NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 17-1426 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SANTOS CENTENO, a/k/a Hector Cruz
Santos Centeno, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00634-001) District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) December 12, 2017
Before: RESTREPO, GREENBERG and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 2, 2018 ) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Santos Centeno appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court abused its
discretion in its consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—specifically, by ignoring
factors contained in the statute and considering factors outside it. We conclude that the
District Court’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable, and we
therefore affirm.
I.
Centeno participated in two violent assaults within one week against pedestrians
walking in Philadelphia near the Independence National Historic Park. As a result of the
first assault, the victim—a man who had approached Centeno and the group of men he
was with to ask for help finding his car—suffered traumatic brain injury and required
surgery to repair severe facial fractures and implant a metal plate in his face. He spent ten
days in the hospital, weeks in rehabilitation, and months unable to work. As a result of
the second assault—this time on a husband and wife leaving a restaurant after dinner—
the husband suffered blows to the face, head and back. Centeno punched the wife in the
face and then, attempting to steal her pocketbook, dragged her across the sidewalk. After
being treated in the hospital, she needed orthodontic work and two root canals because of
damage from Centeno’s punch to her face.
In 2013, a jury convicted Centeno of aiding and abetting: assault resulting in
serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)), assault by striking, beating, or wounding,
2 (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4)), and robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2111). At sentencing, the District
Court applied the career offender enhancement and found that Centeno had a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range
of 151–188 months. He was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release, restitution, a fine, and a special assessment cost. The District
Court denied the Government’s motion for an upward variance because, though it found
the Government’s argument compelling, it concluded that 188 months was sufficient. On
appeal, this Court held that Centeno’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) and (a)(6)
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because (a)(4) (assault by striking) was a lesser
included offense of (a)(6) (assault resulting in serious bodily injury).1 This Court vacated
Centeno’s sentence on the lesser included offense and remanded for resentencing.2
Before the District Court resentenced Centeno, the Supreme Court decided
Johnson v. United States.3 Under Johnson, the parties agree that Centeno no longer
qualifies as a career offender. Therefore, at his resentencing in 2017, the District Court
determined that Centeno’s total offense level was 25 and that he had a criminal history
category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 110–137 months. The District Court
granted the Government’s motion for an upward variance and again sentenced Centeno to
a total term of imprisonment of 188 months, basing its variance on Centeno’s criminal
1 United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2015). 2 Id. at 392. 3 135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015).
3 history, his apparent proclivity for violence, and the random and vicious nature of the
attacks. Neither party made a contemporaneous objection to the sentence.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unpreserved claims of
sentencing errors like Centeno’s are reviewed for plain error.4 Plain error “occurs when
there is ‘(1) an error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s
substantial rights.’”5 We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.”6 We defer to the sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the
district court provided.”7
III.
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court’s above-Guidelines
sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. This issue incorporates
the question of whether the District Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors in
its decision.
4 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133, 134–35 (2009). 5 United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008)). 6 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). 7 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
4 To determine if there was plain error, we proceed in two steps.8 First, we examine
whether the sentencing was free from procedural error, i.e., whether the district court
calculated the correct Guidelines range, ruled on motions for departure from the that
range, and considered the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).9 If there is
no procedural error, we then review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.10
The District Court here committed no procedural error. It correctly calculated the
Guidelines range, gave both parties the opportunity to argue, and granted the
Government’s motion for an upward variance. The court did not base the sentence on
clearly erroneous facts; it considered the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its
chosen sentence and its decision to exceed the Guidelines range.11
Centeno’s argument that the District Court relied on inappropriate factors and did
not adequately consider § 3553(a) factors fails. The District Court did not err in
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 17-1426 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SANTOS CENTENO, a/k/a Hector Cruz
Santos Centeno, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00634-001) District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) December 12, 2017
Before: RESTREPO, GREENBERG and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 2, 2018 ) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Santos Centeno appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court abused its
discretion in its consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—specifically, by ignoring
factors contained in the statute and considering factors outside it. We conclude that the
District Court’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable, and we
therefore affirm.
I.
Centeno participated in two violent assaults within one week against pedestrians
walking in Philadelphia near the Independence National Historic Park. As a result of the
first assault, the victim—a man who had approached Centeno and the group of men he
was with to ask for help finding his car—suffered traumatic brain injury and required
surgery to repair severe facial fractures and implant a metal plate in his face. He spent ten
days in the hospital, weeks in rehabilitation, and months unable to work. As a result of
the second assault—this time on a husband and wife leaving a restaurant after dinner—
the husband suffered blows to the face, head and back. Centeno punched the wife in the
face and then, attempting to steal her pocketbook, dragged her across the sidewalk. After
being treated in the hospital, she needed orthodontic work and two root canals because of
damage from Centeno’s punch to her face.
