United States v. Ryan Dales

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4202 Doc: 64 Filed: 06/23/2026 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4202

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RYAN E. DALES, a/k/a Ryan Dales,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00026-GLR-1)

Argued: May 7, 2026 Decided: June 23, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, HARRIS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Steven M. Klepper, KRAMON & GRAHAM, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David Christian Bornstein, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4202 Doc: 64 Filed: 06/23/2026 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

This appeal concerns the validity of a warrant to search Ryan Dales’s Baltimore

apartment. Federal agents suspected Dales had committed wire fraud and an agent sought

a warrant to search Dales’s residence. The agent supplied an affidavit detailing Dales’s

suspected criminal activities to a magistrate judge who issued the requested warrant.

Pursuant to that warrant, investigators searched Dales’s apartment where they discovered

evidence of other crimes.

Following the search, Dales was indicted on several federal crimes. He filed a

motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his apartment, arguing that

the agent’s affidavit failed to establish probable cause that evidence of wire fraud would

be discovered in his residence. The district court denied Dales’s motion, ruling that the

affidavit established probable cause. The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that

the evidence collected during the search need not be suppressed under the good-faith

exception, which applies when law enforcement relies in an objectively reasonable manner

on a warrant that is subsequently deemed deficient. Dales appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion to suppress.

We review “the legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion to suppress” de

novo, and any factual findings “relating thereto” for clear error. United States v. Sanders,

107 F.4th 234, 250 (4th Cir. 2024). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government. Id. Whether the good faith exception applies is a legal

conclusion that we review de novo. United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 334–35 (4th

Cir. 2014).

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“[T]he good-faith exception precludes the suppression of seized evidence where law

enforcement has relied on a search warrant in an ‘objectively reasonable’ manner, even if

the warrant is later found to be deficient.” United States v. Ordonez-Zometa, 141 F.4th 531,

556 (4th Cir. 2025). This exception does not apply if “a reasonably well trained officer

would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”

United States v. Henderson, 136 F.4th 527, 531 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.

Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002)). This occurs when the warrant is “so facially

deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be

seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” United States

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).

Having carefully reviewed the record before us on appeal and the submissions of

the parties, we hold that the district court’s application of the good-faith exception was

proper. The federal agents executing the search warrant could have reasonably presumed

the warrant was valid. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to

suppress.

AFFIRMED