United States v. Sean Davis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 24-4652
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4652

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SEAN JARRED DAVIS, a/k/a Mike, a/k/a White Mike,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:23-cr-00003-GMG-RWT-1)

Submitted: February 27, 2026 Decided: March 27, 2026

Before AGEE, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Dallas F. Kratzer III, Alexys M. Bardonaro, Margaret A. Lohmann, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Randolph J. Bernard, Acting United States Attorney, Lara K. Omps-Botteicher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Sean Jarred Davis pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. On appeal, Davis challenges his 240-month sentence,

arguing that the district court erred in applying a four-level leadership enhancement under

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (2023) and a two-level livelihood

enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16). The Government moves to dismiss the appeal

in part based on the appeal waiver included in Davis’s plea agreement. The Government

argues that the only issue not encompassed by the appeal waiver is whether the district

court erred in applying the four-level leadership enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(a). In

response to the Government’s motion, Davis argues that the appeal waiver is not

enforceable because the Government breached the plea agreement and the appeal waiver

was not knowing and voluntary. He further argues that enforcement of the appeal waiver

would constitute a miscarriage of justice.

Initially, “[p]lea agreements are grounded in contract law, and as with any contract,

each party is entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain.” United States v. Edgell, 914

F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The government

breaches a plea agreement when a promise it made to induce the plea goes unfulfilled.”

United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 2017). Where, as here, the defendant did

not challenge the Government’s purported breach of the plea agreement below, we review

his claim for plain error. Edgell, 914 F.3d at 286.

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In Davis’s plea agreement, the Government indicated that it would seek a four-level

sentencing enhancement based on Davis’s leadership role pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(a)

and a two-level enhancement for Davis’s use of a firearm pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).

The parties agreed that they would not argue for any additional enhancements or

adjustments at sentencing. The plea agreement also provided that the district court would

not be bound by the parties’ sentencing stipulations, and Davis would not have the right to

withdraw his plea agreement if the court did not accept the stipulations. The plea

agreement further provided that the Government reserved the right to provide relevant

information for the presentence report (PSR), which could inform the court’s sentencing

decision. In the PSR, the probation officer recommended applying an additional

enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16) because Davis committed the offense as part of

a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood. At sentencing, the Government

argued for the application of the leadership and firearm enhancements under USSG

§ 3B1.1(a) and USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), respectively. Contrary to Davis’s contention on

appeal, the Government, however, did not similarly actively argue for the court to impose

the livelihood enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16). The court adopted the PSR and

imposed the two-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16). Our review of the record

reveals that the Government did not breach the plea agreement.

Next, we conclude that Davis’s appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary.

“Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his right of appeal must

be evaluated by reference to the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Manigan,

592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A waiver is generally

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valid “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights

during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532,

537 (4th Cir. 2012).

At the Rule 11 hearing, Davis affirmed that he had read and understood the plea

agreement, including the appeal waiver, that he had discussed the agreement with his

counsel, and that he had not been pressured or threatened to sign the waiver. Following

the Government’s summary of the plea agreement, the district court asked if Davis

understood the plea agreement. Davis confirmed that he understood that the plea

agreement contained recommendations and that the court would decide whether to accept

those recommendations after the PSR was prepared. The court questioned Davis about the

waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 hearing, and the record indicates that Davis

understood the full significance of the waiver. Our review of the record reveals that Davis

knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence, preserving the

right to appeal only the application of sentencing enhancements under USSG §§ 3B1.1(a),

2D1.1(b)(1). The waiver’s language is clear and unambiguous, and the district court

reviewed the terms of the waiver with Davis at the Rule 11 hearing to ensure that he

understood it. Therefore, we find that Davis’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable.

Because Davis’s challenge to the application of the two-level livelihood enhancement

under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16) falls within the scope of the waiver, we grant the

Government’s motion to dismiss Davis’s appeal as to court’s application of that

enhancement.

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The only claim on appeal not encompassed by Davis’s appeal waiver is the

application of the leadership enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(a). Generally, in

reviewing a challenge to the district court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation, we review

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Allen, 909 F.3d 671, 677 (4th Cir. 2018).

Under USSG § 3B1.1(a), a probation officer is directed to increase a base offense

level by four levels if the officer determines that “the defendant was an organizer or leader

of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.”

To apply a leadership enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1, courts should consider, among

other factors, the exercise of decision-making authority, recruitment of accomplices, the

right to a larger share of the proceeds, participation in planning and organizing, and the

degree of control over others in the conspiracy. See USSG § 3B1.1, n.4.

Here, the district court found that Davis operated a large-scale drug conspiracy and

exercised control and decision-making authority over younger members of the operation.

The evidence supports that finding. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in

applying the four-level leadership enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(a).

Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and affirm the

remainder of the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART