United States v. Shelby Beam

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 25-5156
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0595n.06

No. 25-5156

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 22, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF SHELBY N. BEAM, ) TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Shelby N. Beam appeals her 18-month sentence for a robbery offense. As

set forth below, we affirm.

While in an abusive relationship with Imari Glover, Beam helped him rob a Cash Express

store in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Beam subsequently pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Hobbs

Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951.

Beam’s presentence report set forth a guidelines range of 51 to 63 months of imprisonment

based on a total offense level of 24 and a criminal-history category of I. Prior to sentencing, the

government moved for a downward departure under USSG § 5K1.1 based on Beam’s substantial

assistance. Beam also moved for a downward departure, claiming coercion and duress under USSG

§ 5K2.12, as well as aberrant behavior under USSG § 5K2.20, or for a downward variance based

on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In support of her motion, Beam asserted that

she assisted Glover in the robbery out of fear, and that her actions were out of character for her. No. 25-5156, United States v. Beam

At sentencing, the district court granted the government’s motion and decreased Beam’s

total offense level by six levels. The district court also granted Beam’s motion and departed

downward by four more levels, resulting in a total offense level of 14 and a guidelines range of 15

to 21 months. According to the district court, USSG § 5K2.12 “clearly applies” because “Beam

was operating under a degree of coercion and duress when she participated in this very, very

serious armed robbery.” But the district court expressed “some hesitancy” in applying USSG

§ 5K2.20, the policy statement addressing downward departures for aberrant behavior:

[I]n the Court’s mind this provision indicates that a defendant had significant volitional control over their actions, and to the Court it seems that this conflicts somewhat with the 5K2.12 provision. If you are coerced and doing something under duress, then obviously you do not have complete volitional control over your . . . actions. So although the Court takes into account that this is a departure from the defendant’s normal behavior, the Court is reluctant to apply Section 5K2.2[0]. So the Court will rely primarily upon 5K2.12 but does have in the back of its mind the aberrant behavior provision.

The district court ultimately sentenced Beam to 18 months of imprisonment followed by three

years of supervised release and ordered her to pay $2,680 in restitution to Cash Express.

In this timely appeal, Beam challenges the district court’s decision not to apply USSG

§ 5K2.20 in granting her a downward departure. “[A] district court’s decision not to depart

downwards is considered unreviewable, except where there is clear evidence that ‘the lower court

incorrectly believed that it lacked authority to grant such a departure.’” United States v. Church,

731 F.3d 530, 533–34 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 610 (6th

Cir. 2008)). According to Beam, the district court was not aware that it could grant a downward

departure for aberrant behavior under USSG § 5K2.20 while also granting a departure for coercion

and duress under USSG § 5K2.12. We review de novo a district court’s determination that it

lacked authority to depart downward. United States v. Truman, 304 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2002).

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Beam argues that the district court erred in determining that USSG §§ 5K2.12 and 5K2.20

conflict because § 5K2.20 requires the defendant to have “significant volitional control” over his

or her actions. USSG § 5K2.20 states that a district court may grant a downward departure “only

if the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction that (1) was

committed without significant planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked

deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.” USSG § 5K2.20(b), p.s. (2018

ed.). Beam contends that USSG § 5K2.20 does not require a defendant to have “significant

volitional control” over his or her actions and that her offense otherwise qualifies for a downward

departure for aberrant behavior.

To qualify for a downward departure for aberrant behavior under USSG § 5K2.20, an

“offense must have been more than something out of the defendant’s character; it must have been

a spontaneous and thoughtless act.” United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 590 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Bueno, 443 F.3d 1017, 1023 (8th Cir. 2006)). As the government

acknowledges, a thoughtless action would not necessarily involve “significant volitional control.”

See Volition, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The ability to make a choice or determine

something.”); see also United States v. Harper, 875 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2017) (likening

“volitional” to “deliberate”).

We need not resolve whether the district court erred in applying USSG § 5K2.20, however,

if any such error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or

variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). “Under the harmless error

test, a remand for an error at sentencing is required unless we are certain that any such error was

harmless—i.e., any such error ‘did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence

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imposed.’” United States v. Ziesel, 38 F.4th 512, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.

Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Here, although the district court was “reluctant” to apply USSG § 5K2.20 and “rel[ied]

primarily upon 5K2.12” in granting a downward departure, it expressly took “into account that

this is a departure from the defendant’s normal behavior” and kept “in the back of its mind the

aberrant behavior provision.” The record shows that, despite its doubts about USSG § 5K2.20’s

application, the district court considered the fact that Beam’s offense constituted aberrant behavior

in granting her a four-level downward departure. We agree with the government that any error in

the district court’s interpretation of USSG § 5K2.20 was harmless. See United States v. Crumpton,

814 F. App’x 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Furthermore, even if the district court had failed to

consider its discretion to make a downward departure . . . the error was harmless because the

district court considered the same conduct in making a downward variance under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553.”); see also Carson, 560 F.3d at 590 (concluding that the district court’s error in applying

USSG § 5K2.20 was harmless).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM Beam’s sentence.

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