USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10371 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SHI-YOUNG LAMAR SHARPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 7:23-cr-00036-HL-TQL-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 2 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10371
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Shi-Young Sharper appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm as an individual previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the government did not present suffi- cient evidence to sustain his conviction. He also asserts that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. For the reasons below, we reject both contentions and affirm Sharper’s conviction. I We first consider Sharper’s argument that the government did not present sufficient evidence that Sharper knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had a previous conviction punish- able by more than one year in prison. We review de novo Sharper’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the district court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal un- der Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. See United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015). We will uphold the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquit- tal if a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the evi- dence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016). We view all facts in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1293 (11th Cir. 2016). We will not USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 3 of 9
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overturn a jury’s verdict if there is any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have allowed the jury to convict. Id. at 1294. Section 922(g)(1) makes it a crime for any person convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To justify a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant was an individual with such a conviction, that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). We have held that the fact that “a defendant does not recog- nize that he personally is prohibited from possessing a firearm un- der federal law is no defense if he knows he has a particular status and that status happens to be one prohibited by § 922(g) from pos- sessing a firearm.” United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171, 1189 (11th Cir. 2020). As we explained, a defendant who knows of his status but not that his status prohibits him from possessing a fire- arm is mistaken about the law, which is not a defense. Id. The government’s burden in proving a defendant’s knowledge of his status is not onerous, and knowledge can be in- ferred from circumstantial evidence. United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). In Bates, for example, we explained that a jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of his status as some- one barred from firearm possession under § 922(g)(1) from, among other evidence, his failure to object or express confusion about the USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 4 of 9
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government’s assertion that he was a felon in his plea hearing and at sentencing. Id. Meanwhile, in United States v. Innocent, we iden- tified other circumstantial evidence that may be probative of a de- fendant’s knowledge of his status—including the defendant having multiple prior felony convictions, serving multiple years in prison pursuant to a prior conviction, fleeing when police approach, and dropping a firearm into someone else’s vehicle. See 977 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court did not err in denying Sharper’s mo- tion for a judgment of acquittal because, although Sharper did not sign the certified copy of his felony conviction, the government presented sufficient additional evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, when he possessed the fire- arm, he knew he was an individual with a prior conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1). The evi- dence showed that Sharper accelerated away from the attempted traffic stop while driving with a firearm in the driver’s side door pocket, fled on foot after crashing his vehicle, and stated that some- one else was driving once apprehended, all of which suggested that he knew both that he was violating the law at the time and should not have been proximate to the firearm. Sharper also did not pro- test when the arresting officer identified him as a convicted felon and informed him that he would be charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Instead, he conceded that he could understand why he was to be charged as a convicted felon. Taken together, this evidence allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 5 of 9
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Sharper knew of his status. See Bates, 960 F.3d at 1296; Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1083–84. We reject Sharper’s argument to the contrary. II We next address Sharper’s assertion that his conviction un- der § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. 1 “Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). As we explain below, our precedent forecloses Sharper’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Mi- litia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court con- sidered a Second Amendment challenge to a Washington, D.C. law that barred the private possession of handguns in homes. 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008). After considering both the text and history of the Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it granted an individual a right to keep and bear arms, and held that the D.C. law infringed that right. Id. at 595, 635. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right is “not unlim- ited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to
1 Sharper purports to challenge § 922(g)(1) both facially and as applied to his
conviction.
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USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10371 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SHI-YOUNG LAMAR SHARPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 7:23-cr-00036-HL-TQL-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 2 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10371
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Shi-Young Sharper appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm as an individual previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the government did not present suffi- cient evidence to sustain his conviction. He also asserts that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. For the reasons below, we reject both contentions and affirm Sharper’s conviction. I We first consider Sharper’s argument that the government did not present sufficient evidence that Sharper knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had a previous conviction punish- able by more than one year in prison. We review de novo Sharper’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the district court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal un- der Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. See United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015). We will uphold the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquit- tal if a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the evi- dence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016). We view all facts in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1293 (11th Cir. 2016). We will not USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 3 of 9
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overturn a jury’s verdict if there is any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have allowed the jury to convict. Id. at 1294. Section 922(g)(1) makes it a crime for any person convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To justify a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant was an individual with such a conviction, that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). We have held that the fact that “a defendant does not recog- nize that he personally is prohibited from possessing a firearm un- der federal law is no defense if he knows he has a particular status and that status happens to be one prohibited by § 922(g) from pos- sessing a firearm.” United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171, 1189 (11th Cir. 2020). As we explained, a defendant who knows of his status but not that his status prohibits him from possessing a fire- arm is mistaken about the law, which is not a defense. Id. The government’s burden in proving a defendant’s knowledge of his status is not onerous, and knowledge can be in- ferred from circumstantial evidence. United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). In Bates, for example, we explained that a jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of his status as some- one barred from firearm possession under § 922(g)(1) from, among other evidence, his failure to object or express confusion about the USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 4 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10371
