NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7229 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-01590-JLS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOSE ANGEL SERRANO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Jose Angel Serrano conditionally pleaded guilty to drug
and firearm possession charges and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment.
He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from his residence. “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. to suppress, reviewing for clear error the district court’s underlying factual findings.”
United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
1. Consent. “[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Serrano
first argues that his wife, Jacqueline Valenzuela, could not have consented to the
officers’ “[s]earch of the garage in general” because she lacked actual authority.
Serrano contends that the garage was his “personal space in the house,” that he had
“granted [the family] access on a limited basis,” and that any use beyond that basis
would have been contingent on his approval. “A third party has actual authority” to
consent to the search of a space “when [s]he has ‘mutual use of the property [and
also has] joint access or control for most purposes.’” United States v. Dearing, 9
F.3d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1993) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)), overruled on other grounds by, United
States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, Valenzuela had Serrano’s permission to use the garage to access their
refrigerator, care for their dogs, fix their motorcycles, and work on various house
projects. In addition to accessing the garage “for h[er] own purposes,” Kim, 105 F.3d
at 1582, as Serrano’s wife, Valenzuela lived in “their joint . . . residence” and had
ready access to the garage key—each of which is indicative of her actual authority
2 24-7229 over the entire premises. See United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.
1988). Taken together, these circumstances are more than enough to conclude that
Valenzuela had “joint access . . . for most purposes” such that she had actual
authority to consent to the officers’ search of the garage. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171
n.7.
Serrano further argues that even if Valenzuela had authority to consent to the
search of the garage, “she did not have authority over the locked workbench” in the
garage. However, because the officers entered the garage with Valenzuela’s consent,
they did not need probable cause to view the objects inside the garage. See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
2. Plain View. Serrano also contends that Officer Myers’s inspection of
the gap between the locked workbench drawers was not sufficiently “cursory” to fit
within the meaning of “plain view.” Specifically, Serrano argues that Officer Myers
conducted more than a cursory inspection when he “focused on [the workbench],
asked family members if they knew whether it contained drugs, and crouched down
and used his flashlight to peer into” a gap between its drawers. We disagree. Under
the Fourth Amendment, there is no “search” when officers conduct “a truly cursory
inspection,” which “involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view,
without disturbing it.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). “[O]nce police
are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest
3 24-7229 in that item is lost . . . .” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). Likewise, an
officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate what is already in sight does not transform
anything “encompassed within the plain view doctrine” into a “search.” E.g., United
States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1974). And Serrano does not otherwise
explain how, if at all, Officer Myers’s ancillary attention “disturb[ed]” the
workbench. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328.
3. Private Search. Finally, Serrano argues that Valenzuela was operating
as a government actor when she opened and examined the workbench’s contents in
front of the police, triggering Fourth Amendment protections. We have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment only “protects individuals from government actors, not
private ones.” United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2021). As such,
the Fourth Amendment’s protections are “wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure,
even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of
the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental
official.’” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). To determine
whether a private party was acting as a government agent or instrument, we consider
“(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and
(2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement
efforts or further h[er] own ends.” United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th
4 24-7229 Cir. 1982). “In analyzing the second requirement—the private party’s intent in
searching—we look to whether it acted to ‘assist law enforcement efforts,’ or
whether it had a ‘legitimate, independent motivation to further its own ends.’”
United States v. Rosenow, 50 F.4th 715, 733 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Cleaveland, 38 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994)). Where “a legitimate,
independent motivation is established, ‘that motivation is not negated by any dual
motive to . . .
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-7229 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-01590-JLS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOSE ANGEL SERRANO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Jose Angel Serrano conditionally pleaded guilty to drug
and firearm possession charges and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment.
He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from his residence. “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. to suppress, reviewing for clear error the district court’s underlying factual findings.”
United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
1. Consent. “[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Serrano
first argues that his wife, Jacqueline Valenzuela, could not have consented to the
officers’ “[s]earch of the garage in general” because she lacked actual authority.
