COFFRIN, District Judge.
This case raises questions regarding the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act which were left unanswered by the Supreme Court in
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974). The Act (Pub.L. 91-508; 81 Stat. 1121), now codified principally in 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1081-83, 1101-05, 1121, 1122, empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations requiring record keeping and reporting of a wide range of domestic and foreign monetary transactions “where such reports or records have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.” 31 U.S.C. § 1051. Regarding the specific coverage of the Act, it ig sufficient for purposes of this opinion to note that Title I and and the implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury require banks and financial institutions to maintain records of the identities of their customers, to make microfilm copies of certain checks drawn on them, and to keep records of certain other items, while Title II of the Act and its implementing regulations require reports of certain domestic and foreign currency transactions.
Shultz, supra
at 30-41, 94 S.Ct. 1494. In this case we are concerned only with that portion of Title II and its implementing regulations which require persons who transport monetary instruments exceeding $5000 into or out of the United States to file reports with the Treasury Department, disclosing,
inter alia,
the amount of money transported, the name, address and business of the person for whom the money is being transported, and the identity, address and destination of the person transporting the money.
31 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) and 1101(b); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.23(a) and 103.25(b).
The defendant, Delia Aguilar San Juan, was charged by Information on October 22, 1975
with wilful failure to file the reports required in connection with her transportation of approximately $77,500 in cash from Canada to the United States on March 30, 1975 in violation of the above-n.amed provisions. Criminal liability is sought to be im
posed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1058.
Mrs. San Juan has moved to dismiss the information against her on the grounds that the reporting requirements violate her First Amendment right to freedom of association, her Fourth Amendment rights to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Counsel for both parties have filed memoranda of law, and a hearing was held on October 29, 1975.
The Court believes that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shultz, supra
at 59-63, 94 S.Ct. 1494, is entirely dis-positive of defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, and further discussion of that issue is unwarranted.
See also, Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) and
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).
The questions raised by defendant’s First and Fifth Amendment claims, though raised in
Shultz,
were left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case that a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Act by bank depositor plaintiffs was premature,
Shultz, supra,
416 U.S. at 72-75, 94 S.Ct. 1494, and that the First Amendment challenge of the ACLU was speculative and hypothetical.
Id.
at 75-76, 94 S.Ct. 1494. In this case, however, defendant’s First and Fifth Amendment claims arise in a factual context which is entirely different from that in
Shultz.
Mrs. San Juan was the subject of a routine border search as a passenger on board a bus passing from Canada into the United States at Highgate Springs, Vermont. The primary search in the bus led to the discovery of brown paper bags in Mrs. San Juan’s suitcase, and a follow-up search in the Inspection Station revealed that the paper bags contained approximately $77,500 in cash. Customs Inspectors explained to Mrs. San Juan that she was required by law to fill out a report concerning the money she was carrying into the United States.
Mrs. San Juan apparently understood this explanation of the reporting requirement of 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.-23(a) and 103.25(b), but chose not to fill out the form. Whatever her motives were at that time for refusing to comply with the reporting requirement, Mrs. San Juan’s constitutional claims now stand as a direct challenge to her criminal prosecution, and we are therefore obliged to consider whether those claims have merit.
Defendant’s Fifth Amendment claim calls into question the scope of governmental power to compel persons crossing our national border to file reports of information which might later be used as evidence against them or lead to evidence which could be used against them in criminal prosecutions. The Government contends that the reports required by 31 U.S.C. § 1101 and its implementing regulations give rise to only minimal hazards of incrimination and are within the scope of the so-called “required records exception” to the Fifth Amendment privilege, as it was first suggested in
United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259,
47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927) and later clarified in
Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L. Ed. 1787 (1948). The defendant claims that the required records doctrine is inapplicable to the challenged statute and regulations and that the privilege against self-incrimination bars the Government from compelling her to file reports which later might be used against her in a criminal proceeding. As authority for her claim, defendant refers to
Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968);
Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968), and
Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968), cases which substantially limit the scope and meaning of the required records doctrine.
In order to resolve these conflicting claims, the Court must first determine whether or not compliance with the challenged reporting requirement actually exposed the defendant to “real and appreciable” dangers of incrimination.
Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 599, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896). If no such danger existed, or if the dangers were merely “imaginary and unsubstantial,”
Ibid,
the Fifth Amendment would offer no protection to defendant. As stated more recently by the Supreme Court: “In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.’ ”
California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424, 429, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1538, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971).
At the outset, it must be observed that in comparison with reporting and registration requirements which have been held by the Supreme Court to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, the challenged reporting requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act and Regulations exposes the persons it affects to a much lesser danger of self-incrimination. A review of the pertinent cases will illustrate this point.
Albertson v. SACB,
382 U.S. 70, 86 S. Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965) was the first case to establish clear limits on government power to compel self-reporting of potentially incriminating activity. That power had earlier received Supreme Court sanction without clear limitations in
United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927) and
Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948). In
Sullivan,
the court had held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not entitle a bootlegger to decline altogether to file an income tax return, even though specific questions in the return might call for disclosure of the illegal source of his income. In
Shapiro
the privilege was asserted against the record keeping requirements of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which compelled businessmen during the war to preserve their business records for examination by the Office of Price Administration. The Court, enunciating the so-called “required records” doctrine, held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available as to records which were “appropriate subjects of government regulation,” were “ordinarily kept” by the person compelled to produce them, and had “public aspects.”
Shapiro, supra
at 32-36, 68 S.Ct. 1375.
In
Albertson, supra,
the compelled disclosures were of a different nature. That case involved Fifth Amendment challenges to the registration requirements imposed upon Communists by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. Compliance with those requirements constituted an admission of membership in the Communist Party and exposed the registrant to immediate prosecution under the membership clause of the Smith Act, Í8 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964 ed.) and under § 4(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (1964 ed.),
Albertson, supra,
382 U.S. at 77, 86 S.Ct. 194. Obviously, the dangers of incrimination created by the challenged requirements, compelling virtual admissions of criminal liability,
were far greater than in
Sullivan
or
Shwpiro
or in the case at hand. The Court in
Albertson
made the following comments by way of distinction:
In
Sullivan
the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.
Albertson, supra
at 79, 86 S.Ct. at 199.
Similarly, the cases cited in defendant’s brief,
Marchetti, Grosso '
and
Haynes,
each involved registration requirements exposing those affected to a very high probability of incrimination.
Marchetti
and
Grosso
held that gamblers, who were liable to prosecution in practically every state,
Marchetti, supra,
390 U.S. at 44-45, 88 S.Ct. 697, could not be compelled by the federal wagering tax statutes to register prior to engaging in the business of accepting wagers.
Haynes
held invalid certain registration requirements of the National Firearms Act which were directed principally at persons whose possession of the firearm was illegal.
Haynes, supra
at 96, 88 S.Ct. 722. Compliance with the reporting requirements in each of these three cases was virtually the equivalent of “turning oneself in” to the authorities for prosecution. The Supreme Court has also invalidated registration provisions of the' Marihuana Tax Act, which were directed again at a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” — possessors of marihuana — who were subject to criminal prosecution in every state.
Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1968).
In contrast, the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations, which are under attack in this case, are not directed at a group inherently as suspect of criminal activities as in prior cases. The requirements, though not affecting “the public at large”, apply to all persons travelling across the borders with more than $5,000, exempting only specified banks and trust companies and their agents, securities brokers and dealers, common carriers, and travelers check issuers. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(c). It is safe to assume that most international travelers, even those carrying substantial sums of money, are without criminal disposition. To them, the reporting requirements pose no danger of present or future incrimination. Defendant conceded in her brief that “there is not even a rational basis . to conclude that the mere possession of $5,000 is related to criminal activity.” In addition, the disclosures actually called for in the challenged reports are comparatively “neutral on their face,” as was the case in
Sullivan
with tax returns. Form 4790 of the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, the report which Mrs. San Juan refused to complete,
asked only her name, birthdate, address, nationality, passport identification, place of departure and destination, the amount of currency she was carrying, whether she was acting as an agent for anyone in transporting the money, and if so, the person’s name, address and business. These disclosures, unlike disclosures of gambling, criminal possession of a firearm or marihuana, or membership in the Communist Party, would be insufficient, without more, to incriminate her. Finally, the Court notes that international travelers desiring to carry large sums of money across our borders for whatever purpose, but wishing to avoid entirely the reporting requirements challenged in this case, can accomplish both purposes simply by making multiple trips and by taking care never to transport more than $5,000 across the border at one
time. Unlike the gamblers in
Marchetti,
who were permitted to pursue their wagering activities only by sacrificing their privilege against self-incrimination, a dilemma the Court refused to sanction,
Marchetti, supra,
390 U.S. at 50-52, 88 S.Ct. 697, international travelers like Mrs. San Juan are permitted by the Bank Secrecy Act to pursue their foreign monetary transactions without making compulsory disclosures at the border, provided they do so in installments of $5,000 or less.
These significant differences, however, cannot mask the underlying purposes of Congress in promulgating the foreign reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act — purposes which were fundamentally prosecutorial. The stated objective of the Act — to acquire information which would have a “high degree of usefulness” in criminal investigations and proceedings, 31 U.S.C. § 1051 — was not “essentially regulatory.” Plainly, Congress suspected that some of the persons transporting large sums of money across our borders were engaged in criminal activity. See generally, S.Rep. 91-1139 (1970); H.R.Rep. 91-975 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1970, p. 4394;
Shultz, supra,
416 U.S. 25-30, 94 S.Ct. 1494. It was expected by Congress that at least in some cases, compelled reports of foreign monetary transactions would lead to apprehension and conviction of tax evaders, racketeers and other persons using foreign banks for illicit purposes. The reports, not unlike the registration requirements of the Wagering Tax Statute struck down in
Grosso
and
Marchetti,
were “designed primarily for and utilized to pierce the anonymity of citizens engaged in criminal activity.”
Grosso, supra,
390 U.S. at 76, 88 S.Ct. at 717 (Brennan, J., concurring).
With these considerations in mind, the Court cannot say that Mrs. San Juan’s fears of self-incrimination were imaginary or patently frivolous. Compliance with the self-reporting requirements necessarily exposed her to some risk of subsequent prosecution. For that reason, the reporting requirements cannot be equated with the requirements to file tax returns, upheld in
Sullivan,
or to preserve business records, upheld in
Shapiro,
or to comply with the “stop and report” auto accident requirements, most recently upheld in
California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971). Those requirements were parts of statutory schemes which were purely regulatory in nature.
Byers, supra
at 430, 91 S.Ct. 1535. The California “hit-and-run” statute upheld in
Byers,
for example, compelled drivers involved in automobile accidents to stop at the scene of the accident and leave their name and address, and was not “intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents.”
Id.
In contrast, the requirements now under consideration have a stated purpose of facilitating convictions.
Thus, it is a difficult task to evaluate defendant’s claim in the light of existing Supreme Court precedent.
The compulsory foreign reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act are neither as threatening to Fifth Amendment liberties as those struck down in
Albertson, Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes,
and
Leary
nor as innocuous as those held justifiable in
Sullivan, Shapiro,
and
Byers.
Moreover, the Court does not agree with the Government that defendant’s claims can be easily dismissed under the “required records” doctrine of
Shapiro.
That doctrine is applicable only to statutes which are regulatory in nature and to records that are ordinarily kept and that have assumed public as
pects. None of these essential factors, as already discussed, are attributable to the reporting requirements challenged here.
The Court is obliged, therefore, to resolve the “ . . . tension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination” by “balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other.”
Byers, supra
at 427, 91 S.Ct. at 1537. Ultimately, the validity or invalidity of the compelled disclosures depends not on labels which the Court may attach to them, such as “criminal” or “regulatory”, but on the relative weight of competing governmental ,. policies and individual liberties.
Ibid.
As suggested by Justice Harlan, “we must deal in degrees in this troublesome area.”
Byers, supra
at 454, 91 S. Ct. at 1551 (J. Harlan, concurring).
In balancing competing interests the Court concludes that there is one critical factor which distinguishes the compelled disclosures attacked in this case from those struck down by the Supreme Court in other cases, requiring us to give substantial weight to the governmental interests involved. That factor is one which the Court in
Shultz
empha-. sized by stressing the fact that the reporting requirements involve “transactions which take place across national boundaries.”
Shultz, supra,
416 U.S. at 62, 94 S.Ct. at 1518. In contrast, the requirements struck down in
Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes
and
Leary
pertained primarily to domestic activities. The 'Court believes the Government’s power to compel incriminating disclosures of persons seeking to cross our borders, like the Government’s power to make warrant-less searches at. the border,
Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), is exceptional. Customs officers, for example, exercise broad authority to compel invoices and manifests of merchandise imported into the United States, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1459, 1481, 1485, in order to enforce the collection of customs duties under the Tariff Act of 1930. This legislation has been upheld under the Fifth Amendment, in spite of its incriminating potential.
