United States v. Spruce

99 F.2d 877, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3014
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedNovember 12, 1938
DocketNo. 1716
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 99 F.2d 877 (United States v. Spruce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Spruce, 99 F.2d 877, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3014 (10th Cir. 1938).

Opinion

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Alfonso Spruce, original plaintiff herein, commenced the above entitled action in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, Second Division, on July 3, 1931, serving a copy of his petition therein on the United States District Attorney for said district and mailing a true and correct copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United Stales.

[878]*878On September 22, 1931, defendant filed its answer.

Thereafter, jury having been waived, said cause having been heard, it was submitted to the court on February 25, 1937, when it was taken under advisement.

Thereafter on April 20, 1937, said Alfonso Spruce died intestate. On November 26, 1937, neither the court nor any-agent or representative of the United-States Government nor the attorney of the said deceased had any information of his death, on the date the court entered judgment in his favor, the court finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Thereafter on February 24, 1938, defendant did all necessary acts to perfect an appeal from said judgment, citation thereon having been duly presented-to and acceptance signed by counsel for said Alfonso Spruce.

Thereafter, on March 16, 1938, Pearl Spruce was duly appointed administratrix of the estate of Alfonso Spruce, deceased, and granted letters testamentary thereon. On March 17, 1938, said Pearl Spruce, as such administratrix, filed a motion to revive said action in her name as personal representative as such administratrix, and asked to be substituted as party plaintiff therein. On March 29, 1938, all parties being in court represented by attorney, said court over objection and exception of counsel for the United States of America, after hearing the foregoing facts as to de^fendant’s death at time of the entry of said judgment, entered an order finding that said judgment entered on November 26, 1937, was void on account of said plaintiff having died on April 20, 1937, prior to the date of the rendering of said judgment, and entered an order of revival, substituting-said Pearl Spruce as such administratrix as party plaintiff and further over objection of counsel for said defendant, va-, cated said judgment of November 26, 1937, on the ground that it was void, and re-entered said judgment in favor of Pearl Spruce as such administratrix and against the United States, nunc pro tunc, as of February 25, 1937, the date that said cause was heard and taken under advisement, and on April 30, 1938, in due time after the entering of said judgment, defendant' filed its petition for appeal and assignments of error, said court allowing such appeal and issuing citation thereon which-was duly served upon counsel for said plaintiff, Pearl Spruce, administratrix, and thereafter on the same date, to'-wit, April 30, 1938, said district court signed, settled and approved bill of exceptions, and duly settled the record.

Said intestate, Alfonso Spruce, in said action declared upon a $5,000 contract of War Risk Term Insurance, issued to him. by the government on July 15, 1918, alleging that he became permanently and totally disabled during the period of. insurance-protection, as a result of pulmonary tuberculosis, and general disability. The United States Government denied the material allegations of said petition.

A jury being waived, the case was tried' to the court and at close of all the evidence, said defendant moved for judgment in its favor under the record and all the evidence on the ground that there was no-substantial evidence to prove permanent and total disability as alleged.

The court overruled government’s motion for judgment, allowing an exception, and judgment in favor of said plaintiff was entered upon a finding that he became permanently and totally disabled as of March 25, 1919.

From the former judgment entered November 26, 1937, an appeal was duly allowed upon the filing of petition therefor and assignment of errors, and the time for-settling bill of exceptions was extended to June 1, 1938, which was in due course settled. A citation on appeal was issued and’ service accepted thereon by insured’s attorneys on February 25, 1938.

It is recited in the re-entered judgment-that the court found that the former judgment had been entered under a mutual mistake of fact as neither court nor counsel were aware of insured’s death; that the said judgment as formerly entered was void, and that Pearl Spruce was the duly qualified administratrix of the estate of the insured, and vacated the former judgment, and then and there overruled the Government’s motion for judgment as .made at close of all the evidence, the government reserving an exception to this ruling, having substituted Pearl Spruce, administratrix, as plaintiff, and revived the action in;her name as such and as in the vacated judgment awarded permanent total disability benefits in her favor, exceptions separately being made and allowed to the actions, findings, rulings, decisions and reentry of the judgment on the part of the-court.

■ An appeal was duly allowed on the reentered judgment and perfected, it being; [879]*879stated that the defendant took this action to protect its right to prosecute an appeal on the merits of the case, apprehending the possibility that the second judgment might be held invalid, as entered after an appeal had been taken from the former entered judgment. The government has filed in this court a suggestion of the death of the original plaintiff and a motion that this court order the substitution of Pearl Spruce, administratrix, as appellee in the former appeal, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to the district court with instructions to order the substitution.

Prior to his induction into the military service of the United States, Alfonso Spruce, the insured, was a waiter at Trion, Georgia, apparently in good health, although he had had gonorrhea and a sunstroke and had shown some indication of lung trouble. When he reported for mobilization at Camp Gordon in the state of Georgia on June 27, 1918, he was five feet, five inches tall, weighing 136 pounds. His heart, lungs, and other organs were found to be normal, and physically qualified for general military service. Said insurance contract was issued July 15, 1918, the assured being admitted to the hospital at Camp Gordon on December 7, 1919, with a diagnosis of mumps (bilateral). Orchitis and acute bronchitis developed on December 10, 1918, and broncho-pneumonia on December 12, 1918. He remained in the hospital until December 26, 1918, when he was discharged and returned to duty, his condition being considered good, at which time he weighed 150 pounds.

At expiration of his furlough and return, he was readmitted to the hospital on February 21, 1919, for two days’ treatment on account of a cold. On February 24, 1919, he again was re-admitted and treated for two weeks for sub-acute bronchitis, and transferred to the infirmary as convalescent on March 10, 1919, returning to duty on March 18, 1919.

Immediately prior to his discharge from the army on March 25, 1919, insured declared in writing that he had no reason to believe that he was suffering from the effects of any wound, injury, or disease, or that he had any .disability. Also upon examination by a physician and surgeon immediately prior to his discharge he was found to be physically and mentally sound. After such discharge he went to his sister’s home in Rome, Georgia.

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Bluebook (online)
99 F.2d 877, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3014, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-spruce-ca10-1938.