, he requested and was given permission to withdraw from the area.

Shortly, the Captain of the Port’s office began to have difficulty maintaining radio contact with CG 40427, although the tug circuit remained clear. At 12:34 a. m. Officer Day departed by automobile from his office to the Central Basin to make a personal inspection. He arrived about twenty minutes later and ordered CG 40427 to take him to the stricken barge. The patrol boat again traversed the gasoline-covered waters to the two stranded vessels. Day boarded the barge and discussed with the tanker-man the feasibility of transferring gasoline from the ruptured tank to the undamaged tanks. When informed that this could be done in about ten minutes, Officer Day boarded the tug and told Captain Autiere not to attempt to move the barge because of the danger of tearing open the other tanks. Returning to CG 40427, Officer Day ordered it to return to Pier 64.

As Officer Day was leaving the pier by automobile, he noticed that the recently-arrived Standard Tug No. 2 had passed a tow line to the immobilized tug to pull the barge off the ramp. Using his car radio, he ordered CG 40427 to stop Tug No. 2 and to proceed back to Tug No. 4 to obtain the tug captain’s name and license number for an oil pollution form. The patrol boat went alongside Tug No. 2 and ordered it not to pull the barge. The tug complied and moved about 75 to 100 yards out of the area. CG 40427 then returned to Tug No. 4 and tied up port side to its starboard quarter with engines left idling. The coxswain boarded the tug to obtain Au-[915]*915tiere’s license number, but when the captain said he did not have his license there, Bush returned to CG 40427 to radio Day and ask if this information might be telephoned in the morning. Unable to reach Officer Day, Coxswain Bush was just about to step back from his vessel onto the tug when he heard the port engine of CG 40427 accelerate followed by a loud popping noise behind him which sounded like a firecracker. He turned, saw what appeared to be a flame near the port side of his boat where the engine was located, and saw smoke ■ coming from the engine’s compartment, then almost instantaneously a burst of flames. In the words of one of the onlooking crewmen aboard Tug No. 2, “then the whole works blew up.”

All three crew members of the Standard tug and barge, and two of the three Coast Guard sailors were killed as a result of the fire. Only Coxswain Bush, miraculously, escaped with slight injuries. In addition, there was extensive fire damage to the three vessels and assorted property damage to docks, rafts, floats, piers and other shore property.

Claims were filed against both Standard and the United States in their respective limitation proceedings by the estates of the deceased Standard employees. Claims against only Standard were filed by representatives of the two deceased members of the Coast Guard, Coxswain Bush, and others who sustained property damage.

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Bluebook (online)
495 F.2d 911, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-standard-oil-co-of-california-ca9-1974.