Serrano contends that the garage was his “personal space in the house,” that he had
“granted [the family] access on a limited basis,” and that any use beyond that basis
would have been contingent on his approval. “A third party has actual authority” to
consent to the search of a space “when [s]he has ‘mutual use of the property [and
also has] joint access or control for most purposes.’” United States v. Dearing, 9
F.3d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1993) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)), overruled on other grounds by, United
States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, Valenzuela had Serrano’s permission to use the garage to access their
refrigerator, care for their dogs, fix their motorcycles, and work on various house
projects. In addition to accessing the garage “for h[er] own purposes,” Kim, 105 F.3d
at 1582, as Serrano’s wife, Valenzuela lived in “their joint . . . residence” and had
ready access to the garage key—each of which is indicative of her actual authority
2 24-7229 over the entire premises. See United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.
1988). Taken together, these circumstances are more than enough to conclude that
Valenzuela had “joint access . . . for most purposes” such that she had actual
authority to consent to the officers’ search of the garage. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171
n.7.
Serrano further argues that even if Valenzuela had authority to consent to the
search of the garage, “she did not have authority over the locked workbench” in the
garage. However, because the officers entered the garage with Valenzuela’s consent,
they did not need probable cause to view the objects inside the garage. See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
2. Plain View. Serrano also contends that Officer Myers’s inspection of
the gap between the locked workbench drawers was not sufficiently “cursory” to fit
within the meaning of “plain view.” Specifically, Serrano argues that Officer Myers
conducted more than a cursory inspection when he “focused on [the workbench],
asked family members if they knew whether it contained drugs, and crouched down
and used his flashlight to peer into” a gap between its drawers. We disagree. Under
the Fourth Amendment, there is no “search” when officers conduct “a truly cursory
inspection,” which “involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view,
without disturbing it.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). “[O]nce police
are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest
3 24-7229 in that item is lost . . . .” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). Likewise, an
officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate what is already in sight does not transform
anything “encompassed within the plain view doctrine” into a “search.” E.g., United
States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1974). And Serrano does not otherwise
explain how, if at all, Officer Myers’s ancillary attention “disturb[ed]” the
workbench. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328.
3. Private Search. Finally, Serrano argues that Valenzuela was operating
as a government actor when she opened and examined the workbench’s contents in
front of the police, triggering Fourth Amendment protections. We have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment only “protects individuals from government actors, not
private ones.” United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2021). As such,
the Fourth Amendment’s protections are “wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure,
even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of
the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental
official.’” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). To determine
whether a private party was acting as a government agent or instrument, we consider
“(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and
(2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement
efforts or further h[er] own ends.” United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th
4 24-7229 Cir. 1982). “In analyzing the second requirement—the private party’s intent in
searching—we look to whether it acted to ‘assist law enforcement efforts,’ or
whether it had a ‘legitimate, independent motivation to further its own ends.’”
United States v. Rosenow, 50 F.4th 715, 733 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Cleaveland, 38 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994)). Where “a legitimate,
independent motivation is established, ‘that motivation is not negated by any dual
motive to . . . assist the police, or by the presence of the police nearby during the
search.’” Id. (quoting Cleaveland, 38 F.3d at 1094).
Serrano claims that Valenzuela intended to assist law-enforcement efforts
since, in seeking to have Serrano arrested, “the purpose of her actions in the presence
of the police was the same” as theirs. But Valenzuela’s interest was not “in
preventing criminal activity[] on its own.” Id. Instead, she told the police that she
wanted Serrano arrested because she believed that he had hidden a gun in their home,
and that she and her daughters would not be safe with him in the home. Valenzuela’s
interest in protecting her daughters was more pronounced because the family had
called the police after one of her daughters alleged that Serrano had drugged and
raped her.
Because Valenzuela “had a ‘legitimate, independent motivation to further
[her] own ends,’” id. (quoting Cleaveland, 38 F.3d at 1094), satisfying the second
requirement of the private-actor analysis, we do not consider whether Officer
5 24-7229 Myers’s actions in accepting her invitation to see what was in the garage,
“follow[ing] her into the garage, h[olding] a flashlight while she unlocked the top
drawer . . . and rummaged around,” and “t[aking] over once she stopped” satisfy the
first requirement. Valenzuela’s examination of the workbench’s contents constituted
a private search and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
AFFIRMED.
6 24-7229