NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0267n.06
Case No. 22-1503
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED ) Jun 09, 2023 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF SHANNON DAWN HAWKINS, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. After escaping federal custody and evading local police during
a dangerous high-speed chase, Shannon Dawn Hawkins was arrested and charged with both federal
and state crimes. Hawkins pled guilty to federal escape, and the district court sentenced Hawkins
to 18 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to her undischarged state and federal sentences.
On appeal, Hawkins challenges her consecutive sentence as procedurally unreasonable. Because
the court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm.
I.
After serving most of her 16-month sentence for aggravated identify theft in prison, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons transferred Hawkins to the Cherry Street Services reentry center
(“Cherry Health”) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. But with less than three weeks left to serve,
Hawkins took advantage of the trust that Cherry Health placed in her and absconded. Specifically, Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
Hawkins obtained permission to take some items to her car, which was parked across the street
from the facility. Instead of returning, she got in her car and drove away.
Days later, an Ionia County police officer observed Hawkins driving well above the posted
speed limit with one broken headlight. So he attempted a traffic stop. But instead of pulling over,
Hawkins fled.
The officer called for backup. During the chase, Hawkins drove as fast as 90 miles per
hour while evading officers across 3 separate counties. After deploying stop sticks on 4 separate
occasions and puncturing multiple tires, the officers finally stopped her. During her arrest,
Hawkins appeared to be paranoid. She complained of government plots to kidnap and surveil her.
Hawkins was also quite inebriated. Her car was littered with 9 empty beer cans, she had trouble
speaking and walking, and she had a blood-alcohol level of 0.172—more than double the legal
limit.
Months later, Michigan charged Hawkins with two offenses: (1) felony fleeing and eluding
a police officer, and (2) misdemeanor driving while impaired. To protect the community from
Hawkins’s dangerous behavior—indeed, she had committed a similar crime years before—the
Michigan court sentenced Hawkins to 22–60 months’ imprisonment for the first offense concurrent
with a 93-day sentence for the second offense.
A federal grand jury then indicted Hawkins for escaping from federal custody at Cherry
Health in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). In a written plea agreement, Hawkins and the United
States made two key stipulations. First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a)’s consecutive-
sentence provision applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape sentence and the three weeks remaining on
-2- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
her sentence for aggravated identity theft.1 Second, the parties stipulated that “U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)
and/or (d)”—including Application Note 4(D)—applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape conviction
and the undischarged term of her state convictions. R. 21, Pg. ID 40
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) directs that a district court impose a concurrent sentence if it
determines that “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to
the instant offense of conviction.” Section 5G1.3(d) grants district courts discretion “[i]n any other
case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment” to structure the sentences “concurrently,
partially concurrently, or consecutively . . . to achieve a reasonable punishment.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3(d). Finally, Application Note 4(D) says that courts may exercise their discretion under
subsection (d) when “faced with a complex case” involving multiple undischarged terms of
imprisonment “that seemingly call for the application of different rules.” Id. cmt. n.4(D). As the
plea agreement acknowledges, Hawkins was subject to “more than one undischarged term of
imprisonment.” R. 21, Pg. ID 40 (paraphrasing Application Note 4(D)).
At sentencing, the court enhanced Hawkins’s sentence by two levels for recklessly
“creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to [the] police officer[s] who [were]
trying . . . to stop her vehicle.” R. 39, Pg. ID 168. In light of that enhancement, the court initially
calculated Hawkins’s Guidelines range to be 30–37 months’ imprisonment. But after finding that
Hawkins’s conduct supporting the enhancement overlapped with her conduct punished by her state
sentences, the court concluded that it was “more appropriate” to sentence Hawkins without the
two-level enhancement. Id. at 196. So the court varied downward to a new range of 24–30
months’ imprisonment.
1 Under U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a), “[i]f the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment . . ., the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.”
