United States v. Seugasala

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 24-44
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-44 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:13-cr-00092-RRB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* STUART T. SEUGASALA, AKA Tone,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4235 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00092-RRB v.

STUART T. SEUGASALA, AKA Tone,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2026** Portland, Oregon

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Stuart Seugasala appeals the district court’s denial of his motion

for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). His Rule

60(b) motion asked the district court to vacate its prior order partially denying his

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his convictions for drug trafficking, kidnapping,

and firearms offenses. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court judge,

Judge Ralph Beistline, abused his discretion when he declined to recuse himself

from Defendant’s trial, resentencing, and habeas proceedings based on Judge

Beistline’s undisclosed personal relationship with a witness in the case. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of relief from judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d

977, 984 (9th Cir. 2017). We also review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself

for abuse of discretion. United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir.

2012).

1. Defendant argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 62.1(a) when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion on jurisdictional grounds

and subsequently issued an indicative ruling explaining that it would deny the

motion on the merits once it regained jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a) (If a

party files a motion “that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal

2 24-44 that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer considering the

motion; (2) deny the motion [on its merits]; or (3) state either that it would grant

the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises

a substantial issue.”). Assuming Defendant is correct that the district court

committed procedural error, that error was harmless. Indeed, Defendant argues that

“practically speaking, the court’s [denial on jurisdictional grounds and indicative

ruling] operated as a deferral.” Rule 62.1(a)(1) expressly authorizes a district court

to defer consideration of a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(1). An effective

deferral therefore could not have prejudiced Defendant. Thus, any procedural error

the district court committed was harmless and does not justify vacating the district

court’s order denying the Rule 60(b) motion.

2. To determine whether Judge Beistline had a duty to recuse himself under

28 U.S.C. § 455(a), we evaluate “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of

all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). Conducting “an independent examination of the unique facts and

circumstances” present here, id. (citation omitted), Judge Beistline properly

exercised his discretion when he held that a reasonable person would conclude that

his minimal contacts with the witness would not jeopardize his impartiality. He

3 24-44 therefore did not abuse his discretion when he declined to recuse himself from

Defendant’s criminal proceedings.

Because there was no failure to recuse, Judge Beistline did not abuse his

discretion when he determined that the witness’s declaration was not newly

discovered evidence that could have changed the outcome of the case. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(2); Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990)

(noting that relief under Rule 60(b)(2) is warranted if a movant presents newly

discovered evidence that is “of such magnitude that production of it earlier would

have been likely to change the disposition of the case.”) (citation omitted). Nor did

Judge Beistline abuse his discretion when he determined that the witness’s

declaration did not create “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief from

judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). See Martinez v. Shinn, 33 F.4th 1254, 1262 (9th

Cir. 2022) (“A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is required to show

‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.”)

(quotation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-44