USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4439
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN LEROY BUTLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-4443
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00076-CCE-1; 1:18-cr-00408-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 15, 2025 Decided: May 19, 2025 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Stacey D. Rubain, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Leroy Butler pled guilty, under a written plea agreement, to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). The district
court sentenced him to 87 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district
court also revoked Butler’s prior supervised release term and imposed a 21-month
consecutive sentence. In these consolidated appeals, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal, thoroughly discussing the plea, revocation, and sentencing proceedings, but
pointing to no specific errors. Although notified of his right to do so, Butler has not filed
a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Because Butler did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea to the § 922(g) offense, we
review the validity of his plea for plain error. United States v. King, 91 F.4th 756, 760 (4th
Cir. 2024) (stating standard of review and discussing plain-error standard). Before
accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy with the defendant to
“ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charge[] to which the plea is
offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various
rights the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” United States v. Williams, 811
F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must determine
that the plea is voluntary, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and supported by an independent
factual basis, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Our review of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing transcript reveals no error. The
district court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Butler’s guilty plea to the § 922(g)
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
offense. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Butler was competent, that he entered his
plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that a factual basis supported his conviction. See
United States v. Robertson, 68 F.4th 855, 862 (4th Cir.) (stating elements of possession of
a firearm by a felon), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 301 (2023).
Next, we “review[] all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We “must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error,” which includes, among other things, “improperly
calculating[] the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there is no significant
procedural error, then we consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under “the
totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th
Cir. 2019). We afford a presumption of reasonableness to any sentence within a properly
calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Henderson, 107 F.4th 287, 297 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 578 (2024). A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a)
factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record confirms the procedural reasonableness of Butler’s
sentence on the § 922(g) offense. The district court adopted the uncontested Guidelines
calculations set forth in the presentence report, and we discern no error in the calculation
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of Butler’s advisory Guidelines range. The district court afforded the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, and Butler declined to allocute. The
district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and Butler’s arguments, and the court
provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence. Finally, because nothing in the record
undermines the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded the selected sentence,
we conclude that Butler’s 87-month sentence is substantively reasonable.
Turning to the appeal of the revocation judgment, “[w]e review a district court’s
factual findings underlying a revocation of supervised release for clear error and its
ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. George, 95 F.4th 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To revoke supervised release, the district court need only find a violation of a
supervised release condition by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3);
United States v. Dennison, 925 F.3d 185, 191 (4th Cir. 2019). Upon review of the record,
we discern no error in the district court’s decision to revoke Butler’s term of supervised
release.
Regarding the 21-month revocation sentence, “[a] district court has broad discretion
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4439
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN LEROY BUTLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-4443
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00076-CCE-1; 1:18-cr-00408-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 15, 2025 Decided: May 19, 2025 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Stacey D. Rubain, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Leroy Butler pled guilty, under a written plea agreement, to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). The district
court sentenced him to 87 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district
court also revoked Butler’s prior supervised release term and imposed a 21-month
consecutive sentence. In these consolidated appeals, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal, thoroughly discussing the plea, revocation, and sentencing proceedings, but
pointing to no specific errors. Although notified of his right to do so, Butler has not filed
a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Because Butler did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea to the § 922(g) offense, we
review the validity of his plea for plain error. United States v. King, 91 F.4th 756, 760 (4th
Cir. 2024) (stating standard of review and discussing plain-error standard). Before
accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy with the defendant to
“ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charge[] to which the plea is
offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various
rights the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” United States v. Williams, 811
F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must determine
that the plea is voluntary, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and supported by an independent
factual basis, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Our review of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing transcript reveals no error. The
district court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Butler’s guilty plea to the § 922(g)
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
offense. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Butler was competent, that he entered his
plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that a factual basis supported his conviction. See
United States v. Robertson, 68 F.4th 855, 862 (4th Cir.) (stating elements of possession of
a firearm by a felon), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 301 (2023).
Next, we “review[] all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We “must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error,” which includes, among other things, “improperly
calculating[] the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there is no significant
procedural error, then we consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under “the
totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th
Cir. 2019). We afford a presumption of reasonableness to any sentence within a properly
calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Henderson, 107 F.4th 287, 297 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 578 (2024). A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a)
factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record confirms the procedural reasonableness of Butler’s
sentence on the § 922(g) offense. The district court adopted the uncontested Guidelines
calculations set forth in the presentence report, and we discern no error in the calculation
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4443 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/19/2025 Pg: 5 of 6
of Butler’s advisory Guidelines range. The district court afforded the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, and Butler declined to allocute. The
district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and Butler’s arguments, and the court
provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence. Finally, because nothing in the record
undermines the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded the selected sentence,
we conclude that Butler’s 87-month sentence is substantively reasonable.
Turning to the appeal of the revocation judgment, “[w]e review a district court’s
factual findings underlying a revocation of supervised release for clear error and its
ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. George, 95 F.4th 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To revoke supervised release, the district court need only find a violation of a
supervised release condition by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3);
United States v. Dennison, 925 F.3d 185, 191 (4th Cir. 2019). Upon review of the record,
we discern no error in the district court’s decision to revoke Butler’s term of supervised
release.
Regarding the 21-month revocation sentence, “[a] district court has broad discretion
when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v.
Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). Thus, we “will affirm a revocation sentence
if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. When reviewing
“whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id.; see United States v.
Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (providing standards). “Only if a sentence is
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either procedurally or substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is
clear or obvious. Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable, we will affirm it. Id.
Our review confirms that Butler’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The district court correctly calculated the applicable policy
statement range of 15 to 21 months, considered the relevant statutory factors and Butler’s
arguments for a lesser sentence, imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum, and
offered sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision. We also conclude that there is no
basis to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded Butler’s within-
policy-statement-range sentence. See United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
2018).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in these cases and
have found no potentially meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal
and revocation judgments. This court requires that counsel inform Butler, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Butler
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Butler. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED