United States v. Shawntavis Green

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: June 20, 2019
• Docket: 18-12746
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 18-12746 Date Filed: 06/20/2019 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 18-12746 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:06-cr-00197-JA-KRS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHAWNTAVIS GREEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________

(June 20, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12746 Date Filed: 06/20/2019 Page: 2 of 4

Shawntavis Green appeals his 46-month sentence, imposed at the low end of

his guideline range, following the revocation of his supervised release. Green

admitted that he violated the terms of his supervised release when he was charged

with a domestic-violence offense under Florida law and tested positive for

methamphetamine. He now argues that the district court procedurally erred by

focusing too heavily on the specific facts of the domestic-violence offense

underlying his violation, rather than making the “breach of trust” of the supervised

release system its primary inquiry. After review, 1 we affirm.

Applicable policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines indicate that the

primary focus of a revocation sentence is the defendant’s breach of trust, though

the district court can account, to a limited degree, for the seriousness of the

underlying violation. U.S.S.G. § Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment 3(b). Specifically,

the court may consider the conduct leading to the revocation in measuring the

extent of the defendant’s breach of trust, but the overall goal of the sentence is to

sanction the defendant for failing to abide by the conditions of his supervision. Id. 1 The parties dispute the standard of review—the Government asserts plain-error review applies because Green failed to object in the district court after the sentence was imposed, while Green maintains this Court should review the reasonableness of his sentence under an abuse-of- discretion standard. While Green did not raise any objections following the district court’s pronouncement of its sentence, he did argue, throughout the revocation proceeding, that the district court should focus primarily on the “violation of trust” that occurred when he violated the terms of his supervised release, and should only focus on the underlying offense “in a limited fashion.” We need not definitively resolve whether this was sufficient to preserve the error for appeal, as Green’s 46-month revocation sentence is reasonable under the higher abuse-of- discretion standard. See United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1273 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse- of-discretion standard.”). 2 Case: 18-12746 Date Filed: 06/20/2019 Page: 3 of 4

According to Green, the district court here went too far in considering his

underlying conduct, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable.

Green’s claim of procedural error fails for several reasons. The policy

statements are not binding on the district court; the court must simply consider

them, which the record indicates it did. See United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d

1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). Second, although the district court discussed Green’s

underlying conduct, it expressly indicated his domestic violence offense was a

“breach of the trust” it had placed in him. Thus, the record shows the court’s

discussion of Green’s underlying conduct was focused on measuring the extent of

his breach of trust.

Third, contrary to Green’s arguments, the district court specifically stated

that it was not sentencing Green as a state judge. Green points to the district

court’s statement that, were it a state court presiding over criminal charges

stemming from the domestic-violence incident, it would have imposed the

maximum sentence. Green argues this statement “clearly reflects that the conduct

underlying [his] violation was, in the court’s mind, the end all be all of the

sentencing determination.” However, a closer examination of the record reflects

the court did not offer its opinion on the seriousness of the underlying conduct

unprompted. Rather, it made this statement in response to Green’s argument that,

if he was convicted and sentenced on the underlying state charge, he would likely

3 Case: 18-12746 Date Filed: 06/20/2019 Page: 4 of 4

face a sentence of only a year and a half to two years. The statement therefore is

not as reflective of what was “in the court’s mind” at sentencing as Green suggests.

Finally, the district court stated that it was basing the sentence on the

considerations already mentioned, along with the remaining 18 U.S.C. § 3553

factors, and its pronouncement provided enough reasoning to show that it

considered the arguments and had a reasoned basis for the sentence. See United

States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he sentencing judge

should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal

decisionmaking authority.” ).

In sum, the district court did not procedurally err in imposing Green’s

sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.