United States v. Shehadeh

857 F. Supp. 2d 290, 2012 WL 1372256, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55247
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedApril 19, 2012
DocketNo. 10-cr-1020 (ENV)
StatusPublished

This text of 857 F. Supp. 2d 290 (United States v. Shehadeh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Shehadeh, 857 F. Supp. 2d 290, 2012 WL 1372256, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

VITALIANO, District Judge.

Defendant Abdel Hameed Shehadeh stands charged by an indictment filed on this docket of making material false statements to government agents in a matter involving international terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). At the heart of this case is the government’s allegation that Shehadeh traveled to Pakistan in 2008 to join a violent insurgent group and, thereafter, lied to federal agents about the purpose of his trip. Before the Court now is the government’s motion, pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), 18 U.S.CApp. 3 §§ 1-16, and Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(1), for a [292]*292protective order. The government seeks relief from certain of its ordinary disclosure obligations due to the classified nature of much of the evidence collected during its investigation. Given this context, the government submitted its motion on an ex parte, in camera basis. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted and this protective order issues.

A. CIPA’s Framework for Protecting Classified Information

“CIPA establishes rules for the management of criminal cases involving classified information.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 115 (2d Cir.2008). “Its animating purpose is to harmonize a [criminal] defendant’s right to obtain and present exculpatory material with the government’s need to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to national security.” Id. at 115-16.

Section 4 of CIPA “provides that, if the discovery to be provided to the defense pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure includes classified information, the district court may, ‘upon a sufficient showing, ... authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information!,] ... to substitute a summary of the information!,] ... or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.’ ” Id. at 116; see also 18 U.S.C.App. 3 § 4. “This provision clarifies district courts’ power under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) to issue protective orders denying or restricting discovery for good cause.” United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir.2008).

CIPA’s framework for nondisclosure provides a means for applying the state secrets privilege to classified information which, otherwise, would be discoverable. Id. at 78-79. Proper application of that privilege requires a balancing of the government’s need to protect national security with the right of a defendant to mount a full defense. In balancing these competing concerns, “the district court must first decide whether the classified information the Government possesses is discoverable.” Id. at 80.1

If it is, the district court must then determine whether the state-secrets privilege applies because: (1) there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose ... matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged, and (2) the privilege is lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer....
If the evidence is discoverable but the information is privileged, the court must next decide whether the information is helpful or material to the defense, i.e., useful to counter the government’s case or to bolster a defense.

[293]*293Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953). “To be helpful or material to the defense, evidence need not rise to the level that would trigger the Government’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), to disclose exculpatory information. Information can be helpful without being ‘favorable’ in the Brady sense.” Aref, 533 F.3d at 80 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Where the classified materials at issue contain matter that is helpful or material to the defense, the government’s privilege must “give way” to a “defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense.” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 141 (2d Cir.2010) (quotations omitted). A court, however, may permit the government to produce that information in a form that will preserve its sensitivity {e.g., redacted, summaries, factual stipulations). See Zazi, 2011 WL 2532903, at *4; Khan, 2010 WL 330241, at *2; see also 18 U.S.C.App. 3 §§ 4, 6.

B. Discussion

In addition to its memorandum of law, the government submitted extensive examples of the material it seeks to exclude from discovery and, in some cases, even substitute disclosure. Though the Court’s “discussion of the classified information is necessarily circumspect,” Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 141; Zazi, 2011 WL 2532903, at *1, it reviewed, in detail, all materials submitted. The Court also requested, ex parte, supplementary material to review in camera. (Dkt. No. 74.) Moreover, the Court held an ex parte conference with defense counsel to glean insight into defense strategy so as to ensure informed evaluation and identification of any items of information that could be “helpful or material.” See, e.g., Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 118-19; Aref, 533 F.3d at 76-77.2 The Court is satisfied that the government, in good faith and with, the interests of justice truly in mind, conducted a diligent and thorough search for all discoverable material — whether under Rule 16, Brady, Giglio, or the Jencks Act — and, with respect to the privileged matter it has culled, has endeavored to provide defense counsel with all information that is even arguably helpful or material to the defense.

Set against that backdrop, the government seeks two forms of relief. First, it seeks to delete certain classified documents and information from discovery entirely, and, second, moves to substitute approved classified summaries for certain other of the withheld classified materials.

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the materials the government seeks to exclude in whole or in part from discovery are, in fact, discoverable. Aref, 533 F.3d at 80. Further, the privilege for state secrets has been properly invoked.

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Related

United States v. Reynolds
345 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1953)
Roviaro v. United States
353 U.S. 53 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
United States v. Abu-Jihaad
630 F.3d 102 (Second Circuit, 2010)
United States v. David Stevens
985 F.2d 1175 (Second Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Aref
533 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Odeh
552 F.3d 93 (Second Circuit, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
857 F. Supp. 2d 290, 2012 WL 1372256, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-shehadeh-nyed-2012.