USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4039
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SATYASHEEL S. KORPE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:24-cr-00210-MSN-IDD-1)
Submitted: June 12, 2025 Decided: June 17, 2025
Before HARRIS and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Christopher Leibig, THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER LEIBIG, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, James Reed Sawyers, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Following a bench trial, a magistrate judge found Satyasheel S. Korpe guilty of
violating a closure, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(f) (2024); unsafe operation of a motor
vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(a) (2024); and driving while intoxicated, in
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2) (2024). The magistrate judge imposed a total fine of
$425 and sentenced Korpe to one year of supervised probation. Korpe appealed and the
district court affirmed the judgment. Korpe now appeals to this court. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
On February 24, 2024, at approximately 1:30 A.M., two United States Park Police
officers were performing a closure of Gravelly Point Park, which closed at 10 P.M. The
officers made an announcement over their loudspeaker for the people in the park to leave.
When one vehicle did not leave, the officers again made an announcement that the park
was closed and everyone must leave. Korpe, who was in the backseat of the remaining
vehicle, then got into the driver’s seat and drove the vehicle away from the exit to the park.
When Korpe made a sudden movement with the vehicle, the officers initiated a traffic stop.
Korpe did not stop, but took a right turn, jumping a curb and finally stopping on a grassy
area. Korpe failed several field sobriety tests and the officers placed him under arrest.
When the officers searched the vehicle, they found a bottle of alcohol, a shot glass, and an
alcoholic beverage in the vehicle. Later that morning, Korpe took two breath tests that
measured his blood alcohol level as .135% and .138%.
Prior to the bench trial, Korpe moved for a jury trial and sought to assert an
affirmative public authority defense. The magistrate judge denied Korpe’s motion for a
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
jury trial and granted the Government’s motion to preclude Korpe from presenting a public
authority defense. Just prior to the trial, Korpe also sought to introduce an innocent intent
defense. The magistrate judge also denied this request. On appeal, Korpe argues that the
magistrate judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial and in precluding him from
arguing the defenses of public authority and innocent intent.
With respect to Korpe’s motion for a jury trial, “[i]t has long been settled that there
is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury
trial provision.” Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 540 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Generally, where the punishment for an offense does not exceed
six months of imprisonment, the offense is considered petty and there is no right to a jury
trial. Id. at 542-45. In Blanton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with
driving under the influence, for which he could be sentenced to six months of
imprisonment, a $1000 fine, a suspension of his driver’s license, and/or community service,
was a petty offense for which there was no right to a jury trial. Id. at 544-45. In addition,
“[a]n individual convicted of driving under the influence, in violation of 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.23(a)(1) . . . is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.” United States v. Nachtigal,
507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993).
Here, the offenses with which Korpe was charged and convicted are petty offenses.
Driving while intoxicated is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum punishment of
six months of imprisonment, a $5000 fine, and/or a five-year term of probation. See
Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 2. In addition, the offenses of violating a closure and unsafe
operation of a motor vehicle carry the same penalties. See 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2024); 18
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
U.S.C. § 1865(a). Therefore, because these offenses are petty offenses, see Nachtigal, 507
U.S. at 5, Korpe was not entitled to a jury trial and the magistrate judge did not err in
denying Korpe’s motion.
Korpe also argues on appeal that the magistrate judge erred in precluding him from
raising the public authority defense. “The public authority defense allows the defendant to
seek exoneration based on the fact that he reasonably relied on the authority of a
government official to engage him in a covert activity.” United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d
244, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). To invoke the defense, the defendant must
demonstrate “reasonable reliance upon the actual authority of a government agent to
engage him in a covert activity.” Id. at 254.
Here, the magistrate judge did not err in precluding Korpe from relying on this
defense as there was no evidence to support application of the defense. Initially, the
officers did not direct Korpe to drive his vehicle, they merely directed the occupants of the
park to leave. Therefore, they did not engage Korpe in any covert or illegal activity.
Moreover, even if the officers had actual authority to sanction Korpe’s driving illegally,
Korpe did not reasonably rely on any such authority because the officers did not instruct
Korpe to drive, but merely to leave the park. Finally, even if Korpe could rely on the
defense of public authority, he did not do so here as he failed to comply with the directions
to leave the park because he drove away from the only park exit.
Lastly, Korpe argues that the magistrate judge erred in precluding him from
invoking the innocent intent defense. This court has not recognized the innocent intent
defense. United States v. Galecki, 932 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2019). However, even if
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the defense was available to Korpe, the innocent intent defense merely negates criminal
intent if the defendant “honestly believed he was performing the otherwise-criminal acts
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USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4039
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SATYASHEEL S. KORPE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:24-cr-00210-MSN-IDD-1)
Submitted: June 12, 2025 Decided: June 17, 2025
Before HARRIS and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Christopher Leibig, THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER LEIBIG, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, James Reed Sawyers, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Following a bench trial, a magistrate judge found Satyasheel S. Korpe guilty of
violating a closure, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(f) (2024); unsafe operation of a motor
vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(a) (2024); and driving while intoxicated, in
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2) (2024). The magistrate judge imposed a total fine of
$425 and sentenced Korpe to one year of supervised probation. Korpe appealed and the
district court affirmed the judgment. Korpe now appeals to this court. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
On February 24, 2024, at approximately 1:30 A.M., two United States Park Police
officers were performing a closure of Gravelly Point Park, which closed at 10 P.M. The
officers made an announcement over their loudspeaker for the people in the park to leave.
When one vehicle did not leave, the officers again made an announcement that the park
was closed and everyone must leave. Korpe, who was in the backseat of the remaining
vehicle, then got into the driver’s seat and drove the vehicle away from the exit to the park.
When Korpe made a sudden movement with the vehicle, the officers initiated a traffic stop.
Korpe did not stop, but took a right turn, jumping a curb and finally stopping on a grassy
area. Korpe failed several field sobriety tests and the officers placed him under arrest.
When the officers searched the vehicle, they found a bottle of alcohol, a shot glass, and an
alcoholic beverage in the vehicle. Later that morning, Korpe took two breath tests that
measured his blood alcohol level as .135% and .138%.
Prior to the bench trial, Korpe moved for a jury trial and sought to assert an
affirmative public authority defense. The magistrate judge denied Korpe’s motion for a
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
jury trial and granted the Government’s motion to preclude Korpe from presenting a public
authority defense. Just prior to the trial, Korpe also sought to introduce an innocent intent
defense. The magistrate judge also denied this request. On appeal, Korpe argues that the
magistrate judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial and in precluding him from
arguing the defenses of public authority and innocent intent.
With respect to Korpe’s motion for a jury trial, “[i]t has long been settled that there
is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury
trial provision.” Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 540 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Generally, where the punishment for an offense does not exceed
six months of imprisonment, the offense is considered petty and there is no right to a jury
trial. Id. at 542-45. In Blanton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with
driving under the influence, for which he could be sentenced to six months of
imprisonment, a $1000 fine, a suspension of his driver’s license, and/or community service,
was a petty offense for which there was no right to a jury trial. Id. at 544-45. In addition,
“[a]n individual convicted of driving under the influence, in violation of 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.23(a)(1) . . . is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.” United States v. Nachtigal,
507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993).
Here, the offenses with which Korpe was charged and convicted are petty offenses.
Driving while intoxicated is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum punishment of
six months of imprisonment, a $5000 fine, and/or a five-year term of probation. See
Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 2. In addition, the offenses of violating a closure and unsafe
operation of a motor vehicle carry the same penalties. See 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2024); 18
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
U.S.C. § 1865(a). Therefore, because these offenses are petty offenses, see Nachtigal, 507
U.S. at 5, Korpe was not entitled to a jury trial and the magistrate judge did not err in
denying Korpe’s motion.
Korpe also argues on appeal that the magistrate judge erred in precluding him from
raising the public authority defense. “The public authority defense allows the defendant to
seek exoneration based on the fact that he reasonably relied on the authority of a
government official to engage him in a covert activity.” United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d
244, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). To invoke the defense, the defendant must
demonstrate “reasonable reliance upon the actual authority of a government agent to
engage him in a covert activity.” Id. at 254.
Here, the magistrate judge did not err in precluding Korpe from relying on this
defense as there was no evidence to support application of the defense. Initially, the
officers did not direct Korpe to drive his vehicle, they merely directed the occupants of the
park to leave. Therefore, they did not engage Korpe in any covert or illegal activity.
Moreover, even if the officers had actual authority to sanction Korpe’s driving illegally,
Korpe did not reasonably rely on any such authority because the officers did not instruct
Korpe to drive, but merely to leave the park. Finally, even if Korpe could rely on the
defense of public authority, he did not do so here as he failed to comply with the directions
to leave the park because he drove away from the only park exit.
Lastly, Korpe argues that the magistrate judge erred in precluding him from
invoking the innocent intent defense. This court has not recognized the innocent intent
defense. United States v. Galecki, 932 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2019). However, even if
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4039 Doc: 29 Filed: 06/17/2025 Pg: 5 of 6
the defense was available to Korpe, the innocent intent defense merely negates criminal
intent if the defendant “honestly believed he was performing the otherwise-criminal acts
in cooperation with the government.” Id. at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
is not a “defense per se, but a defense strategy aimed at negating the mens rea of the crime,
an essential element of the prosecution’s case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under this strategy, “criminal intent is negated if two elements are met: (1) the defendant
honestly believed that he was acting in cooperation with the government and (2) the
government official or officials upon whose authority the defendant relied possessed actual
authority to authorize his otherwise criminal acts.” Id. at 253.
Here, the innocent intent defense has no application because driving while
intoxicated is not a specific intent crime. “[I]f a criminal statute does not specify a
heightened mental element, such as specific intent, general intent is presumed to be the
required element.” United States v. Darby, 37 F3.3d 1059, 1066 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, the regulation criminalizing driving while intoxicated
provides that “[o]perating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle is
prohibited while . . . [t]he alcohol concentration in the operator’s blood or breath is 0.08
grams or more of alcohol per . . . 210 liters of breath.” 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2). As the
statute does not specify a heightened mental element, driving while intoxicated is a general
intent crime. Therefore, the Government only had to prove that Korpe intended to operate
the vehicle, not that he intended to operate the vehicle while having a blood alcohol level
above 0.08%. See Darby, 37 F.3d at 1066 (discussing general versus specific intent
requirements). Thus, the innocent intent defense, which excuses the criminal intent
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element of a crime, has no application to the offense of driving while intoxicated.
Moreover, even if the defense could apply to a driving while intoxicated offense, there was
no evidence to support a determination that Korpe believed he acted in cooperation with
the Government when he drove his vehicle away from the park exit while intoxicated.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately addressed in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED