UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHEKU DEEN YANSANE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:17-cr-00435-TDC-1)
Submitted: September 23, 2020 Decided: October 7, 2020
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven M. Klepper, Emily R. Greene, KRAMON & GRAHAM, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Kelly O. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Sheku Deen Yansane appeals from his convictions, entered pursuant to his guilty
plea, to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and felon in possession of a firearm.
On appeal, Yansane contends that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a
competency hearing. He also asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. We
affirm.
A district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Torrez, 869 F.3d 291, 321 (4th Cir. 2017). “District
courts are in the best position to make competency determinations,” United States v.
Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2013), for they alone may assess a defendant’s
demeanor in evaluating his “capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel,”
see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
The district court must sua sponte order a competency hearing “if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists is a question left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592. “Reasonable cause may
be established through evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial,
and medical opinions concerning the defendant’s competence.” Id. at 592-93 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The mere presence of mental illness is not, however, “equated
with incompetence.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). Competency turns on
2 “whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err. While Yansane expressed confusion
at various points in his proceedings, it does not appear that Yansane acted irrationally at
any point. At his hearing to proceed pro se, Yansane informed the district court that he had
been treated for mental illness and was taking several medications, but upon further
inquiry, he testified that neither his medications nor his mental conditions interfered with
his understanding of the proceedings. Moreover, Yansane was sufficiently cognizant of
the proceedings that he disputed the constitutionality of the search, sought discovery, and
made many other legal and factual arguments. Additionally, Yansane participated in
numerous proceedings and hearings over the course of two years in front of three
magistrate judges and one district court judge, and with the assistance of three different
attorneys. None of these professionals seriously questioned Yansane’s competency or
sought a hearing on the question.
While the record clearly shows that Yansane suffered from mental illness, there is
nothing in the record showing that such illnesses or his medications affected his
competency. Yansane was treated in prison and when he was on pretrial release, and he
presents no medical records supporting his claim that he was incapable of consulting with
3 his attorney and understanding the criminal proceedings. * Moreover, while Yansane may
have been seeking things he was not entitled to under the law, the mere fact that he was
making such requests does not show that he was thinking irrationally. See Burket v.
Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Likewise, neither low intelligence, mental
deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental
incompetence to stand trial.”). Instead, the record reflects that Yansane managed to
successfully convince the court to replace his attorney twice and to eventually allow him
to proceed pro se. Because Yansane has failed to show that his mental health conditions
prevented him from understanding the proceedings and participating in his defense, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a competency
hearing.
Next, Yansane contends that his plea was not voluntary because he was mentally
incompetent, he lacked understanding of the legal process, he had not received discovery,
and the Government pressured him with additional charges shortly before trial. Before
accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure that the defendant’s “plea is voluntary,
i.e., is not the result of force, threats, or promises made by the government that are not part
of the plea agreement.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1991); see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). The decision to plead guilty “must reflect a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” United
* In addition, Yansane has imputed knowledge of all of his statements in court to the district court judge, even though the district court judge did not preside over most of the hearings.
4 States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review the validity of a defendant’s guilty plea with reference to the totality of the
circumstances. Id. A defendant seeking to retract statements made during a Rule 11
colloquy “bears a heavy burden,” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 417 (4th Cir.
2003), because, absent “extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made
during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established,” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d
216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005).
Yansane affirmed at his plea hearing that his plea was voluntary and free of
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHEKU DEEN YANSANE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:17-cr-00435-TDC-1)
Submitted: September 23, 2020 Decided: October 7, 2020
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven M. Klepper, Emily R. Greene, KRAMON & GRAHAM, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Kelly O. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Sheku Deen Yansane appeals from his convictions, entered pursuant to his guilty
plea, to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and felon in possession of a firearm.
On appeal, Yansane contends that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a
competency hearing. He also asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. We
affirm.
A district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Torrez, 869 F.3d 291, 321 (4th Cir. 2017). “District
courts are in the best position to make competency determinations,” United States v.
Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2013), for they alone may assess a defendant’s
demeanor in evaluating his “capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel,”
see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
The district court must sua sponte order a competency hearing “if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists is a question left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592. “Reasonable cause may
be established through evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial,
and medical opinions concerning the defendant’s competence.” Id. at 592-93 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The mere presence of mental illness is not, however, “equated
with incompetence.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). Competency turns on
2 “whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err. While Yansane expressed confusion
at various points in his proceedings, it does not appear that Yansane acted irrationally at
any point. At his hearing to proceed pro se, Yansane informed the district court that he had
been treated for mental illness and was taking several medications, but upon further
inquiry, he testified that neither his medications nor his mental conditions interfered with
his understanding of the proceedings. Moreover, Yansane was sufficiently cognizant of
the proceedings that he disputed the constitutionality of the search, sought discovery, and
made many other legal and factual arguments. Additionally, Yansane participated in
numerous proceedings and hearings over the course of two years in front of three
magistrate judges and one district court judge, and with the assistance of three different
attorneys. None of these professionals seriously questioned Yansane’s competency or
sought a hearing on the question.
While the record clearly shows that Yansane suffered from mental illness, there is
nothing in the record showing that such illnesses or his medications affected his
competency. Yansane was treated in prison and when he was on pretrial release, and he
presents no medical records supporting his claim that he was incapable of consulting with
3 his attorney and understanding the criminal proceedings. * Moreover, while Yansane may
have been seeking things he was not entitled to under the law, the mere fact that he was
making such requests does not show that he was thinking irrationally. See Burket v.
Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Likewise, neither low intelligence, mental
deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental
incompetence to stand trial.”). Instead, the record reflects that Yansane managed to
successfully convince the court to replace his attorney twice and to eventually allow him
to proceed pro se. Because Yansane has failed to show that his mental health conditions
prevented him from understanding the proceedings and participating in his defense, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a competency
hearing.
Next, Yansane contends that his plea was not voluntary because he was mentally
incompetent, he lacked understanding of the legal process, he had not received discovery,
and the Government pressured him with additional charges shortly before trial. Before
accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure that the defendant’s “plea is voluntary,
i.e., is not the result of force, threats, or promises made by the government that are not part
of the plea agreement.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1991); see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). The decision to plead guilty “must reflect a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” United
* In addition, Yansane has imputed knowledge of all of his statements in court to the district court judge, even though the district court judge did not preside over most of the hearings.
4 States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review the validity of a defendant’s guilty plea with reference to the totality of the
circumstances. Id. A defendant seeking to retract statements made during a Rule 11
colloquy “bears a heavy burden,” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 417 (4th Cir.
2003), because, absent “extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made
during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established,” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d
216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005).
Yansane affirmed at his plea hearing that his plea was voluntary and free of
improper outside influence and that he understood the proceedings. Such declarations
“carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, neither Yansane’s mental illness nor his
confusion regarding parts of the legal process rendered his plea involuntary. Yansane made
rational arguments, engaged with counsel and the court, responded appropriately, and
appeared oriented and mentally present.
Regarding his issues with discovery, Yansane pled guilty before his motion for
discovery could be ruled upon. Moreover, his attorney reviewed discovery with Yansane
for numerous hours. Finally, although Yansane wanted to personally obtain the discovery,
Yansane was informed repeatedly that he was only permitted to view the discovery with
his counsel.
Finally, Yansane’s argument regarding the superceding indictment is meritless.
Notably, Yansane provides no evidence that the additional charge was without basis in fact
or law and cites no legal basis to argue that the indictment was improper. Essentially,
5 Yansane is arguing that the justice system is weighted in favor of the Government. Even
if true, this imbalance does not render Yansane’s plea involuntary. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in concluding that Yansane’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
As such, we affirm Yansane’s convictions. We deny Yansane’s motion to file a
supplemental brief. See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 106 n.11 (4th Cir. 2016)
(declining to consider pro se brief filed by appellant represented on direct appeal by
counsel). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED