United States v. Sambrano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-5140
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 20 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-5140 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:19-cr-01100-GPC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* GERARDO ANTONIO SAMBRANO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 13, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Gerardo Antonio Sambrano appeals his sentence

imposed after he admitted to violating the conditions of his supervised release by

possessing a firearm. Because Sambrano raises his challenges for the first time on

appeal, we review for plain error.1 United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1103

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 We reject Sambrano’s assertion that his attorney did not have the opportunity to object at sentencing. The record shows that Sambrano’s attorney had the (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

1. Rehabilitation Argument. Sambrano first argues that the district court

erred by failing to address his mitigation argument that he rehabilitated himself after

learning about his daughter’s birth. Relatedly, Sambrano argues that the district court

erred by relying on the erroneous belief that he failed to take responsible actions

after his daughter’s birth. We disagree with both points. The district court

acknowledged Sambrano’s rehabilitation argument and adequately explained its

reasons for rejecting it. See United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir.

2013). Before imposing his sentence, the district court told Sambrano, “I’ll take you

at your word that given this gift that has been both – bestowed upon you and your

significant other that is a baby girl, that you want to turn your life around.” The court

then explained that it was rejecting that Sambrano had changed because “[it was]

clear that” Sambrano still was not “ready or wanting to discontinue . . . gang contacts

or discontinue possessing a loaded firearm” and was “prepared to take someone’s

life.” On this record, we conclude that the district court properly considered

Sambrano’s argument, see United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1054

(9th Cir. 2009), and did not clearly err in finding that Sambrano was not

rehabilitated, see United States v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir.

opportunity to, and did, raise objections during sentencing. And there is no indication that it would have been futile for Sambrano’s attorney to raise additional objections. Cf. United States v. Martinez, 850 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017).

2 24-5140 2015).

2. Suspicionless-Search Condition. Next, Sambrano argues that the

district court erred by imposing as part of his new term of supervised release a

suspicionless-search condition that extended to electronic devices without making

the requisite factual findings that this condition was related to his violation and was

necessary to serve the sentencing goals. Because this search condition does not

implicate a “particularly significant liberty interest,” the district court was not

required to state its reasons for imposing this specific condition so long as its

reasoning was apparent from the record. See United States v. Magdaleno, 43 F.4th

1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the court’s reasoning was apparent given its

discussion of Sambrano’s criminal history and its concerns about Sambrano’s

current gang ties and public safety. We reject the contention that our decision in

United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2015), established a

heightened procedural standard for imposing search conditions of electronics.

3. Gang-Paraphernalia Condition. Finally, Sambrano argues that the

district court erred by imposing an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad condition

prohibiting him from using, wearing, or possessing paraphernalia “known to

represent” affiliation with any “criminal street gang.” We have held that conditions

forbidding association with “any criminal street gang” are constitutional. See United

States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v.

3 24-5140 Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008). And while Sambrano contends that the

phrase “known to represent” does not specify that Sambrano, as opposed to the larger

community, must have the requisite knowledge, we construe supervised-release

conditions to require an element of mens rea so as “to exclude inadvertent

violations.” Vega, 545 F.3d at 750 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272,

281 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.

2018). “Thus construed, the condition . . . is not vague or overbroad.” Evans, 883

F.3d at 1161.

AFFIRMED.

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