United States v. Sacksith

397 F. Supp. 2d 594, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26142, 2005 WL 2979570
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 1, 2005
DocketCRIM.A. 04-390-I
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 397 F. Supp. 2d 594 (United States v. Sacksith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Sacksith, 397 F. Supp. 2d 594, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26142, 2005 WL 2979570 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATZ, Senior District Judge.

I. FACTS

On June 10, 2004, Defendant Sacksith, a Laotian citizen who has been living in the United States since 1989, was arrested for his role in the attempted sale of approximately 10,000 ecstasy pills. Defendant was subsequently indicted on three counts: 1) conspiracy to distribute “MMDA,” commonly known as ecstasy; 2) knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and “MMDA”; and 3) committing the offense charged in Count Two within 1000 feet of a public playground. 1 On October 26, 2004, the government filed an “Information Supporting Enhanced Sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851,” which exposed Defendant to a mandatory life sentence for Counts Two and Three because he had two prior convictions for drug trafficking felonies. Despite this mandatory legal exposure, Defendant expressed his desire to enter a guilty plea so that he could accept responsibility for what he had done.

On December 6, 2004, the Court held a change of plea hearing, at which a Laotian interpreter was present to ensure Defendant was able to fully participate in the plea proceeding. The Court conducted a full colloquy, including a thorough explanation of the factual basis for the charges, Defendant’s rights, and the mandatory legal exposure he faced by pleading guilty. Throughout the colloquy, Defendant remained steadfast in his desire to plead guilty. The Court found that Defendant was competent to plead, that he understood his rights and mandatory legal exposure and that the plea was voluntary. For those reasons, the Court accepted Defendant’s plea and scheduled sentencing for October 20, 2005.

Several weeks before sentencing, however, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea on the grounds that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court has held an evidentiary hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court shall grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. “The burden of demonstrating a ‘fair and just’ reason falls on the defendant, and that burden is substantial.” United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir.2003). Here, Defendant does not meet that burden.

The Court examines three factors when determining whether Defendant has a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing his plea: 1) “whether the defendant asserts his innocence”; 2) “the strength of the defendant’s reason to withdraw the plea”; and 3) “whether the government would be prejudiced by his withdrawal.” United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir.1989)

A. An Assertion of Innocence by Defendant

Although an assertion of innocence would weigh in favor of granting Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, the facts on the record do not support the *596 conclusion that Defendant is innocent of the crimes charged. “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in the record that support a claimed defense.” United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818 (quoting United States v. Salgado-Ocam-po, 159 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.1998)).

In this case, Defendant admitted guilt to the charges numerous times during the plea hearing. See e.g. Plea Hearing Transcript at 19 (“I did make a phone call and brought friends to meet other people.”). Additionally, Defendant adopted as accurate the Government’s summary of the evidence against him, which included all elements necessary to convict Defendant of all three counts, including the identity and weight of the controlled substance and the location of the attempted sale.

Court: Did you hear the summary that [the prosecutor] said.
Defendant: Yes, I did' hear what he said.
Court: Do you agree with it.
Defendant: Yes, that’s what happened that day. That’s how it happened.

Plea Hearing Transcript at 31. Defendant never credibly disputes that his criminal actions satisfy all the elements necessary for conviction of the three counts. Although he does attempt to minimize his role in the offense by claiming he never touched the drugs, that is not an assertion of innocence. See Holbrook v. Folino, No. 03-6841, 2005 WL 469589, at * 6 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 28, 2005)(holding that Petitioner’s argument that “he played a minor role in the substantive offense also does not prove actual innocence”). Even if Defendant did not touch the drugs, he was at least in joint constructive possession of the drugs, and by helping to broker the drug deal, he aided and abetted his co-felons in the attempted drug sale. See United States v. Martorano, 709 F.2d 863, 866 (3d Cir.1983)(“Constructive possession may be found if the evidence shows that the defendant was knowingly in a position, or had the right to exercise dominion and control of the drug either personally or through others.”). As such, he did not identify adequate facts to support a claim of actual innocence.

B. Strength of Defendant’s Reason to Withdraw the Plea

Defendant avers that the his plea was “not supported by a full understanding of the nature of the proceeding... or ..the severest consequences” of the plea as a result of his limited speaking ability in the English language. Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea at 2. The record, however, does not support Defendant’s claim.

A review of the record demonstrates that Defendant understood the nature of the proceeding, despite his assertion to the contrary. The Court conducted a thorough colloquy as prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in order to ensure that Defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See FED. R. CRIM. P 11; see also United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1973)(“Rule 11 is designed to assure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).

Defendant’s answers during the plea colloquy were responsive and coherent. See Plea Hearing Transcript; United States v. Nostratis,

Related

United States v. Sacksith
248 F. App'x 430 (Third Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
397 F. Supp. 2d 594, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26142, 2005 WL 2979570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-sacksith-paed-2005.