In 2013, a jury convicted Centeno of aiding and abetting: assault resulting in
serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)), assault by striking, beating, or wounding,
2 (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4)), and robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2111). At sentencing, the District
Court applied the career offender enhancement and found that Centeno had a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range
of 151–188 months. He was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release, restitution, a fine, and a special assessment cost. The District
Court denied the Government’s motion for an upward variance because, though it found
the Government’s argument compelling, it concluded that 188 months was sufficient. On
appeal, this Court held that Centeno’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) and (a)(6)
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because (a)(4) (assault by striking) was a lesser
included offense of (a)(6) (assault resulting in serious bodily injury).1 This Court vacated
Centeno’s sentence on the lesser included offense and remanded for resentencing.2
Before the District Court resentenced Centeno, the Supreme Court decided
Johnson v. United States.3 Under Johnson, the parties agree that Centeno no longer
qualifies as a career offender. Therefore, at his resentencing in 2017, the District Court
determined that Centeno’s total offense level was 25 and that he had a criminal history
category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 110–137 months. The District Court
granted the Government’s motion for an upward variance and again sentenced Centeno to
a total term of imprisonment of 188 months, basing its variance on Centeno’s criminal
1 United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2015). 2 Id. at 392. 3 135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015).
3 history, his apparent proclivity for violence, and the random and vicious nature of the
attacks. Neither party made a contemporaneous objection to the sentence.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unpreserved claims of
sentencing errors like Centeno’s are reviewed for plain error.4 Plain error “occurs when
there is ‘(1) an error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s
substantial rights.’”5 We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.”6 We defer to the sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the
district court provided.”7
III.
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court’s above-Guidelines
sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. This issue incorporates
the question of whether the District Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors in
its decision.
4 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133, 134–35 (2009). 5 United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008)). 6 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). 7 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
4 To determine if there was plain error, we proceed in two steps.8 First, we examine
whether the sentencing was free from procedural error, i.e., whether the district court
calculated the correct Guidelines range, ruled on motions for departure from the that
range, and considered the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).9 If there is
no procedural error, we then review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.10
The District Court here committed no procedural error. It correctly calculated the
Guidelines range, gave both parties the opportunity to argue, and granted the
Government’s motion for an upward variance. The court did not base the sentence on
clearly erroneous facts; it considered the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its
chosen sentence and its decision to exceed the Guidelines range.11
Centeno’s argument that the District Court relied on inappropriate factors and did
not adequately consider § 3553(a) factors fails. The District Court did not err in
considering the random and violent nature of the attacks, the severity of the victims’
injuries, or the fact that Centeno’s criminal history surpassed the maximum criminal
history accounted for by the Guidelines. Each of these considerations is grounded in the
§ 3553(a) factors, namely “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need . . . to reflect the seriousness of the
8 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567–68. 9 See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 10 United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2017). 11 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
5 offense . . . [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”12 The court
made “an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”13 Deciding to impose
a sentence outside of the Guidelines, the court “consider[ed] the extent of the deviation
and ensure[d] that the justification [was] sufficiently compelling to support the degree of
the variance.”14 Because the District Court appropriately considered these items under the
§ 3553(a) factors, it committed no procedural error.
Having determined that there was no procedural error, we turn to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, considering the totality of the circumstances.15 In doing
so, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”16 Centeno argues that the court’s sentence
was not substantively reasonable because it did not consider the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct, as required by § 3553(a)(6). We first note that “[s]ince
the District Judge correctly calculated and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, he
necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted
disparities.”17 The court also made clear that it was imposing a sentence outside of the
12 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). 13 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 51; Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 16 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 17 Id. at 54.
6 Guidelines because of the “unique things about this case,”18 particularly the extreme
randomness, the cruelty of the conduct, the significant harm caused (beyond the threshold
of serious bodily injury), and Centeno’s extensive criminal history. These unique
elements distinguish him from “defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct”19 and further indicate that the judge appropriately considered
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Centeno’s conduct and history
provided sufficient reason to conclude that a disparate sentence was warranted.
The sentence was substantively reasonable because the District Court did more
than recite the factors; “it detailed, step-by-step, its individualized assessment of the
sentence that it believed appropriate in this particular case,” and provided reasons that
were logical and consistent with the factors.20 The District Court did not commit plain
error.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Centeno’s sentence.
18 App. 238. 19 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 20 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 571.