United States v. Sha-Kim Mandela

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: August 1, 2025
• Docket: 24-3718
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0385n.06

No. 24-3718

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Aug 01, 2025 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN SHA-KIM MANDELA, ) DISTRICT OF OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION )

Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Sha-Kim Mandela appeals his 120-month sentence,

imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)

and (f). Mandela argues that the district court erred in classifying him as a career offender at

sentencing because his past Ohio conviction for aggravated robbery does not qualify as a crime of

violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. We disagree and AFFIRM.

I.

On April 28, 2023, Mandela walked into and robbed Key Bank in Elyria, Ohio. He gave

the teller a note that read: “Give me the money, no die pack I will kill you and everybody in here.

Stay away from the button.” He took $1,587 from the teller and fled the scene in a vehicle that

was waiting outside for him.

Mandela then drove to a nearby supermarket and disposed of the clothes he wore during

the robbery. A short time later, officers found Mandela’s jacket and hat in the trash bin of the No. 24-3718, United States v. Mandela

supermarket bathroom. Mandela was arrested later that day. Officers found him with $1,671.56

in cash, the robbery note, rubber gloves, and Vaseline in his possession.

The government indicted Mandela on one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2113(a) and (f). He pleaded guilty to that count.

The pre-sentence report initially outlined Mandela’s base offense level under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B3.1 as 20. The report then added two levels under § 2B3.1(b)(1) because Mandela stole money

from a financial institution, and an additional two levels under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) because he

threatened to kill everyone inside the bank.

But the report also outlined an alternative, higher Guidelines range under the career-

offender provision. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. In the report’s view, the provision applied to Mandela

because he was previously convicted of Ohio aggravated robbery, a violation of Ohio Revised

Code § 2911.01(A)(1), and assault, a violation of § 2903.13(A). After a three-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), probation reported Mandela’s offense

level to be 29 with a criminal history category VI. That calculation correlated to an advisory

Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.

Mandela objected to his characterization as a career offender. He argued that his prior

aggravated-robbery conviction did not constitute a crime of violence. The district court ultimately

overruled Mandela’s objection, finding the requirements for career-offender status under § 4B1.1

satisfied. It held that a conviction under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.01(a)(1), when predicated on

a § 2913.02 theft offense, qualifies as a crime of violence because it categorically matches the

Guidelines’ definition of extortion.

The district court relied on the Shepard documents attached to the government’s sentencing

memorandum. The documents set forth detailed descriptions of Mandela’s prior convictions—

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eleven, to be exact. Because we are concerned with the prior assault and aggravated-robbery

charges only, we pause to explain the facts underlying those charges. In September 2009, officers

arrested Mandela after they were called to investigate his attempt to cash a fraudulent check.

During the arrest encounter, Mandela resisted the officers while possessing a firearm. Among

other offenses, he was charged with assault under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.13(A). In January

2010—just a few months after being released on bond—Mandela walked into a store with a

firearm, demanded money from one bystander, and fought with a second one. As a result of this

incident, Mandela was charged with, most relevant here, aggravated robbery under

§ 2911.01(A)(1). Mandela served prison time for both convictions.

For the present case, the district court varied downward from the Guidelines and sentenced

Mandela to 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. Although

Mandela’s counsel argued for a Guidelines-range sentence absent the career-offender designation,

the court declined, citing Mandela’s rapid return to criminal conduct following his release from

custody in 2022.

II.

Mandela timely appealed. His challenge is a narrow one. He contends that his prior Ohio

conviction for aggravated robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under either the elements

clause or the enumerated-offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender provision.

We need not address whether his conviction satisfies the elements clause, as the government relies

solely on the enumerated-offenses clause. Because Mandela’s aggravated-robbery conviction is a

categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of extortion, the district court did not err in

applying the career-offender enhancement.

3 No. 24-3718, United States v. Mandela

A.

The Sentencing Guidelines impose an increased offense level and criminal history category

for individuals classified as career offenders. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, 4B1.1 (2023). A defendant

is deemed a career offender if three conditions are met: (1) the defendant was at least 18 years old

at the time he committed the current offense; (2) the current offense is a federal felony that qualifies

as either a crime of violence or a controlled-substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least

two prior felony convictions that are also classified as either crimes of violence or controlled-

substance offenses. Id. § 4B1.1(a).

