United States v. Salazar

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-1088
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-1088 United States v. Salazar

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand twenty-five.

Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNY CHIN, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 24-1088

MIGUEL R. SALAZAR,

Defendant-Appellant. * __________________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: EMILY J. DEAN (with Susan Corkery on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, Of Counsel, for Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: WILLIAM MOSS, Rule 46.1(e) Law School Graduate (with Sarah Baumgartel, Of Counsel, on the brief), Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York (Hall, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED IN PART and the case is

REMANDED.

Defendant-Appellant Miguel Salazar was convicted of possession of child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to 30 months of

imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. On July 6, 2023, we vacated a

supervised-release condition that limited Salazar to a single electronic device and permitted access

to and monitoring of data on Salazar’s electronic device at any time. See United States v. Salazar,

No. 22-1385-CR, 2023 WL 4363247 (2d Cir. July 6, 2023). On remand, the district court revised

the monitoring condition to require that the government have reasonable suspicion before

searching Salazar’s devices and allow him multiple devices so long as they are subject to electronic

monitoring. The condition also requires Salazar to identify any computer systems or internet-

capable devices that he has access to, and that he allow examination of the devices and installation

of monitoring software and hardware at his expense. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We “review challenges to conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2025) (per curiam).

Salazar argues that the district court’s reasons for imposing the monitoring condition,

2 which applies to both personal devices and devices that Salazar would access in a workplace, were

neither sufficiently explained nor otherwise self-evident in the record. “A district court is

required to make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a special

condition of supervised release, and to state on the record the reason for imposing it; the failure to

do so is error. In the absence of such an explanation, we may uphold the condition imposed only

if the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record.” United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d

198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a district

court may only impose special conditions that are reasonably related to the sentencing factors and

“which ‘involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ for these purposes.”

Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)).

Salazar contends that the district court failed to conduct an “individualized assessment”

because it relied “on broad statements . . . untethered to any specific consideration to the facts and

circumstances in this particular case.” United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 314 (2d Cir.

2024). We agree. The district court stated that “there is a very real chance that [Salazar] could

engage in this conduct,” but did not discuss Salazar’s individual characteristics or his criminal

conduct in reaching that conclusion. Joint App’x at 200. The court stated only that the

monitoring condition was needed because the court had “had a number of defendants who have

used their work computers to engage in the viewing and possession of child pornography,” and

that without the condition, “40 hours of any given week . . . would be beyond the reach of the

Court in terms of monitoring.” Joint App’x at 199-201. This reasoning, however, is both

circular and unspecific to Salazar.

Further, it is not self-evident in the record that the condition is reasonably related to the

3 sentencing factors and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.

Salazar is a first-time offender who was 22 years old at the time of his arrest, and there was no

evidence that Salazar viewed child pornography outside of his home or concealed his use of such

materials, let alone accessed child pornography at work or on a workplace device. See United

States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181, 195 (2d Cir. 2017) (vacating employer notification condition

where “the relationship between [that condition] and [the] offense,” which was possession of child

pornography, and defendant’s circumstances, which included that he was a first-time offender, was

“not readily apparent”). And there are a variety of less restrictive means available to accomplish

the district court’s goal of protecting the public. See, e.g., id. at 186 (computer monitoring

condition carved out use of computers at defendant’s place of employment); United States v. Ruff,

795 F. App’x 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that if defendant’s employment entailed “access to a

computer that could be used to access child pornography,” the probation officer could then

recommend that the district court “add any additional conditions that are reasonably tailored to

protect the employer and the public” (emphasis added)). Meanwhile, the condition seriously

hampers Salazar’s ability to find gainful employment, as evidenced by the district court’s denial

of Salazar’s request to modify the condition to accommodate a potential job at a food pantry. 1

Accordingly, we vacate the monitoring special condition and remand for the district court

to consider whether to re-impose the condition and, if so, whether to modify it. If the district

court reimposes the condition (as is or modified), it shall explain its basis for doing so, including

addressing whether the condition is reasonably related to the sentencing factors, such as the nature

1 The parties dispute whether the monitoring condition is an occupational restriction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5. In light of the above, however, we need not reach this issue.

4 and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, and involves

no greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED IN PART and

the case is REMANDED for the district court to reconsider the electronic monitoring special

condition.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court