United States v. Shaniquawa Hill

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 29, 2023
• Docket: 21-4716
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4716 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/29/2023 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4716

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANIQUAWA LATIFAH HILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00064-HEH-1)

Submitted: January 3, 2023 Decided: March 29, 2023

Before WYNN, THACKER AND RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-4716 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/29/2023 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Shaniquawa Hill (“Appellant”) pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 75

months imprisonment. Appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level

enhancement for an offense involving three to seven firearms pursuant to the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Specifically, Appellant challenges

(1) the admissibility and reliability of Appellant’s uncorroborated post-Miranda statements

pertaining to three additional firearms (other than the firearm of conviction); and (2) the

Government’s failure to recover and/or examine any of the four separate and additional

firearms the district court attributed to Appellant (other than the firearm of conviction).

As an initial matter, “[f]ederal courts historically have exercised . . . broad

discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent

with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” Concepcion v. United

States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (2022). Turning first to Appellant’s challenge to her own

prior statements, “[i]t is well established that, at sentencing, the district court ‘may consider

relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence

applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy.’” United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2014)

(U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the rules of evidence

are inapplicable to sentencing proceedings). And, even where the rules of evidence do

apply, statements against interest -- supported by corroborating circumstances clearly

indicating the statements’ trustworthiness -- serve as an exception to the rule against

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hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 804(3)(A)–(B). Therefore, we need not assess the admissibility of

Appellant’s prior statements. Rather, we review whether the district court abused its

discretion in determining that the statement was sufficiently reliable to be considered at

sentencing. See United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).

The Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of a sentencing

enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Bullard, 301 F.

App’x 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[a]t sentencing, the Government bears the

burden of proving the facts necessary to show that enhancements are warranted by a

preponderance of the evidence”). Here, Appellant provided a post-Miranda statement to

law enforcement where she detailed the (1) number of firearms she discharged; (2) type of

firearms; (3) location where she discharged the firearms; and (4) manner in which the

firearms were discharged. J.A. 88–89. Based upon the level of detail and context

surrounding Appellant’s statement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that Appellant’s post-Miranda statement bore an indicium of reliability. See

United States v. Blue, 536 F. App’x 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that the

district court did not err in crediting defendant’s post-arrest statement to support drug

quantities for purposes of sentencing). Moreover, Appellant’s statement was corroborated

by text messages wherein she sought to acquire firearms, photographs of Appellant with

objects identified by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives as actual

firearms, and Appellant’s possession of a Taurus PT111 G2A 9mm firearm on the date of

her arrest. See United States v. Cummings, 337 F. App’x 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (holding that the district court did not err in utilizing post-arrest statements for

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purposes of determining defendant’s appropriate offense level where those statements have

established reliability).

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level

enhancement per U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(b)(1)(A) for an offense involving three to seven

firearms. We need not reach the merits of Appellant’s challenge to the four remaining

firearms because attributing the three firearms detailed in Appellant’s post-Miranda

statement to Appellant, plus the firearm of conviction, * is sufficient to warrant a two-level

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) is

AFFIRMED.

* As the Taurus PT111 G2A firearm is a 9mm, it is conceivable that this is the “9” Appellant admitted to discharging at her grandfather’s home the day prior to her arrest. However, this does not impact the two-level enhancement as, even assuming duplication on this firearm, there remain three firearms attributable to Appellant.