United States v. Salgado-Ocampo

50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9250, 1999 WL 398026
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJune 16, 1999
Docket97-239(2) (DSD/JMM)
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 50 F. Supp. 2d 908 (United States v. Salgado-Ocampo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9250, 1999 WL 398026 (mnd 1999).

Opinion

ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a limited remand from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for a determination of defendant’s birth date and his status for purposes of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et. seq. Based on a review of the file, record, and all the evidence received at a hearing held on June 11, 1999, the court determines that defendant’s date of birth is November 30,1981.

*909 BACKGROUND

Defendant Andres Salgado Ocampo was found guilty by jury verdict on March 31, 1998, of Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the Superseding Indictment in this case, charge ing various drug trafficking offenses. Defendant was sentenced on July 14, 1998, to 78 months imprisonment and four years supervised release. Defendant then appealed his conviction and .sentence to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

While his case was pending before the Eighth Circuit, defendant claimed for the first time that the date of birth he had' provided to federal agents, the court, and the probation officer,. November 30, 1978, was false. Defendant now claims his date of birth is November 30, 1981, and that this court had no jurisdiction to try Him for the cocaine distribution offenses charged in the Second Superseding Indictment without following the procedures set forth ' in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.

Because a factual dispute exists regarding defendant’s date of birth, the Eighth Circuit remanded defendant’s case for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentia-ry hearing to resolve the issue of defendant’s age. The court held such a hearing on June 11, 1999, and issued a preliminary order on that date establishing defendant’s date of birth as November 30, 1981. 1 This order will provide the reasons behind the court’s determination.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

From the paucity of decisions dealing with a defendant who was assumed to be an adult but who later challenges this status, the court has determined the evidentiary standard which controls here. The initial burden of proving defendant’s age falls on the government, which must offer prima facie evidence of defendant’s adult status. If the government satisfies this burden, defendant must then come forward with evidence of‘his juvenile status. If the defendant comes forward with such evidence, the government has an opportunity to rebut with any additional information. See U.S. v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839, 102 S.Ct. 146, 70 L.Ed.2d 121 (1981) (agreeing with district court’s determination that the government has the obligation of proving that a defendant is an adult, but if defendant does not offer verifiable personal data to determine his age the burden should fall on defendant to show his juvenile status). See also U.S. v. Garcia-Flores-, 925 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir.1991) (unpublished opinion, text available at 1991 WL 17448); State v. Sandom-ingo, 39 Wash.App. 709, 695 P.2d 592, 594 (1985) (“[W]hen there is a reasonable basis for believing a defendant to be an adult, and the State has no means of verifying his claims, the defendant has the burden of proving his minority.”). After receiving such evidence, the court must determine from the preponderance of the evidence the date on which defendant was born. Garcia-Flores, 1991 WL 17448 at *3 (upholding trial court’s decision concerning defendant’s age under preponderance of evidence standard).

B, Evidence Presented

At the outset, the court notes the impossibility of definitively determining defendant’s date of birth. Evidence received at the hearing indicated that birth records in Amate Amarillo, Guerrero, Mexico, defendant’s purported place of birth, are premature at best. Indeed, the evidence indicated that defendant’s name could not be found in the written birth registry. As will be clear from the ensuing discussion, the lack of definitive proof has forced the *910 court to examine, and in some cases rely on, evidence whose authenticity and reliability is not beyond reproach.

The court first finds that the government has offered prima facie evidence that defendant’s date of birth is November 30, 1978, and that he should be considered an adult for purposes of this case. At the hearing, government witnesses testified that throughout the proceedings in this case defendant has asserted that his date of birth is November 30, 1978. Deputy United States Marshal John Dillon testified that at the time of defendant’s arrest and booking defendant informed authorities that his date of birth was November 30, 1978. See Government Exhibit 7 (United States Marshal Service personal history for defendant, completed with information provided by defendant himself, showing his date of birth as “11/30/1978”). Special Agent Emilio Munoz of the Drug Enforcement Agency testified that he spoke with the defendant after his arrest, and when asked his date of birth for purposes of a “Personal History Report,” defendant indicated his date of birth was “11-30-78.” See Government Exhibit 2 (copy of personal history report for defendant). At his arraignment, defendant, when asked his age, indicated he was 18 years old. See Government Exhibit 6 at page 3. United States Probation Officer Joan White testified that when she interviewed defendant during the preparation of the presentence investigation report, defendant informed her that his date of birth was November 30,1978. 2

The government also offered a number of other exhibits showing that defendant’s date of birth is November 30, 1978. A traffic ticket issued to defendant on March 21, 1997, shows defendant’s date of birth as “11 30 78.” See Government Exhibit 1. This is not surprising, however, given that defendant provided the Minnesota Department of Motor Vehicles with that same date of birth and it therefore appeared on his Minnesota driver’s license. See Government Exhibit 8 (applications made by defendant for a Minnesota Driver’s License all showing date of birth as “11-30-78”). While defendant apparently provided a Mexican birth certificate as proof of age to the Department of Motor Vehicles, that birth certificate was not retained by the State of Minnesota.

The government has also offered proof of what it contends is the suspicious similarity of birth certificates of defendant, Carlos Alvear, and Eduardo Castillo, all of whom have recently come forward in separate cases arguing that they are in fact juveniles.

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Bluebook (online)
50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9250, 1999 WL 398026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-salgado-ocampo-mnd-1999.