United States v. Shantai Shelton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 11, 2023
• Docket: 21-4566
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4566

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANTAI MONIQUE SHELTON, a/k/a Tai, a/k/a Lady Blaze, a/k/a Boss Lady,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00016-MFU-2)

Submitted: March 21, 2023 Decided: April 11, 2023

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Rhonda E. Quagliana, MICHIEHAMLETT, PLLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, Laura Day Rottenborn, Assistant United States Attorney, Kari K. Munro, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Shantai Monique Shelton of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), Hobbs Act

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a), brandishing a

firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), violent crimes in aid of

racketeering (VICARs), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(3), discharging a firearm

during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii),

VICARs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(1), and tampering with a witness, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1512(a)(1)(C). The district court sentenced Shelton to life

imprisonment plus a consecutive prison term of 82 years. In Shelton’s first appeal, this

court vacated her conviction on count 27 for discharging a firearm during and in relation

to a crime of violence, remanded for resentencing, and affirmed the remainder of the

criminal judgment. United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2019). At

resentencing on remand in October 2021, the district court sentenced Shelton to life

imprisonment plus a consecutive prison term of 34 years. In this appeal of the amended

criminal judgment, Shelton challenges her prison sentence, arguing that the district court

erred in determining that she did not qualify for a reduction to her offense level under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.

This court reviews a sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness,

applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41,

51 (2007). When reviewing a district court’s application of a Sentencing Guideline, this

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court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United

States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018). Under the clear error standard, this

court “will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Shelton contends that the district court

erred in failing to award her credit under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility

because her post-conviction statements expressing remorse justified the reduction.

Under the Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for a reduction to her offense level if

she “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility” for her offenses. USSG § 3E1.1(a).

“To earn the reduction, a defendant must prove to the [district] court by a preponderance

of the evidence that [s]he has clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal

responsibility for h[er] criminal conduct.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914

(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a defendant

has satisfied this standard, a district court may consider, among other matters, whether the

defendant truthfully admitted the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction, the

defendant’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and the timeliness of her conduct in

manifesting acceptance of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1. Although the reduction

“is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the [G]overnment to its burden of proof

at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits

guilt,” proceeding to trial does not “automatically preclude” the reduction. Id. cmt. n.2. In

“rare situations,” such as when the “defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues

that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a

challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct),” a reduction still may be

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appropriate. Id. “In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has

accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.” Id.

Because the district court “is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of

responsibility,” id. cmt. n.5, this court affords great deference to the district court’s

determination, Bolton, 858 F.3d at 915.

There is no evidence here Shelton demonstrated acceptance of responsibility prior

to her trial or initial sentencing. She contested her factual guilt at trial and made no

statement regarding acceptance of responsibility at initial sentencing. It was not until the

case was on remand—over seven years after some of her criminal conduct and more than

five years after she contested her guilt at trial—that Shelton expressed some remorse for it

in a letter she wrote to the district court and in allocution she made at the resentencing

hearing. According to Shelton’s letter, however, at the time of her crimes and when she

was first incarcerated for them, she did not care about her victims or their families; it was

not until some unspecified point during her incarceration post-conviction that she reflected

on her criminal conduct and its effect. The district court determined that Shelton’s

statements expressing remorse—although genuine—did not warrant an offense-level

reduction under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. Given Shelton’s conduct

in expressing acceptance of criminal responsibility well after putting the Government to its

factual burden of proof at trial, being convicted and sentenced, and serving part of her

prison sentence, we conclude the district court did not reversibly err in determining that

she did not deserve a reduction to her offense level under USSG § 3E1.1.

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Accordingly, we affirm the amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED