United States v. Sanchez

179 F. Supp. 2d 689, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26430, 2001 WL 1699153
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 26, 2001
Docket3:01-cv-00402
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 179 F. Supp. 2d 689 (United States v. Sanchez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Sanchez, 179 F. Supp. 2d 689, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26430, 2001 WL 1699153 (W.D. Tex. 2001).

Opinion

ORDER

JUSTICE, Senior District Judge,

The defendant’s objection to the presen-tence report prepared by the United *690 States Probation Office has been presented for resolution. Because the government incorrectly applied the definition of “aggravated felony” in section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the objection will be sustained, and the presen-tence report revised accordingly.

The defendant in this criminal action pled guilty to illegal re-entry into the United States, under 8 -U.S.C. § 1325(a) and (b)(2). A criminal history investigation revealed that, in 1993, defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine for personal use. Although possession of a controlled substance is classified as a felony under Texas law, defendant was sentenced to eight months’ probation. ‘Defendant was subsequently deported from the United States. Most recently, defendant was arrested for illegal re-entry after having crossed the border back into Texas. The United States Probation Office, in its pre-sentence report for the current offense, applied an 8-level increase to the base offense level for illegal re-entry, reasoning that the prior conviction was an “aggravated felony” prior to deportation under the applicable guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C).

Defendant objected to the presentence report, arguing that his prior conviction for cocaine possession was incorrectly classified as an “aggravated felony.” The government relies on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir.1997), which held, under the previously applicable sentencing guideline, that a felony conviction for simple drug possession should be considered an aggravated felony. The question before this court is whether, after the most recent revision of the sentencing guidelines, the reading of “aggravated felony” in Hinojosa-Lopez remains viable.

Sentencing for an illegal re-entry offense is governed by section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Effective November 1, 2001, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 was substantially revised by the Sentencing Commission, and it is uncontested that the new guideline applies to this criminal action.

Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, a conviction for illegal re-entry carries a base offense level of 8. This base offense level is subject to the following relevant increases for the defendant’s prior convictions before deportation:

« a 16-level increase for a “drug trafficking offense” that resulted in a sentence of more than 13 months, see id. at § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)

® a 12-level increase for a “drug trafficking offense” that resulted in a sentence of 13 months or less, see id. at § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B);

• an 8-level increase for an “aggravated felony” conviction, see id. at § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C); and

• a 4-level increase for any other felony conviction, see id. at § 2L1.2(b)(l)(D).

For purposes of subsection (b)(1), “drug trafficking offense” does not include simple drug possession. The newly adopted definition reads, in relevant part:

“Drug trafficking offense” means an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance ... or the possession of a controlled substance ... with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.

Id. at § 2L1.2, comment. (n.l(B)(iii)). The government concedes that defendant’s pri- or conviction for cocaine possession is not a “drug trafficking offense” under the above definition, and that neither a 16-level nor a 12-level increase is warranted.

*691 The government contends, however, that defendant’s prior conviction is an “aggravated felony” under the new guideline, requiring an 8-level increase under section 2L1.2(b)(l)(C). The government interprets the guideline’s definition of “aggravated felony” as follows:

1. Under section 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, “aggravated felony” retains the meaning given that term in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment (n.2).

2. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), “aggravated felony” includes “a drug trafficking crime,” as defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).

3. Under the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), “drug trafficking crime” includes “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.”

4. Following the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Hinojosa-Lopez, “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act,” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), means any offense that (1) is a felony under the applicable state or federal law, and (2) would be a federal drug crime.

Applied to this criminal action, defendant’s state felony conviction for cocaine possession satisfies the Hinojosa-Lopez definition of “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act,” which makes the conviction a “drug trafficking offense” under the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which makes it an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationalization Act, which makes it an aggravated felony under the sentencing guidelines. Thus, the government argues, the 8-level enhancement for a prior aggravated felony before deportation must apply to defendant’s sentence.

Such a result may seem rational under a strict, methodical interpretation of the guidelines. But this analysis reveals an inherent inconsistency. It is a accepted rule of statutory construction that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” C.I.R. v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 113 S.Ct. 2006, 2011, 124 L.Ed.2d 71 (1993). This principle should apply even more strongly when identical terms are incorporated by reference into a single subsection of a sentencing guideline.

The new guidelines explicitly define “drug trafficking offense” to exclude convictions for simple possession, felonies or not. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.l(B)(iii)). However, the new guidelines’ definition of “aggravated felony” incorporates a definition of “drug trafficking offense” that includes felony convictions for simple possession.

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179 F. Supp. 2d 689, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26430, 2001 WL 1699153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-sanchez-txwd-2001.