See, e. g., United States v. Vaught,
434 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied,
401 U.S. 976, 91 S.Ct. 1197, 28 L.Ed.2d 326 (1971). Similar legislation authorizing Immigration and Naturalization officers to interrogate persons over their objection as to their right to be in the United States (See, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)) has been upheld as not violative of Due Process.
Laqui v. Imm. & Nat. Serv.,
422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970);
Henriques v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., Bd. of Imm. App.,
465 F.2d 119, 120 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972). Although the reporting requirements of the customs and immigration laws are primarily regulatory in nature, the Court believes they bear a more direct analogy to the requirements challenged in this case, in terms of the interplay of governmental and individual interests which they create, than the requirements struck down in cases relied upon by the defendant.
At the same time, the individual liberties at stake in this case, though by no means to be “treated lightly,”
Byers, supra,
402 U.S. at 427, 91 S.Ct., 1535, are not as seriously jeopardized as in
Albertson
or
Marchette
and their progeny. The Court has already pointed to important factors which make the dangers of self-incrimination created by the foreign reporting requirements comparatively less substantial: (1) their general applicability to
all
persons crossing the borders with more than $5,000; (2) the comparative neutrality of the disclosures required; and (3) the possibility of avoiding the reporting requirements, without incurring criminal liability, simply by arranging to carry less than $5,-000 at each border crossing. In this regard, the comments of the plurality opinion in
Byers
are pertinent here:
An organized society imposes many burdens on its constituents. It com
mands the filing of tax returns for income; it requires producers and distributors of consumer goods to file informational reports on the manufacturing process and the content of products, on the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees. Those who borrow money on the public market or issue securities for sale to the public must file various information reports; industries must report periodically the volume and content of pollutants discharged into our waters and atmosphere. Comparable examples are legion.
In each of these situations there is some possibility of prosecution — often a very real one — for criminal offenses disclosed by or deriving from the information that the law compels a person to supply. Information revealed by these reports could well be “a link in the chain” of evidence leading to prosecution and conviction. But under our holdings the mere
possibility
of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here, (emphasis supplied).
Byers, supra
at 427-428, 91 S.Ct. at 1537.
In spite of underlying prosecutorial purposes, the foreign reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and Regulations create only a “possibility” of incrimination which in the Court’s opinion is not sufficient to require invalidation.
Compliance with the requirements “does not by itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct.”
Byers, supra
at 434, 91 S.Ct. at 1541. Although the disclosures demanded on Form 4790 “when made known, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and charge, those developments depend on different factors and independent evidence.”
Ibid.
Compelling those disclosures does not undermine the accusatorial system of criminal justice which the privilege against selfincrimination was designed to protect. For that reason, the Court is constrained to hold, in what appears to be a case of first impression, that the foreign reporting requirements of the Act and Regulations are not violative of the Fifth Amendment.
We turn now to the defendant’s First Amendment claim. The Court is unable to find any indication in the record that compulsory disclosure of the information sought from Mrs. San Juan in Form 4790 would have a deterrent or detrimental effect upon her freedom to enter into associations or to participate in organizations. It is true that governmental power to compel disclosures of membership in organizations engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs is severely restricted under the First Amendment.
NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S 449, 460-462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1488 (1957);
Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231
(1960);
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,
401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971). But no such disclosures are sought by the government in this case.
The only question on Form 4790 which inquires into Mrs. San Juan’s associations with other persons is Question No. 27, which asks: “Were you acting as an agent, attorney, or in other capacity for anyone in this currency or monetary instrument activity?” To that question, a “yes” or “no” answer is required. If Mrs. San Juan had completed Form 4790 and answered “yes” to Question No. 27, she would then have been required to give the name, address, and business activity, occupation, or profession of the person in whose behalf she was acting. There was no inquiry into Mrs. San Juan’s beliefs or her membership in groups or associations espousing particular beliefs. At most, the disclosures in Form 4790 would have revealed only an agency relationship of a financial or fiduciary nature existing between Mrs. San Juan and another person or entity.'
This type of government inquiry is very different from one enjoining the Alabama Chapter of NAACP to turn over its membership lists, disallowed in
NAACP v. Alabama, supra,
or compelling a school teacher to disclose all his organizational connections over the previous five years, disallowed in
Shelton, supra,
or requiring an applicant for admission to the Arizona Bar to state whether she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or of any subversive organization, disallowed in
Baird, supra.