-3- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
After considering various mitigating factors, the court then varied downward again,
ultimately imposing an 18-month consecutive sentence. While the court acknowledged that
Hawkins’s state offenses were in some sense relevant to her federal-escape conviction, it found
that a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence was necessary to respect each government’s
interests in punishing Hawkins for fleeing arrest from local officers and escaping from federal
custody at Cherry Health. The court also determined that a consecutive sentence would be “the
better way to effectuate all of the 3553 factors” and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. Id. Hawkins objected and
timely appealed.
II.
Hawkins argues that her consecutive sentence was procedurally unreasonable under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Specifically, she claims that the court offered “no explanation” for varying
from “5G1.3(b) despite finding [that] the state term of imprisonment was relevant conduct.”
Appellant Br. 22.
We review the district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence under Sentencing
Guideline § 5G1.3 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campbell, 309 F.3d 928, 930 (6th Cir.
2002). Hawkins can prove procedural error by showing that the court failed to calculate the proper
Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as advisory rather than binding, consider the § 3553(a)
factors, or adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“When deciding to impose consecutive sentences, . . . a district court must indicate on the record
its rationale, either expressly or by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained
elsewhere.” United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Rodriguez v.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0267n.06
Case No. 22-1503
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED ) Jun 09, 2023 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF SHANNON DAWN HAWKINS, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. After escaping federal custody and evading local police during
a dangerous high-speed chase, Shannon Dawn Hawkins was arrested and charged with both federal
and state crimes. Hawkins pled guilty to federal escape, and the district court sentenced Hawkins
to 18 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to her undischarged state and federal sentences.
On appeal, Hawkins challenges her consecutive sentence as procedurally unreasonable. Because
the court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm.
I.
After serving most of her 16-month sentence for aggravated identify theft in prison, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons transferred Hawkins to the Cherry Street Services reentry center
(“Cherry Health”) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. But with less than three weeks left to serve,
Hawkins took advantage of the trust that Cherry Health placed in her and absconded. Specifically, Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
Hawkins obtained permission to take some items to her car, which was parked across the street
from the facility. Instead of returning, she got in her car and drove away.
Days later, an Ionia County police officer observed Hawkins driving well above the posted
speed limit with one broken headlight. So he attempted a traffic stop. But instead of pulling over,
Hawkins fled.
The officer called for backup. During the chase, Hawkins drove as fast as 90 miles per
hour while evading officers across 3 separate counties. After deploying stop sticks on 4 separate
occasions and puncturing multiple tires, the officers finally stopped her. During her arrest,
Hawkins appeared to be paranoid. She complained of government plots to kidnap and surveil her.
Hawkins was also quite inebriated. Her car was littered with 9 empty beer cans, she had trouble
speaking and walking, and she had a blood-alcohol level of 0.172—more than double the legal
limit.
Months later, Michigan charged Hawkins with two offenses: (1) felony fleeing and eluding
a police officer, and (2) misdemeanor driving while impaired. To protect the community from
Hawkins’s dangerous behavior—indeed, she had committed a similar crime years before—the
Michigan court sentenced Hawkins to 22–60 months’ imprisonment for the first offense concurrent
with a 93-day sentence for the second offense.
A federal grand jury then indicted Hawkins for escaping from federal custody at Cherry
Health in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). In a written plea agreement, Hawkins and the United
States made two key stipulations. First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a)’s consecutive-
sentence provision applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape sentence and the three weeks remaining on
-2- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
her sentence for aggravated identity theft.1 Second, the parties stipulated that “U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)
and/or (d)”—including Application Note 4(D)—applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape conviction
and the undischarged term of her state convictions. R. 21, Pg. ID 40
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) directs that a district court impose a concurrent sentence if it
determines that “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to
the instant offense of conviction.” Section 5G1.3(d) grants district courts discretion “[i]n any other
case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment” to structure the sentences “concurrently,
partially concurrently, or consecutively . . . to achieve a reasonable punishment.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3(d). Finally, Application Note 4(D) says that courts may exercise their discretion under
subsection (d) when “faced with a complex case” involving multiple undischarged terms of
imprisonment “that seemingly call for the application of different rules.” Id. cmt. n.4(D). As the
plea agreement acknowledges, Hawkins was subject to “more than one undischarged term of
imprisonment.” R. 21, Pg. ID 40 (paraphrasing Application Note 4(D)).
