United States v. Shelly Leipham

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 11, 2023
• Docket: 22-4532
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4532 Doc: 24 Filed: 09/11/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHELLY ANNE LEIPHAM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cr-00019-TSK-MJA-1)

Submitted: August 30, 2023 Decided: September 11, 2023

Before GREGORY, RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, Wheeling, West Virginia, United States Attorney, Sarah E. Wagner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4532 Doc: 24 Filed: 09/11/2023 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Shelly Anne Leipham was convicted on three counts of wire fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1343, five counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and three

counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She was

sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Leipham argues that the district court

erred by admitting at trial incriminating statements she made to law enforcement after her

arrest and prior to receiving warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1966). We affirm.

We review a district court’s legal conclusions underlying a suppression

determination de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Guijon-

Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). A defendant subject to custodial interrogation

must be advised of her Miranda rights. United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319,

325 (4th Cir. 2019). “Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words

or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response from the suspect.” United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)); see also United States v. Bell,

901 F.3d 455, 463–64 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that subtle compulsion alone is insufficient

to qualify an officer’s remarks as interrogation under Innis). However, “when the police

have no reason to expect that a question will lead a suspect to incriminate himself, that

question cannot constitute an interrogation under Miranda.” United States v. Johnson, 734

F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “the failure to administer a Miranda warning . . .

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is harmless if it is clear that a rational factfinder would have found the defendant guilty

absent the error.” Bernard, 927 F.3d at 807.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in

admitting the contested statements. Although Leipham was in custody at the time she made

the incriminating statements, neither was she subject to interrogation, nor did the officers

make any statements to Leipham that were designed to elicit a response or incriminating

statements for purposes of Miranda. Here, any error in introducing the statements was

harmless given the substantial evidence linking Leipham to her crimes.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED