United States v. Serafini

57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9644, 1999 WL 430615
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 23, 1999
Docket3:CR-97-0225
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 57 F. Supp. 2d 108 (United States v. Serafini) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Serafini, 57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9644, 1999 WL 430615 (M.D. Pa. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

VANASKIE, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is a "Jury Questionnaire" proposed on behalf of defendant Frank Serafini, a state legislator who stands accused of committing perjury in connection with an investigation into alleged illegal contributions to candidates for political office. The proposed questionnaire, a copy of which is attached hereto, contains 140 separately numbered questions. The government has submitted objections to a number of the questions.

Consistent with the obligation of the trial judge to superintend the jury selection process, see Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 423, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), I have carefully reviewed the 140 separate questions for purposes of determining whether the inquiries are appropriate, considering the purposes of the questioning process and the privacy interests of prospective jurors. I have concluded that a number of questions will not be included in the questionnaire that will be sent to prospective jurors in advance of jury selection. 1 Set forth herein are my reasons for not allowing certain questions to be asked of prospective jurors.

DISCUSSION

The questioning of jurors that occurs in the voir dire process "serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges." Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899. It is the responsibility of the trial court to ascertain whether a prospective juror is biased. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168, 70 S.Ct. 519, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950). Wide latitude has been accorded federal judges in determining what questions may be asked in an attempt to reveal bias. United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F.Supp. 968, 970 (D.Ariz.1995). As stated in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981):

Because the obligation to empanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.

Whether to allow written questionnaires to be submitted to prospective jurors in advance of the jury selection date, and the content of any such questionnaire, falls within the wide discretion accorded to the trial court in conducting voir dire. Juror questionnaires may serve as a better vehicle to unearth bias than oral questioning in court and may also expedite the jury *112 selection process. In addition to searching for evidence of actual bias, the trial lawyer may seek to use the questionnaire to obtain information to aid jury consultants to compile profiles on prospective jurors for purposes of identifying those prospective jurors more likely to favor the side of the party retaining the consultant. The questionnaire may thus contain a number of inquiries into intensely personal matters that have nothing to do with discovering actual bias. In addition, the questionnaire may also be intended to condition the jury to a party's particular viewpoint.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a "right to ... trial by an impartial jury ", but does not accord the right to either the prosecution or the defense "to have voir dire conducted in such a way as to mold the jury in a way that the jury will be receptive to counsel's case." Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F.Supp. at 972. As stated in Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920, 88 S.Ct. 236, 19 L.Ed.2d 265 (1967):

[T]lfe purpose of the voir dire is to ascertain disqualifications, not to afford individual analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into some mold that [counsel] believes appropriate for [counsel's] case.

It is the trial court's responsibility to ensure that the voir dire is not an overly intrusive inquiry into the private affairs of prospective jurors for the purposes of obtaining personality profiles or molding "the jury in a way that the jury will be receptive to counsel's case." Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F.Supp. at 972. In performing this responsibility, the trial court must balance the right of the parties to engage in a meaningful inquiry against the prospective juror's right of privacy. As explained by Judge Gawthrop in United States v. McDade, 929 F.Supp. 815, 817-818 (E.D.Pa.1996):

[The prospective "jurors'] privacy rights-'to be let alone'-are not, of course, absolute. Their jury service does expose them to some searching inquiry as to such matters as their ability to be fair, their absence of preconceived, fixed opinions. But there must be some balance, some drawing the line, and when hard~charging counsel are in hot pursuit of every little empirical nugget they get their eyes on, it is the trial judge who must, sua sponte, reign them in and give the jurors some protection.

In other words, an intrusion into the prospective jurors' personal and private thoughts is warranted when a question has great probative value with respect to the issues in the case or the ability of the prospective juror to be fair, unburdened by strongly-held opinions. But as the connection between the voir dire question and matters of actual bias or fair-mindedness becomes attenuated, the intrusion into the prospective juror's personal and private thoughts cannot be sanctioned. And when the inquiry has no obvious relevance to actual bias or fair-mindedness, the inquiry should be disallowed.

The comprehensive questionnaire sub-mitteci on behalf of defendant Frank Seraf-mi in this case runs the gamut from the highly relevant and probative to the marginally pertinent and minimally probative questions. Falling in this latter category are a host of questions that will be disal-Jawed.

Specifically, question number 1, which asks where the prospective juror was born and where the prospective jurors' parents were born has no connection between actual bias or the ability to be fair. So too is the inquiry into race and ethnic background set forth in question number 2. Race, of course, can be a legitimate area of inquiry in a case where race may be a factor. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). But race need not be an inquiry in every case, especially where, as here, it is not a factor. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981). Question 2, therefore, will not be allowed.

*113 Nor will I allow question 4, which concerns the current marital status of the prospective juror. Marital status is not an issue in this case, and has no obvious connection to the ability to be fair and open.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9644, 1999 WL 430615, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-serafini-pamd-1999.