See also,
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,
372 U. S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963);
Application of Stolar,
401 U.S. 23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L.Ed.2d 657 (1971). To the extent that Form 4790 inquires into defendant’s affiliations or associations, it does not threaten protected assoeiationa! rights. See,
NAACP v. Alabama, supra,
357 U.S. at 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163. We therefore hold that the foreign reporting requirements of the Act and Regulations do not violate the First Amendment.
Defendant also has moved for discovery of any electronic surveillance by government agents. This motion was denied at the hearing upon the representation of the Assistant United States Attorney that there has been no electronic surveillance resulting in information used in connection with the case.
However, both parties were granted leave to file memoranda of law in support of their respective positions with the understanding that the Court would reconsider the motion if persuaded that it should do so. Defendant in her memorandum filed November 14, 1975 urges that the oral disclaimer by the United States Attorney is insufficient and asks the Court to direct the Government “to file an absolute disclaimer in appropriate affidavit form that there has been no electronic surveillance of the defendant prior to the events that' occurred on March 30, 1975.” This the Court declines to do upon the strength of the Government’s representations and the absence of a sufficiently strong showing by the defendant and her counsel that there is reason to believe surveillance has occurred. See
United States v. Alter,
482 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, the Court’s denial of defendant’s motion is reaffirmed.
Finally, defendant filed a motion to suppress and return to her the $77,500 and the documents, letters, and memoranda seized by the Government on March 30, 1975. Defendant claims that the search and seizure were “suspicion-less” in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment. At the hearing on October 29, testimony in connection with
this motion was taken from Robert M. Johnson and Joan K. McCIatchey, Customs Inspectors, and Robert F. Mercier, Special Agent for the Customs Service. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied the motion to suppress but granted leave to counsel to file memoranda of law with the understanding the motion would be reconsidered, if the memoranda indicated that reconsideration was warranted.
Memoranda having been filed, the Court now finds the following facts from the testimony of Customs Inspector Johnson, a highly credible witness. .At the Canadian border, Inspector Johnson conducted a routine examination of the one piece of baggage which defendant was carrying on board the bus. This examination disclosed two brown paper packages at the bottom of the bag. Defendant said the packages contained books, but Johnson determined that the contents of the packages should be inspected for contraband or dutiable goods and decided to conduct the inspection of the packages inside the Customs Station in order to spare Mrs. San Juan the embarrassment of having her baggage examined further in the presence of other passengers on the bus. When Johnson took defendant's bag and asked her to come inside, she became extremely nervous, arousing the inspector’s suspicions. Although the inspector attempted to calm Mrs. San Juan, she continued to be nervous as the bag was placed on a counter and opened for further inspection. Opening the brown paper packages, Johnson and Inspector McCIatchey, who was assisting him, discovered a sum of money estimated to be in excess of $5,000 and a number of letters and other documents. The packages were then turned over to Port Director Scott and have remained in government custody ever since.
Upon these facts, the Court concludes that the search and seizure were well within the power of the government under applicable statutes and regulations, and under the Fourth Amendment. Customs officers are empowered to examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1496; see also, 19 U.S.C. § 1461; 19 C.F.R. § 162.6. Examination of baggage is permitted upon entry at the border whether or not the customs officer is “suspicious” of the owner of the baggage.
Henderson v. United States,
390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). Inspector Johnson was therefore within his power in examining not only the contents of Mrs. San Juan’s bag but also the contents of the brown paper packages. He needed no suspicion to act, since either container might have held contraband or dutiable goods. The entire search was conducted in a manner that was not only “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, but also courteous and considerate.
Even if “suspicion” were needed to justify the inspection of the brown paper packages, which we doubt, such suspicion was amply supplied by Mrs. San Juan’s extremely nervous behavior upon being asked to accompany Inspector Johnson into the Customs Station.
United States v. Glaziou,
402 F.2d 8, 15 n.5 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1121, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 126 (1969).
Defendant also cannot legitimately object to the seizure of the money she was carrying. Forfeiture was proper under 31 U.S.C. § 1102(a)
and
31 C.F.R. § 103.48,
since defendant failed to fill out form 4790, as required by 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(b).
The letters and other documents in the packages were properly seized as evidence in connection with defendant’s alleged violation of the statute and supporting regulations.
Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). There is no necessity for the Court to disturb the denial made at the time of the hearing of defendant’s motion to suppress.
For the reasons stated in the first part of this opinion, defendant’s motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the reporting requirements violate the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment, is denied, and it is so ordered.