United States v. Santiago-Garcia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: September 26, 2024
• Docket: 24-60157
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-60157 Document: 63-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2024

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-60157 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ September 26, 2024 Lyle W. Cayce United States of America, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Alan Giovani Santiago-Garcia,

Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 1:23-CR-96-1 ______________________________

Before Jones, Willett, and Wilson, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Alan Giovani Santiago-Garcia pled guilty, pursuant to a written agreement with the Government, to being unlawfully present in the United States following removal. The district court sentenced him to 27 months of imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Santiago-Garcia has not yet filed a brief.

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-60157 Document: 63-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/26/2024

No. 24-60157

Invoking the waiver of appeal provision in Santiago-Garcia’s plea agreement, the Government moves to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for summary affirmance, asserting that the waiver is valid and enforceable and precludes Santiago-Garcia’s sentencing challenge. The motion for summary affirmance is DENIED because the summary affirmance procedure is generally reserved for cases in which the parties concede that the issues are foreclosed by circuit precedent. Cf. United States v. Houston, 625 F.3d 871, 873 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting the denial of summary affirmance where an issue was not foreclosed). Santiago-Garcia argues that his appeal waiver is not enforceable because it is unconstitutional, basing his argument on a concurring opinion in United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring). However, as he apparently concedes, this court has held that appellate rights are “statutory, not constitutional,” and that even constitutional rights can generally “be waived as part of a [valid] plea agreement.” United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005); Melancon, 972 F.2d at 567. Santiago-Garcia does not identify the issues that he would raise on appeal or otherwise challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his plea agreement. The validity of an appeal waiver is a question of law that we review de novo. Keele, 755 F.3d at 754. “An appeal waiver bars an appeal if the waiver (1) was knowing and voluntary and (2) applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of the agreement.” United States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2014). The record confirms that Santiago-Garcia read and understood the plea agreement, which contained an “explicit, unambiguous waiver of appeal.” United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). Thus, his waiver was knowing and voluntary. See Higgins, 739 F.3d at 736; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Accordingly, he

2 Case: 24-60157 Document: 63-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/26/2024

is bound by it unless the Government breached the plea agreement. See United States v. Gonzalez, 309 F.3d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 2002). Santiago-Garcia does not argue that the Government breached the plea agreement, and the record demonstrates that, to the contrary, the Government complied with each of its promises in the plea agreement. Consequently, the waiver is valid and enforceable, see Gonzalez, 309 F.3d at 886, and it applies to bar Santiago-Garcia’s appeal. See Higgins, 739 F.3d at 736–37; United States v. Walters, 732 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.