At sentencing, the court enhanced Hawkins’s sentence by two levels for recklessly
“creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to [the] police officer[s] who [were]
trying . . . to stop her vehicle.” R. 39, Pg. ID 168. In light of that enhancement, the court initially
calculated Hawkins’s Guidelines range to be 30–37 months’ imprisonment. But after finding that
Hawkins’s conduct supporting the enhancement overlapped with her conduct punished by her state
sentences, the court concluded that it was “more appropriate” to sentence Hawkins without the
two-level enhancement. Id. at 196. So the court varied downward to a new range of 24–30
months’ imprisonment.
1 Under U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a), “[i]f the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment . . ., the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.”
-3- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
After considering various mitigating factors, the court then varied downward again,
ultimately imposing an 18-month consecutive sentence. While the court acknowledged that
Hawkins’s state offenses were in some sense relevant to her federal-escape conviction, it found
that a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence was necessary to respect each government’s
interests in punishing Hawkins for fleeing arrest from local officers and escaping from federal
custody at Cherry Health. The court also determined that a consecutive sentence would be “the
better way to effectuate all of the 3553 factors” and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. Id. Hawkins objected and
timely appealed.
II.
Hawkins argues that her consecutive sentence was procedurally unreasonable under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Specifically, she claims that the court offered “no explanation” for varying
from “5G1.3(b) despite finding [that] the state term of imprisonment was relevant conduct.”
Appellant Br. 22.
We review the district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence under Sentencing
Guideline § 5G1.3 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campbell, 309 F.3d 928, 930 (6th Cir.
2002). Hawkins can prove procedural error by showing that the court failed to calculate the proper
Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as advisory rather than binding, consider the § 3553(a)
factors, or adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“When deciding to impose consecutive sentences, . . . a district court must indicate on the record
its rationale, either expressly or by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained
elsewhere.” United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). But so long as a judge sufficiently
considers the parties’ arguments and fashions a reasonable sentence, “[t]he appropriateness of
-4- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
brevity or length, conciseness or detail” of the decision is largely left to the “judge’s own
professional judgment.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018) (quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only set
forth enough [detail] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis” for his decision. Id. (citation omitted)
Here, the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a consecutive
sentence. The court considered § 5G1.3’s provisions but found that, in the context of this case,
“the better way to effectuate all of the 3553 factors” was to focus on Hawkins’s hypothetical
guideline range without the obstruction enhancement and impose the resulting sentence to run
consecutively. R. 39, Pg. ID 196. This allowed the court to respect the state and federal
governments’ respective interests in punishing Hawkins.
Beginning with the Michigan crimes, the court noted the “very significant” harms posed
by Hawkins’s eluding-police and impaired-driving offenses. R. 39, Pg. ID 195. She could’ve
killed officers and Michigan residents while driving inebriated at dangerously high speeds, and it
took substantial state resources—including four sets of stop sticks—to finally stop Hawkins’s car.
See also id. at 168 (“When the car hits the sticks, there is a risk . . . that the car is going to go out
of control and [harm] the officers.”). Moreover, though Michigan had previously convicted
Hawkins for engaging in similar criminal conduct, that hadn’t stopped her from endangering her
community again. So to preserve Michigan’s ability to prevent recidivism and future harm to its
officers and residents, the court imposed a consecutive sentence.
Turning to the escape offense, the court then noted the federal government’s separate
interest in deterring detainees from escaping custody. Thus, according to the court, imposing a
-5- Case No. 22-1503, United States v. Hawkins
concurrent sentence would improperly minimize the federal government’s interest in preventing
other inmates from escaping federal custody.
Second, the court found that imposing a consecutive sentence, while removing the
enhancement that double counted the state criminal conduct, would be “the better way to effectuate
all of the 3553 factors.” Id. at 196. Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and for the reasons just
discussed, the court found that a consecutive sentence would best reflect the seriousness of the
offense, deter future criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes, and satisfy the
Guideline’s’ policy statements.
For these reasons, the court “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for
meaningful appellate review.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).
We affirm.
-6-