United States v. Simon Martinez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-30012
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-30012

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:21-cr-00033-BLW-4 v.

SIMON MARTINEZ, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 19, 2024 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Simon Martinez (“Martinez”) pled guilty to possession with intent

to distribute controlled substances (methamphetamine), reserving the right to appeal

the denial of his suppression motion. He also appeals the refusal to allow his second

appointed counsel to withdraw shortly before sentencing. We review the denial of

Martinez’s motion to suppress de novo, United States v. Peterson, 995 F.3d 1061,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1064 (9th Cir. 2021), the denial of the motion for substitution of counsel for an abuse

of discretion, United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2003), and

we affirm.

There was no error in denying Martinez’s motion to suppress evidence

obtained during his traffic stop and arrest. Based on the evidence adduced at the

evidentiary hearing, which included multiple confidential informants and co-

defendants who named Martinez as a major supplier, investigating officers had

probable cause to arrest Martinez for his role in the major drug conspiracy they had

been investigating. A warrantless arrest may be conducted if officers have probable

cause that a crime has been committed. United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072

(9th Cir. 2007). Where, as here, a uniformed officer is directed to make a “walled

off” traffic stop on behalf of other detectives with more complete knowledge of

Martinez’s activities, the doctrine of collective knowledge operates to supply the

necessary probable cause. United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032‒37 (9th

Cir. 2007). Because it was reasonable to believe that Martinez’s vehicle contained

evidence of his drug trafficking offenses, arresting officers could search his vehicle

consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).

We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Nor was there an abuse of discretion by denying Martinez’s motion to

substitute appointed counsel shortly before sentencing. In evaluating this decision,

2 we consider: “(1) the timeliness of the substitution motion and the extent of resulting

inconvenience or delay; (2) the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the

defendant’s complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his

attorney was so great that it prevented an adequate defense.” United States v.

Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court

adequately investigated the nature of the disagreement between Martinez and his

counsel, found that Martinez and his counsel were still communicating, and

determined that it was at most a minor dispute about sentencing strategy. See

Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 887 (9th Cir. 2007) (disagreements over strategy

do not rise to the level of complete breakdown in communication). The court also

noted that substitution of counsel would create inconvenience and delay as it was

only two weeks until scheduled sentencing and the court and at least two other co-

defendants would be affected by any delay. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion

to deny the motion.

AFFIRMED.