United States v. Slaughter

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 27, 2024
• Docket: Criminal No. 2022-0354
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. Case No. 1:22-cr-354-RCL

RICHARD SLAUGHTER and CADEN PAUL GOTTFRIED,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is the defendants’ Motion to Continue the bench trial currently scheduled

to begin on January 6, 2025. For the reasons contained herein, that Motion is DENIED.

The defendants, Richard Slaughter and Caden Paul Gottfried, were first indicted on

November 2, 2022, on several counts related to their alleged participation in the Capitol Riots of

January 6, 2021. See Indictment, ECF No. 19. A superseding indictment was filed on September

27, 2023. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 60. Trial was originally scheduled for December

1, 2023. See Minute Entry of October 18, 2023. That trial date was continued after the defendants’

attorneys withdrew from their representation. See Order of November 20, 2023, ECF No. 94. A

second trial date was set for November 12, 2024. See Scheduling Order of April 9, 2024, ECF No.

107. The defendants again moved for a continuance, arguing that, due to the nature of the

allegations against them, they would be unable to receive a fair trial in the District of Columbia so

close to the date of the 2024 presidential election. See Second Mot. to Continue Trial, ECF No.

110. The Court took no position on the merits of the defendants’ argument, but agreed to move

the trial date up to September 16, 2024. See Minute Entry of August 13, 2024. That trial date,

1 too, was vacated due to unavoidable conflicts on the Court’s part, and continued to its currently

scheduled date of January 6, 2025. See Minute Entry of Sept. 9, 2024.

The defendants now move to vacate this trial date as well, and to instead hold a status

conference during the week of February 2, 2025. See Third Mot. to Continue Trial 2, ECF No.

117. The defendants first argue that, when Special Counsel Jack Smith moved on November 8,

2024 to vacate the briefing schedule in the matter of United States v. Trump, 23-cr-0257-TSC, the

Department of Justice had in effect taken “the official position that the results of the November 5

election . . . constitute[] grounds for pausing an ongoing criminal prosecution of a defendant in

connection with the events of January 6, 2021.” Third. Mot. to Continue Trial at 2. This argument

stumbles right out of the gate: in the case at hand, the Government opposed the defendants’ Motion

the very next day, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 118, unambiguously signaling that the Department

has not, in fact, adopted an official agency policy of halting any and all matters related to the

Capitol Riots. More to the point, the allegations in the Special Counsel’s prosecution bear no

resemblance to the case against Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Gottfried; the fact that the former has been

discontinued has no obvious significance for the latter. The Department of Justice would not be

dealing unfairly or inconsistently with the defendants by proceeding with the trial as scheduled.

The defendants’ more substantial argument rests on the fact that the President-Elect has on

several occasions discussed the possibility of pardoning defendants convicted in relation to the

Capitol Riots. See Third Mot. to Continue Trial at 2. In light of this possibility, the defendants

contend, continuing the trial would avoid the potentially unnecessary expenditure of the

defendants’, the Government’s, and the Court’s resources. This argument, too, is unavailing.

This Court recently had the occasion to discuss what effect the speculative possibility of a

presidential pardon has on the timetable for a pending criminal matter. In short: little to none. See

2 Order Denying Mot. to Continue, United States v. Grillo, No. 21-cr-690-RCL (D.D.C. Nov. 25,

2024), ECF No. 145. The power to pardon rests in the hands of the President, but the just resolution

of criminal prosecutions is the purview of the judiciary. Our constitutional scheme contemplates

each actor performing its respective role in the manner it best sees fit, within the boundaries

imposed by the Constitution and Congress. The defendants ask this Court to do something

extraordinary: to defray the execution of its own constitutional duties “because of the lurking

possibility of a presidential pardon after the conclusion of judicial proceedings,” id. at 2, a decision

by a co-equal branch of government in which this Court properly has no role. The Court declines

that invitation, and will not continue this trial absent an independently compelling demonstration

of good cause to do so.

The defendants have not made such a showing. First, they argue that holding a trial which

may be nullified by an eventual pardon could result in needless personal expenditures on the part

of the defendants in the form of travel, housing, and legal fees. See Third Mot. to Continue Trial

at 3. But these costs are incurred in the course of any trial involving out-of-state defendants and

attorneys, and the defendants provide no reason to believe that this trial will be unusually

burdensome or expensive. Nor have they convincingly demonstrated that the financial burden on

the defendants is likely to be lessened by dragging this case out even longer than it already has.

Second, the defendants argue that the Government will likewise incur potentially wasteful

costs preparing for and participating in the trial. See Third Mot. to Continue Trial at 3. The Court

need not dwell long on this argument: the Government is well-positioned to assess its own resource

constraints and priorities. By opposing the defendants’ Motion, the Government has

communicated its stance that proceeding to trial is not an undue burden. The Court perceives no

reason to second-guess the Government’s judgment, and the defendants’ Motion suggests none.

3 Third, the defendants argue that the conservation of judicial resources favors continuance.

Third Mot. to Continue Trial at 3. This argument, too, falls flat. Both defendants have waived

their right to a jury trial. See Notice of Waiver of Jury Trial, ECF No. 115. Accordingly, with no

concern for time spent empaneling a jury, the only judicial resources at issue are the Court’s own.

And as this Court noted in its recent Order in United States v. Grillo, “[w]hile preservation of

judicial resources is an important goal for this Court, it is not the only or even the ultimate goal of

our courts.” Order Denying Mot. to Continue 3, No. 21-cr-690-RCL (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2024). The

Court’s overarching duty in criminal cases is to facilitate the search for truth and dispense justice

accordingly. In so doing, the Court also serves the public interest in the efficient administration

of the law. Proceeding as scheduled with this trial, which has already languished through multiple

continuances for more than a year, is a worthy use of judicial resources.

Finally, the defendants argue that “[t]o deny this motion . . . would . . . likely subject the

defendant to criminal convictions for no purpose other than expediency.” Third Mot. to Continue

Trial at 4. The Court has already emphatically rejected this exact argument in United States v.

Grillo, and does so again today. See Order Denying Mot. to Continue 1–2, No. 21-cr-690-RCL

(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2024). The defendants’ implicit efforts to caricature the timely pursuit of truth

as a mere “expedien[t],” and to recast the defendants as the hapless victims of arbitrary government

action, are a preposterous mischaracterization of our justice system. Courts do not simply

“subject” defendants to criminal convictions; people subject themselves to conviction by breaking

the law, and trial is the instrument we use to decide whether they did so.

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