United States v. Sorensen

179 F.3d 823, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4406, 99 Daily Journal DAR 5639, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11747, 1999 WL 366586
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 8, 1999
DocketNo. 97-50555
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 179 F.3d 823 (United States v. Sorensen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Sorensen, 179 F.3d 823, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4406, 99 Daily Journal DAR 5639, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11747, 1999 WL 366586 (9th Cir. 1999).

Opinions

Opinion by Judge O’SCANNLAIN; Dissent by Judge LOVELL.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a mortgage broker can be convicted of making false statements with regard to a loan application which was never signed.

I

In 1994, the FBI began a series of sting operations investigating mortgage brokers and other individuals suspected of loan fraud. As part of this effort, a confidential informant for the FBI, Vincent Schuman, contacted Ronald P. Sorensen, a mortgage broker. Posing as a borrower, Schuman told Sorensen that he was looking for a mortgage broker to help him obtain a loan from the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) to finance a purchase of residential property. The two men set up an in-person meeting to be held at Schuman’s apartment.

After this conversation, the FBI caused documents purporting to be a sales contract for a house in Santa Barbara (the one Schuman told Sorensen he intended to purchase) to be delivered to Sorensen. The contract indicated that the selling price was $350,000 and that Schuman had placed a down payment of $150,000. Thus, it appeared that Schuman needed a loan of $200,000 to cover the remainder of the purchase price.

Schuman and Sorensen met in person on January 24, 1995, and the FBI covertly videotaped the meeting. At the outset, Sorensen asked Schuman what the source of his down payment was. Schuman told him that he had obtained a loan from his uncle. Schuman noted that the funds for the down payment were in a bank account under his name, but that the money belonged to his uncle. Sorensen told Schu-man that he would just write on the loan application that the money for the down payment was from his bank account.

The conversation then turned to the subject of Schuman’s employment. Schuman explained that he had not been employed, or filed tax returns, for ten years. Soren-sen said that such facts were not problematic and that he would just put down that Schuman was self-employed, commenting that no one would take the time to verify this information.

Sorensen continued filling out the loan application, later inquiring about Schu-man’s ownership of automobiles. Schu-man told Sorensen that he did not own any cars, but that he drove his uncle’s Rolls Royce and Ferrari. Sorensen explained that to be approved for the loan Schuman would have to list ownership of a car, noting that this information would not be [825]*825checked by anyone. Sorensen then asked again for a car listing. This time, Schu-man stated he had a BMW. The loan application listed Schuman as owning a $50,000 BMW.

When Sorensen asked what other property Schuman owned, Schuman informed him that he owned no property. Sorensen explained that they would have to list something because most people with this much money have items such as antiques or paintings. Again, Sorensen noted that the accuracy of this information would not be checked. Sorensen and Schuman agreed to list Schuman as owning $30,000 in jewelry on the application.

Sorensen then called Irene Kennedy of the RTC and asked what documentation she would need for a loan. Kennedy told Sorensen that all the RTC needed was a form 1003, a standard loan application. Sorensen agreed to fax the form 1003 to her.

After the call, Sorensen told Schuman that “we have to show income, and we have to put down that you do something.” Sorensen then put down that Schuman was self-employed, writing that Schuman was self-employed by V.M.S. Enterprise (a fictitious company name upon which the two men agreed). Sorensen instructed Schu-man to have the V.M.S. Enterprise listed in directory information. Sorensen and Schuman then worked on deriving a false income figure to list on the form 1003.1 Sorensen then said he would type up the information and fax it to Kennedy.

On January 26, 1995, Sorensen caused a seventeen-page loan application to be faxed to Kennedy. This document included the following false statements: that Schuman had been self-employed by V.M.S. Enterprise for ten years, that his income from employment was $12,000 per month, that he owned a $50,000 BMW, and that he owned $30,000 in jewelry. Neither Sorensen nor Schuman, however, had signed the loan application.

On February 27, 1997, the government filed a single-count indictment charging Sorensen with submitting a false statement to the RTC with intent to influence action on a loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. A First Superseding Indictment was filed on May 15, 1997, alleging the same offense. This Indictment charged the following:

SORENSEN knowingly made, and caused to be made a false statement and report to the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) for the purpose of influencing action on a loan. That is, in order to obtain a $200,000 mortgage loan from the RTC on behalf of the Borrower, defendant SORENSEN submitted and caused to be submitted to the RTC a residential loan application [containing false statements],

Sorensen pled not guilty. After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Sorensen was sentenced to one day of imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. Sorensen now appeals, arguing that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction.

II

It is undisputed that Sorensen submitted a purported loan application containing false statements to the RTC. It is similarly undisputed that the form was unsigned. The pivotal question in this case is whether a violation of section 1014 can be established where the false statements made by Sorensen to the RTC are contained only on a loan application that was unsigned.2

[826]*826In answering this question, we begin, as we must, with the text of the statute. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 117 S.Ct. 921, 926, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997). Section 1014 provides, in relevant part, that: “Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report ... for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of ... the Resolution Trust Corporation ... upon any application ... or loan ... shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Sorensen contends that, because the document he submitted was unsigned, it cannot constitute an “application” for purposes of section 1014. Therefore, he argues, he cannot be convicted of attempting to influence the RTC “upon any application” for the simple reason that there was no “application” upon which the RTC could have been influenced.

In United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.1981) the defendant made false statements orally to a federally insured bank, but never submitted a formal loan application. See 657 F.2d 248, 250-51 (10th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit held that such oral statements could form the basis of a violation of section 1014 because the bank in question had a policy of granting loans on the basis of an oral application and without a written, signed application. See id.

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179 F.3d 823, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4406, 99 Daily Journal DAR 5639, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11747, 1999 WL 366586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-sorensen-ca9-1999.