United States v. Specialty House, Inc.

42 C.C.P.A. 136
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 21, 1955
DocketNo. 4817
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 42 C.C.P.A. 136 (United States v. Specialty House, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Specialty House, Inc., 42 C.C.P.A. 136 (ccpa 1955).

Opinion

Cole, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by the Government from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, C. D. 1596, which sustained the -importers’ claim that merchandise invoiced as silk habutae squares, of various solid colors, prints, and ombre shades, used as color and style accessories to complement the feminine costume, was classifiable under paragraph 1210 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified, infra, as silk wearing apparel, not specially provided for, dutiable at 35 per centum ad valorem.

The United States, as appellant, contends that the imported articles were correctly classified by the Collector of Customs at the port of entry under paragraph 1209 of said Act of 1930 as hemmed silk handkerchiefs, valued at not more than $5 per dozen,1 dutiable at 60 per centum ad valorem.

The tariff provisions in question are as follows:

Par. 1209. Handkerchiefs and woven mufflers, wholly or in chief value of silk, finished or unfinished, not hemmed, 55 per centum ad valorem; hemmed or hemstitched, 60 per centum ad valorem.
Par. 1210, as modified by T. D. 51802, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dee. 305.
[138]*138Clothing and articles of wearing apparel of every description, manufactured wholly or in part, wholly or in chief value of silk, and not specially provided for— 35 % ad val.

The question presented, as stated by the Government in its brief, is whether the involved articles are handkerchiefs, wholly of silk within the purview of paragraph 1209, supra, as classified, or are wearing apparel manufactured wholly of silk, not specially provided for, under paragraph 1210, supra, as claimed by the importers.

At the trial, it was agreed between counsel for the respective parties that the imported articles were hemmed, valued at not more than $5 per dozen, and were wholly or in chief value of silk. It was further agreed that importers’ Collective Exhibit 1, consisting of Exhibits 1 a, 1 b, and 1 c, was representative of the merchandise in controversy, Exhibit la being a solid colored, 17 inch square, 5 momme weight, habutae silk article (except that the involved articles do not have any drawn work in the corner), Exhibit lb being a 17 inch, 4 momme, ombre silk article, and Exhibit lc being a 17% inch, 4 momme, printed silk square. Importers also introduced numerous photographic exhibits in evidence illustrating the various uses of the imported articles as costume accessories worn by women and girls in the hair, about the neck and on the wrist, at the waistline, around the ankle and on slippers, and in other similar ways. Other exhibits on behalf of the importers showed use of the merchandise in the manufacture of various articles of women’s wear such as, for example, one of the imported articles pleated and fastened to pearl beads to form a choker, and another pleated square cut in half, each half being attached to the end of a chain designed to be worn around the ankle.

At the outset of the trial, the court’s attention was drawn to the case of Geo. S. Bush & Co., Inc. v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 395, Abstract 56928, wherein merchandise similar to that involved herein was claimed dutiable as silk wearing apparel under paragraph 1210, supra, but held properly classified by the collector as hemmed silk handkerchiefs under paragraph 1209, supra. In that case, the court quoted the definition of a “handkerchief” set. forth in Webster’s New International Dictionary, 1949, as follows:

Handkerchief. 1. A small piece of cloth usually square and often embroidered or laced, carried for wiping the face, nose, or eyes. 2. A piece of cloth shaped like a handkerchief worn about the neck; a neckerchief; a neckcloth.

In finding that the merchandise involved in the Bush case, supra, came within the common understanding of the term “handkerchief,” the court there stated:

In the instant case it must be presumed that the collector found every fact to exist that was necessary to sustain his classification. Therefore, the presumption is that the merchandise in question consists of small pieces of cloth, approximately 18 inches square, carried for wiping the face, nose or eyes, or that it consists [139]*139of a piece of cloth shaped like a handkerchief worn about the neck. Plaintiff had. the burden of overcoming this presumption by competent evidence. This it has failed to do. [Italics added.]

With respect to the court’s ruling in the cited, case, importers’ counsel stated at the trial that it would be established by competent evidence that (1) the instant silk articles differed in use, characteristics, and name from handkerchiefs, as that term is above defined, and (2) that the definite, uniform, and general understanding of the term “handkerchiefs” in the wholesale trade and commerce of the United States on or prior to 1930 was limited to those articles used to wipe the face, nose, or eyes, and did not include, under either definition quoted in the Bush case, sufra, the silk articles in question, and (3) that the imported articles are bought, sold, known and used as scarfs or squares, and not as handkerchiefs.

Eleven witnesses testified in support of the importers’ position. The Government relied largely on the court’s holding in the Bush case, supra, and sought to prove by the testimony of five witnesses appearing in its behalf that merchandise of similar habutae weave, and of the same size and weight as that represented by importers’ Collective Exhibit 1 was in existence on or immediately prior to the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930; that such merchandise was bought, sold, known, and used as handkerchiefs throughout the trade and commerce of the United States; and that there was no commercially differing meaning for the term “handkerchief” from that of its common signification as set forth in the Bush case, sufra.

The trial court set forth its analysis of the testimony and exhibits at great length in its opinion, concluding as follows:

The weight of the evidence establishes that on and immediately prior to June 17, 1930, there was, as to the No. 2 definition quoted in the Bush case, supra, a difference between the common and commercial meaning of the term “handkerchief;” that such commercial meaning of the term “handkerchief” was definite, uniform and general throughout the trade and commerce of the United States; that such commercial meaning covered and included a small piece of cloth usually square, carried by a person for wiping the face, nose, and eyes, but did not cover and include a piece of cloth shaped like a handkerchief worn about the neck, a neckerchief, or'neckcloth, whether such cloth was composed of cotton, linen, silk, or other material.
The weight of the evidence also establishes that the involved merchandise is used by women and girls in their hair, combined with pearls and other jewelry and worn around the neck, as color accents on different articles of wearing apparel, as a fichu around the collar of a suit and in lieu of a blouse, as a color accent at the waistline or the ankle or .on a pair of slippers, and that such uses are the chief uses of .the. involved merchandise.

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Bluebook (online)
42 C.C.P.A. 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-specialty-house-inc-ccpa-1955.