United States v. Rye

70 F.2d 150, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4088
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 5, 1934
DocketNo. 930
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 70 F.2d 150 (United States v. Rye) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rye, 70 F.2d 150, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4088 (10th Cir. 1934).

Opinion

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

This is a suit on a war risk insurance contract. Trial by jury was waived. The court found that plaintiff became totally and permanently disabled on November 10, 1918, while the policy was in force. Judgment was rendered accordingly and the ease came here on appeal.

It is contended that the finding of total and permanent disability is not supported by substantial evidence. A proper motion was interposed at the close of the evidence. That presents the question for review. The burden was upon plaintiff to establish by substantial evidence that he became totally and permanently disabled while the policy was in force. United States v. Rentfrow (C. C. A.) 60 F.(2d) 488; United States v. Thomas (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 245; United States v. Pearson (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 996; United States v. Harrell (C. C. A.) 66 F.(2d) 231. It, therefore, is necessary to review the evidence.

Plaintiff suffered ten gunshot wounds in line of duty at Metz, France, on November 10, 1918. He was sent immediately to an evacuation hospital and spent the ensuing eleven months and twenty days in base hospitals in France and in the New York City Hospital. He was wounded in both arms and shoulders. Pertinent parts of his testimony describing in detail the nature and extent of his injuries are set forth in footnote.1 [152]*152That testimony is not contradicted in any material respect. Dr. Joblin examined him before his discharge and many times since. He described the insured’s condition2 and stated that in his opinion the disability had been total and permanent since the date of discharge. Dr. Neely, formerly employed by the government as an X-ray specialist, examined him and made an X-ray of his right arm. It was his opinion that the disability was as complete and permanent as though the arm had been amputated at the shoulder. He did not examine the left arm.

Plaintiff was employed as straw boss on certain highway construction about a year, beginning in April, 1920. He did very little work; he merely directed the men. His father was county commissioner and he secured the position — a political one — through that source. His father did some of the work for him. He was there only about half the time and carried his arm in a brace. When his father’s term of office expired, he lost his position. He and his wife operated a small grocery for about six or eight months. The stoek was worth from $300 to $400. Sometimes he waited on customers and sometimes she did. She did it alone when he did not feel well. He then tried to raise chickens. He could not mix the feed, nor clean the-houses, nor even gather eggs at times. He conducted a small restaurant for about two months. Two women cooked and served at the counter. He attended the cash register and cigar counter. Each of the ventures was a financial failure. He was employed as corral foreman at a highway construction camp for two or three months. The work was light, but he was unable to perform it and was discharged on that account. He was given voca-' tional training for a clerical position in railway service, but due to his physical condition was unable to secure a position of that kind. He applied to Magnolia Petroleum Company for employment and was rejected for like reason.

Total and permanent disability, as that term is used in a case of this kind, means inability to follow continuously a substantially gainful occupation. It has been held that in-[153]*153capacity of one arm does not constitute such disability. United States v. Ivey (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 653; United States v. Thomas (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 192; Hobin v. United States (D. C.) 59 F.(2d) 224. But this ease goes far beyond that point. The insured here has no use of one arm and the other is seriously impaired. He approaches closely the condition of an armless man. In addition, he suffers almost continuously, wears a brace or sling most of the time and frequently places his arm in a stationary position to alleviate the pain. When it becomes extreme, he takes medicine to relieve it. He can write only twenty or thirty minutes with his right hand and he is unable to write any with his left. He is compelled to shave with his left hand.

Despite this deplorable condition, through commendable courage, he worked some but it was. periodical, punctuated with frequent interruptions caused by his physical condition. One may work spasmodically with frequent interruptions and changes in consequence of his disability and still be unable to follow continuously a substantially gainful occupation. Total and permanent disability does not necessarily require a bedridden condition. In Nicolay v. United States (C. C. A.) 51 F.(2d) 170, 173 — frequently cited with approval — it was said:

“An insured who is able to work only spasmodically, with frequent interruptions or change of jobs made necessary by his condition, cannot be said to be able to work with substantial continuity. Again, the word ‘impossible’ must be given a rational meaning; it cannot fairly be said that it is ‘possible’ for an insured to work because, under the stimulus of a strong will power, it is physically possible for him to stick to a task, if the work is done at the risk of substantially aggravating his condition. * * *
“No hard and fast rule can be laid down to the effect that, if the insured works a certain length of time, he cannot recover. The nature of the work done, the circumstances under which it is done, the character of work the insured is equipped to do, and perhaps other circumstances, all enter into the equation. While the rule may be difficult of application, it is nevertheless a simple one, and it is that the question of the totality and permanence of the disability is a question of fact for the jury, if the evidence is such that reasonable men may differ as to the answer.”

Appropriate application of that exposition of the constituent elements of total and permanent disability in a case of this kind convinces us that the finding of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence. Compare United States v. Pearson, supra. In reaching this conclusion we bear in mind that inability to pursue a pre-war occupation is not the test. Plaintiff was a pumper, tool dresser, and roust-about in oil fields before enlisting. If he is unable to pursue either of those occupations but can follow continuously some other substantially gainful work, he is not totally and permanently disabled. United States v. Howard (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 533; United States v. Luckinbill (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 1000. He has only a seventh grade education, knows nothing of any mechanical trade, and has suffered complete incapacity of one arm and serious impairment of the other. He tried to work but could not do so, and his efforts were not confined to his pre-war occupation. He should not be penalized for making the effort.

It is further contended that the court erred in awarding recovery from November 10, 1918, the date of injury, instead of October 31, 1919, the date of discharge. Appellee alleged that he became totally and permanently disabled on the former date and the court expressly so • found. Apparently through inadvertence he prayed for recovery from the subsequent date. The allegation of disability was enough to impart notice that he sought recovery from that date and would be entitled to it if the proof sustained the allegation. The discrepancy in dates was not prejudicial. Appellant was confined in hospitals throughout the period in question and there can be no doubt that he was then totally and permanently disabled.

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Bluebook (online)
70 F.2d 150, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rye-ca10-1934.