United States v. Russell
This text of United States v. Russell (United States v. Russell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STAES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Action No. 18-cr-103-1 (TSC)
GINA RUSSELL, et al.
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are three pro se motions filed by incarcerated defendant Gina Russell—to
vacate her sentence for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to reduce her restitution
pursuant to the same, and to return her seized property pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(g) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983. Mot. to Vacate Conviction for Improper Venue at 1,
ECF No. 551 (“Mot. to Vacate Conviction”); Mot. to Reduce Restitution at 1-2, ECF No. 522
(“Mot. to Reduce Restitution”); Motion for Return of Property Post-Trial at 1-2, ECF No. 533
(“Mot. to Return Prop.”). The government opposes. Govt’s Omnibus Resp. to Def.’s Pro Se
Mots. to be Resentenced Based on Improper Venue, to Have Her Restitution Obligation Reduced
to Zero, and to Have Prop. Returned at 1-6, ECF No. 555 (“Gov’t’s Opp.”). Because each of
Russell’s motions are foreclosed by her plea agreement and the forfeiture order entered as part of
that agreement, the court will DENY each of them.
Indicted in a multi-count and multi-defendant embezzlement scheme, Russell was
convicted for interference with interstate commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
See Judgment as to Gina Russell at 2, ECF No. 544 (“Judgment”); Indictment, ECF No. 1. On
July 30, 2019, before Judge Sullivan and pursuant to a sealed cooperation agreement, Russell
Page 1 of 4 pleaded guilty, waived her right to trial by jury, and consented to forfeit certain property. Sealed
Plea Agreement at 1-16, ECF No. 144 (“Sealed Plea Agreement”); Sealed Wavier of Trial by Jury
at 1, ECF No. 145 (“Sealed Waiver”); Sealed Consent Ord. of Forfeiture at 1-7, ECF No. 147
(“Sealed Consent Ord.”). On October 17, 2022, while she was awaiting sentencing, Russell’s case
was randomly reassigned to this court. See 10/17/2022 Ord. On July 18, 2024, this court sentenced
Russell to 125 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Judgment
at 1-10. Consistent with the terms of her plea agreement, the court also ordered Russell to pay
$4,217,542.86 in restitution and ordered the forfeiture of certain property. Id. at 7; Sealed Consent
Ord. at 1-7.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a person in custody pursuant to a federal sentence may “move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside[,] or correct the sentence,” on the grounds
that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . .
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a). The petitioner bears the burden of proof under Section 2255 and “must demonstrate
her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Ashton, 961 F. Supp. 2d
7, 11 (D.D.C. 2013); United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973). “Relief under
[Section] 2255 is an extraordinary remedy in light of society’s legitimate interest in the finality of
judgments.” United States v. Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d 568, 571 (D.D.C. 2014). As a result, it is
typically only granted if “the challenged sentence resulted from ‘a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,’ or ‘an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure.’” United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). If the reviewing court finds that any grounds requiring relief under
Page 2 of 4 Section 2255(a) are satisfied, it “shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Since Russell proceeds pro se, the court construes her motions “expansively.” United
States v. Davis, No. 18-cr-26, 2024 WL 4253186, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2024). A defendant’s
waiver of her appeal or collateral attack rights must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). And even “where a defendant waives
the right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction as part of his plea agreement, he does not
waive the right to challenge that waiver itself on the grounds that it was not knowing and
voluntary.” United States v. Safarini, No. 91-cr-504-3, 2021 WL 5050092, at *11 (D.D.C. Nov.
1, 2021); see also Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 239 (2019).
Russell’s motions cannot escape the bind of her agreed-upon plea agreement and consent
forfeiture order. Gov’t’s Opp. at 1-6. “Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea
bargains are essentially contracts.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009). The court
generally enforces the agreement if it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See United States
v. Adams, 780 F.3d 1182, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Russell does not challenge the validity of the
plea agreement, but claims that venue was improper. Mot. to Vacate Conviction at 1. But her plea
agreement waived any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia. See Sealed Plea Agreement
at 7. Next, Russell argues that the $4,217,542.86 she agreed to pay in restitution should be reduced
because she has no ability to pay it. Mot. to Reduce Restitution at 1. But that amount was specified
in her plea agreement, and she reiterated at sentencing that she agreed to pay it. Sealed Plea
Agreement at 10; Judgment at 10. Finally, Russell wants her two iPhones, one Android phone,
luggage, shoes, purses, jewelry, and a laptop returned to her. Mot. to Return Prop. at 1. Yet her
Page 3 of 4 consent order of forfeiture explained in detail each item she would be forced to turnover—
including the items Russell she now seeks. Sealed Consent Ord. at 1-3.
The record “makes clear” that Russell’s plea was “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”
United States v. Bertram, 209 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 762 F. App’x 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). The plea agreement specifically affirmed that Russell read or had read every page of
the agreement, discussed it with her attorney, and that she was not under the influence of anything
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