This case involves a dispute over the third prong: whether Mandela has at least two prior

qualifying convictions that are crimes of violence. A federal or state offense qualifies as a “crime

of violence” if it is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and satisfies one of two

definitions. First, an offense may qualify under the “elements clause” if it “has as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” Id.

§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Second, an offense may qualify under the “enumerated-offenses clause” if the

elements of the offense match one of the specifically listed generic offenses. See id. § 4B1.2(a)(2)

(including murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses,

robbery, arson, extortion, or certain firearm and explosive offenses as defined by federal law).

The parties do not dispute that Mandela’s prior assault conviction constitutes a crime of

violence. So, the only question before us is whether Mandela’s aggravated-robbery conviction

qualifies as a crime of violence under the enumerated-offenses clause. We review de novo the

district court’s holding that it did. United States v. Cervenak, 135 F.4th 311, 320 (6th Cir. 2025)

(en banc).

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To determine whether Mandela’s prior conviction qualifies as one of the offenses listed in

the enumerated-offenses clause, we apply the categorical approach. Id. This analysis focuses

solely on the legal elements of the offense, not the particular facts underlying Mandela’s prior

conviction. United States v. Butts, 40 F.4th 766, 770 (6th Cir. 2022). Under this framework, we

compare the elements of his prior offense with the elements of the “generic” version of the

enumerated crime. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). A state conviction

qualifies as a categorical match only if its “elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of

the generic offense.” Id. Here, that means if Ohio’s aggravated-robbery statute “reaches conduct

outside the scope of” the generic offense—such that a hypothetical defendant could be convicted

without satisfying all the elements of the Guidelines offense—then the conviction does not qualify

as a “crime of violence.” United States v. Ivy, 93 F.4th 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2024).

The government argues that Mandela’s Ohio aggravated-robbery conviction is a

categorical match for Guidelines generic extortion. The district court so found, and we agree.

B.

Our task is to test the government’s claim by comparing the statutory elements of the Ohio

offense to the generic definition of extortion. Ohio’s aggravated robbery statute provides, in

relevant part:

(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it; (2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control; (3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01.

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For categorical-approach purposes, this statute is divisible. At the outset, subsections

(A)(1)–(3) provide three different ways a person may satisfy the “aggravated” element of the

offense. The provision is also divisible a second way. Under subsection (A), the offense “must

be predicated on the defendant’s commission of a ‘theft offense,’” of which § 2913.01 gives 31

different possibilities. United States v. Wilson, 978 F.3d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting State v.

Tench, 123 N.E.3d 955, 1006–07 (Ohio 2018)). The theft statute lists serious crimes like robbery,

burglary, and aggravated theft as well as “less serious offenses, such as tampering with coin

machines, safecracking, insurance fraud, and workers’ compensation fraud.” Ivy, 93 F.4th at 942.

As a result, a person can commit Ohio aggravated robbery by engaging in any of the enumerated

predicate theft offenses while also “possessing and using a deadly weapon.” Id.

Because § 2911.01 is divisible, we apply a modified categorical approach. Id. at 943. That

allows for a limited inquiry into the record to determine which version of the offense formed the

basis of Mandela’s conviction. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 278. Under this approach, courts may

consult a narrow set of records—known as Shepard documents—such as the indictment, jury

instructions, plea agreement, or plea colloquy to identify the statutory basis for conviction. See

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016); Cervenak, 135 F.4th at 322. When the Shepard

documents don’t clearly indicate which statutory alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s

conviction, we must assume that the conviction rested on the least-culpable conduct criminalized

by the statute. See Cervenak, 135 F.4th at 323.

Here, the Shepard documents confirm that Mandela pleaded guilty to violating

§ 2911.01(A)(1), with the predicate offense being general theft, as defined in §§ 2913.01 and

2913.02. The indictment states that:

[Mandela] . . . did, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 and 2913.02 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 6 No. 24-3718, United States v. Mandela

offense upon [the victim] did have a deadly weapon to wit: firearm, on or about his person or under his control and either displayed the weapon, brandished it, indicated that he possessed it, or used it. R. 23-1, Indictment, PageID 158 (emphasis added).