government’s assertion that he was a felon in his plea hearing and at sentencing. Id. Meanwhile, in United States v. Innocent, we iden- tified other circumstantial evidence that may be probative of a de- fendant’s knowledge of his status—including the defendant having multiple prior felony convictions, serving multiple years in prison pursuant to a prior conviction, fleeing when police approach, and dropping a firearm into someone else’s vehicle. See 977 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court did not err in denying Sharper’s mo- tion for a judgment of acquittal because, although Sharper did not sign the certified copy of his felony conviction, the government presented sufficient additional evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, when he possessed the fire- arm, he knew he was an individual with a prior conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1). The evi- dence showed that Sharper accelerated away from the attempted traffic stop while driving with a firearm in the driver’s side door pocket, fled on foot after crashing his vehicle, and stated that some- one else was driving once apprehended, all of which suggested that he knew both that he was violating the law at the time and should not have been proximate to the firearm. Sharper also did not pro- test when the arresting officer identified him as a convicted felon and informed him that he would be charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Instead, he conceded that he could understand why he was to be charged as a convicted felon. Taken together, this evidence allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 5 of 9
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Sharper knew of his status. See Bates, 960 F.3d at 1296; Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1083–84. We reject Sharper’s argument to the contrary. II We next address Sharper’s assertion that his conviction un- der § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. 1 “Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). As we explain below, our precedent forecloses Sharper’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Mi- litia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court con- sidered a Second Amendment challenge to a Washington, D.C. law that barred the private possession of handguns in homes. 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008). After considering both the text and history of the Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it granted an individual a right to keep and bear arms, and held that the D.C. law infringed that right. Id. at 595, 635. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right is “not unlim- ited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to
1 Sharper purports to challenge § 922(g)(1) both facially and as applied to his
conviction. But he has abandoned his as-applied argument because he fails to explain how the particular circumstances of his conviction render the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). We therefore consider only the facial challenge. USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 6 of 9
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cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire- arms by felons and the mentally ill”—restrictions that the Court deemed “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 626–27 & n.26. After Heller, we considered, and rejected, a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by in- dividuals with a conviction punishable by more than one year in prison. See Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 at 770–71. “[T]he first question” under Heller, we explained, was “whether one is qualified to possess a firearm.” Id. at 770. We observed that Heller’s clarification that it did not cast doubt on prohibitions on felon firearm possession “suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. We also noted that Heller recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (citation modified). We re- jected the appellant’s argument that these statements from Heller were mere dicta. Id. at 771 n.6. Instead, we reasoned that (1) to the extent that the statements “limit[ed] the Court’s opinion to pos- session of firearms by law-abiding and qualified individuals,” they were necessary to the decision reached; and (2) even if the state- ments were superfluous to Heller’s central holding, we would still afford them “considerable weight,” as dicta from the Supreme Court is not to be lightly ignored. Id. Therefore, we held that § 922(g)(1) was a constitutional means of restricting the Second Amendment rights of individuals with convictions punishable by more than one year in prison. Id. at 771. USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 7 of 9
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Several years later, the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen considered a Second Amendment chal- lenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that limited when a law- abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a firearm outside the home. See 597 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. The Court explained that, to determine whether a restriction on firearms is constitutional, courts must begin by asking whether the firearm regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17. If the regulation does cover such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the gov- ernment “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen also emphasized that Heller established the correct test for determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions. See id. at 39 (applying “Heller’s text-and-history standard” to the challenged statute). And, like Heller, Bruen de- scribed Second Amendment rights as extending to “law-abiding, re- sponsible citizens . . . for self-defense.” Id. at 26 (citation modified). Then, in United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court consid- ered a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8), the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is subject to a domestic vi- olence restraining order from possessing a firearm when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible threat to the safety of an intimate partner, a child of that partner, or individual. 602 U.S. 680, 684–85 (2024). The Court held that this firearm USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 8 of 9
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restriction was constitutional. Id. at 693. It also, once again, stated that the prohibitions on “the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 699 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). More recently, we held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abro- gated “our holding in Rozier that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.” United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2025) (Dubois III). 2 As we explained, because “the Supreme Court made it clear in Heller that its holding did not cast doubt on felon-in-possession prohibitions,” and because the Bruen Court stated “that its holding was in keeping with Heller,” “Bruen could not have clearly abrogated our precedent upholding section 922(g)(1).” Id. at 893 (citation modified). That was espe- cially so because “Rozier upheld section 922(g)(1) on the threshold ground that felons are categorically disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment right under Heller”—not based on the means-end balancing that Bruen rejected. Id. (citation modified). And the same was true for Rahimi: After all, “[t]he only time that the Rahimi majority mentioned felons was to reiterate Heller’s con- clusion that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill are presumptively lawful.” Id. (citation modi- fied); see Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699.
2 We handed down our decision in Dubois III after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (Dubois I) and vacated and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Rahimi. See Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025) (Dubois II). USCA11 Case: 24-10371 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 08/01/2025 Page: 9 of 9
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In sum, Sharper’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Rozier—a decision that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated. We therefore reject it. * * * Because there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Sharper knew about his status as someone with a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, and because Sharper’s constitutional challenge fails under our prece- dent, we AFFIRM his conviction under § 922(g)(1). AFFIRMED.