United States v. Sharp

27 F. Cas. 1041
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania·Decided April 15, 1815·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice.

Before the case is examined upon the evidence, it will be proper to settle the points of law which have been discussed. It is contended for the prisoners: First That they are not such seamen, as are contemplated by act of congress creating the offences, with which they are charged; because they were not seamen of, or belonging to the vessel, not having been engaged as such by the master, and not having entered into a contract to entitle [1043] them to wages, or the master to their services. The counsel was mistaken in supposing, that the 8th or 12th section of the law, speaks of seamen of, or belonging to the vessel, in reference to the offences charged in this indictment That expression is used in one part of the 8th section, in relation to certain acts of piracy; but the clause which declares it to be piracy to make a revolt, and a misdemeanor to endeavor to make one, or to confine the master, speaks of seamen generally. But if the supposed expression had been used, it would have made no difference, in as much as the men received on board at Bordeaux by the master, upon the application of the American consul, were as much seamen of the vessel, and belonging to her, as those who had signed the shipping articles. By the 4th section of the act of congress, of the 28th February, 1803, the American consuls and vice consuls at foreign ports, are required to provide passages, for all destitute American seamen, within their districts, to some port ot the United States; and to pay for the passage of each seaman, a sum, not exceeding ten dollars. The master of every American vessel is bound, upon the requisition of the consul, to receive such seamen, not exceeding two in number, for every ton of his vessel; and to transport them to the United States, under a penalty; and on the part of such seamen, they are bound, to do duty on board such vessel, according to their abilities. Here then is a contract created by the law. which, in consideration of support and transportation by the master, obliges the seaman to perform all the duties of one, and creates all the relative obligations and duties of master and servant, which exist in cases of articled seamen.

It is objected, that the offence of making a revolt, is not sufficiently defined by this law, or by any other standard, to which reference could be safely made; to warrant the court in passing a sentence upon the prisoners, in case of conviction.

I confess I have always considered, (although without having examined the matter with much attention,) to make a revolt, was to throw off all obedience to the master; to take possession by force of the vessel by the crew; to navigate her themselves, or to transfer the. command to some other person on board. A revolution, going to such an extreme, appeared to me to bear a strict analogy to treason against the state; amounting to a falling off from the allegiance due from an inferior to a superior; and, which might be attended with consequences equally mischievous, to the owner, as preventing him from defending his vessel. I thought it applied as well to merchant vessels in time of peace, as in time of war; whereas the other clause was confined to hostile resistance, against a public enemy, or against a pirate. This was certainly the impression of the court, in the case of U. S. v. Smith [Case No. 16,31S], upon an indictment for confining the master, and endeavouring to make a revolt. But although this is still my opinion, yet I am not able to support it, by any authority to be met with, either in the common, admiralty, or civil law. If we resort to definitions given by philologists, they are so multifarious, and so different, that I cannot avoid feeling a natural repugnance, to selecting from this mass of definitions, one, which may fix a crime upon these men, and that too of a . capital nature; when, by making a different selection, it would be no crime at all, or certainly not the crime intended by the legislature. Laws which create crimes, ought to be so explicit in themselves, or by reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may know what acts it is their duty to avoid. For these reasons, the court will not recommend to the jury, to find the prisoners guilty of making, or endeavouring to make a revolt, however strong the evidence may be. But there is an offence laid in this indictment, the definition of which is perfectly clear. That is, confining the master; which is declared to be a misdemeanor, by the 12th section of this law. In the same case, of U. S. v. Smith, this court laid it down; that any confinement of the master, whether by depriving him of the use of his limbs, or by shutting him up in the cabin, or by intimidation, preventing him from the free use of every part of the vessel; amounts to a confinement, in contemplation of law.

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United States v. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. 1041 (circtdpa 1815).

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