So, are the elements of Ohio aggravated robbery under § 2911.01(A)(1), based on general

theft under § 2913.02, broader than the elements of extortion as defined in the Guidelines’

enumerated-offenses clause? See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. In other words, could Mandela have

been convicted under the Ohio statute without necessarily admitting to all the elements of

Guidelines generic extortion?

The answer is no. According to the Guidelines, the elements of extortion are:

“[1] obtaining something of value from another [2] by the wrongful use of (A) force, (B) fear of

physical injury, or (C) threat of physical injury.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(2) (2023). Thus, to qualify,

the Ohio aggravated-robbery statute must not reach any conduct broader than this definition. It

does not.

C.

The district court correctly concluded that Mandela’s aggravated-robbery conviction under

Ohio Revised Code § 2911.01(A)(1), predicated on general theft under § 2913.02, qualifies as a

crime of violence because the statute’s elements are “the same as, or narrower than,” the elements

of Guidelines extortion. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.

The first question is whether Ohio aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, when

predicated on general theft, requires an offender to obtain something of value from another person.

See Ivy, 93 F.4th at 946. Because the Shepard documents in this case disclosed that Mandela

committed aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and specified that the predicate theft offense

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of § 2913.02 formed the basis of the conviction, we are not left to apply the least-culpable means

and may instead look at the actual specified offense. Id.

Ohio’s general theft statute satisfies the first element of generic extortion. The statute

prohibits a person from “knowingly obtain[ing] or exert[ing] control over either the property or

services” of another. Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02(A). The phrase “knowingly obtain or exert

control” corresponds to the act of “taking” in the generic definition of extortion, and both

“property” and “services” equate to “something of value.”

True, the state statute outlines multiple means of commission—such as through threat,

deception, or simply without consent. See id. § 2913.02(A)(1)–(5). Mandela argues that because

the Shepard documents do not specify which subsection formed the basis for his conviction, we

must presume it rested on the least-culpable conduct criminalized—namely, a violation that does

not include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another.” But

that argument misses the point. Regardless of the specific subsection, each variation under

§ 2913.02 necessarily involves unlawfully obtaining control over something of value from another

person. That is sufficient to meet the first element of generic extortion. Thus, we hold that the

Ohio aggravated-robbery statute, with a specified predicate theft offense of § 2913.02, does require

an offender to obtain something of value from another person to violate the statute.

For the second prong of generic extortion, we look beyond the theft statute to the

aggravated-robbery statute itself. Does Ohio aggravated robbery require proof of force, fear of

physical injury, or threat of physical injury? It does. Section 2911.01(A)(1) applies when the

offender commits a theft offense while having a deadly weapon on or about his person and either

displays it, brandishes it, indicates possession, or uses it. The presence and display (or use) of a

deadly weapon in the course of committing theft inherently involves either actual force or the

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threat of physical harm sufficient to instill fear in the victim. As the Ohio Supreme Court has

recognized, the act of displaying or otherwise signaling possession of a deadly weapon during a

theft offense functions as a coercive threat that compels the victim to surrender property. State v.

Evans, 911 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Ohio 2009). That threat, whether implicit or explicit, is sufficient to

instill fear of physical injury and satisfies the coercive element of generic extortion.

What’s more, Ohio courts have held that a defendant convicted of aggravated robbery

under § 2911.01(A)(1) also commits the lesser-included offense of robbery under

§ 2911.02(A)(2), which requires proof that the perpetrator “[i]nflict[ed], attempt[ed] to inflict, or

threaten[ed] to inflict physical harm on another.” See Evans, 911 N.E.2d at 894; see also State v.

Harris, 911 N.E.2d 882, 885–86 (Ohio 2009); United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d 298, 303 (6th

Cir. 2017). The aggravated-robbery statute, by definition, thus cannot be violated without

conveying at least a threat of violence. Accordingly, aggravated robbery under § 2911.01(A)(1)

involves, at minimum, the threat of violence sufficient to meet the “force, fear of physical injury

or threat of physical injury” element of generic extortion.

***

Mandela’s prior conviction for aggravated robbery is a match for Guidelines generic

extortion and therefore constitutes a crime of violence for Guidelines sentencing purposes. So, the

district court did not err in applying the career-offender enhancement. See also United States v.

Rice, 2024 WL 3898564, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024) (holding that Ohio’s aggravated robbery

statute was a categorical match to Guidelines generic extortion).

III.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.