United States v. Sarault

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedSeptember 15, 1992
Docket92-1180
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. Sarault (United States v. Sarault) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Sarault, (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


September 15, 1992

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No. 92-1180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

BRIAN J. SARAULT,

Defendant, Appellant.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges,
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and Zobel,* District Judge.
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____________________

Kevin J. O'Dea for appellant.
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Edwin J. Gale, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
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Lincoln C. Almond, United States Attorney, was on brief, for the
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United States.

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____________________

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*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

SELYA, Circuit Judge. In a postscript to a sordid tale
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
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of greed and corruption, defendant-appellant Brian J. Sarault,

the former Mayor of Rhode Island's fourth largest city, assails

the district court's imposition of a sentence exceeding the

guideline sentencing range (GSR). Finding, as we do, that the

upward departure was fully justified, we affirm the judgment

below.

I
I
_

Background
Background
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On November 14, 1991, the former mayor of Pawtucket,

Rhode Island, pleaded guilty to a criminal information which

charged him with heading an enterprise engaged in a pattern of

racketeering activity, in violation of the RICO statute, 18

U.S.C. 1962(c) (1988). The predicate offenses described in the

information consisted of fifteen acts of extortion committed in

connection with the award of municipal contracts, each in

violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (1988). On January

31, 1992, appellant was sentenced to sixty-six months in

prison.1 The court used the November, 1991 version of the

sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d
___ _____________ __________

1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Barring any ex facto problem, a
__ _____

defendant is to be punished according to the guidelines in effect

at the time of sentencing.").

We trace the architecture of the sentence step by step.

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1Sarault was also sentenced to three years of supervised
release, fined $20,000, directed to make restitution in the
amount of $80,829, and ordered to pay a $50 special assessment.

2

The court began to design the sentence by referring to

U.S.S.G.

2E1.1 which, in respect to a RICO conviction, provides a base

offense level of nineteen or, if greater, "the offense level

applicable to the underlying racketeering activity." The

application notes indicate that, in order to determine which base

offense level results in the greater offense level, the court

should make the appropriate adjustments under Parts A through D

of Chapter Three of the guidelines, using the two base offense

levels in turn, and compare the results. U.S.S.G. 2E1.1,

comment. (n.1). Following this protocol, the court determined

that the level nineteen floor would produce the greater adjusted

offense level (twenty-five) when all referenced Chapter Three

adjustments were implemented.2 Hence, the court used level

nineteen as the starting point in constructing appellant's

sentence.

The court then increased the offense level by four to

reflect appellant's role as the organizer/leader of an extensive

criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a); elevated it another two

levels to reflect appellant's abuse of a position of public

trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3; and, finally, deducted two levels to

acknowledge appellant's acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G.

3E1.1(a). The court thus arrived at a net offense level of

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2The base offense level for the Hobbs Act violations was
ten. See U.S.S.G. 2C1.1, 2E1.5. After making the interim
___
adjustments described in the Application Note, the adjusted
offense level would have been twenty-four.

3

twenty-three. Inasmuch as appellant had no prior criminal

history, the court's calculations produced a GSR of forty-six to

fifty-seven months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing
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Table).

This brings us to the heart of the matter. After

settling upon the GSR, the district judge departed therefrom and

sentenced Sarault to a prison term that exceeded the high end of

the GSR by nine months. The judge linked the upward departure to

the significant disruption of governmental functions that

attended appellant's antics.

On appeal, Sarault challenges only the upward

departure. He does not contest any of the sentencing court's

interim calculations.

II
II
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Standard of Review
Standard of Review
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Our review of sentencing departures is governed by the

tripartite methodology set forth in United States v. Diaz-

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