United States v. Rufus Todd Jones

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Rufus Todd Jones

56 F. App'x 295

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 25, 2003

Docket02-1589

StatusUnpublished

This text of 56 F. App'x 295 (United States v. Rufus Todd Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Rufus Todd Jones, 56 F. App'x 295 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Rufus Todd Jones pleaded guilty to trafficking in counterfeit Rolex watches. Jones did not object to the sentence imposed by the district court, * namely, a sentence of 36 months imprisonment, three years supervised release, and restitution. *296 On appeal, Jones contends the district court improperly ordered restitution in the amount of $116,779.50 for legal fees and expenses Rolex incurred while obtaining a civil judgment against him.

In our view, the district court correctly ordered restitution for attorney fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (authorizing restitution); United States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir.) (Standard of review), ce rt. denied, 525 U.S. 1059, 119 S.Ct. 627, 142 L.Ed.2d 565 (1998). The record amply supports the district court’s determination that the attorney fees were triggered by the specific conduct that was the basis for the offense of conviction. Indeed, Jones testified Rolex had brought multiple actions against him relating to his sales of watches, and an unobjected-to portion of the presentence report (PSR) asserted Rolex had accrued $116,779.50 in legal fees and expenses in pursuing him. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(D) (district court may accept unobjected-to portions of PSR); United States v. Akbani, 151 F.3d 774, 779-80 (8th Cir.1998). The district court properly considered Jones’s financial resources and ability to meet the restitution obligation inasmuch as it recognized his negative net worth, stated its desire that he be able to have at least a little money while incarcerated, and ordered him to pay only a fraction of his earnings while in prison and $50 per month following his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(l)(B)(i)(II) (court shall consider financial resources of defendant); United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995). Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

*

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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PER CURIAM.

Rufus Todd Jones pleaded guilty to trafficking in counterfeit Rolex watches. Jones did not object to the sentence imposed by the district court, * namely, a sentence of 36 months imprisonment, three years supervised release, and restitution. *296 On appeal, Jones contends the district court improperly ordered restitution in the amount of $116,779.50 for legal fees and expenses Rolex incurred while obtaining a civil judgment against him.

In our view, the district court correctly ordered restitution for attorney fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (authorizing restitution); United States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir.) (Standard of review), ce rt. denied, 525 U.S. 1059, 119 S.Ct. 627, 142 L.Ed.2d 565 (1998). The record amply supports the district court’s determination that the attorney fees were triggered by the specific conduct that was the basis for the offense of conviction. Indeed, Jones testified Rolex had brought multiple actions against him relating to his sales of watches, and an unobjected-to portion of the presentence report (PSR) asserted Rolex had accrued $116,779.50 in legal fees and expenses in pursuing him. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(D) (district court may accept unobjected-to portions of PSR); United States v. Akbani, 151 F.3d 774, 779-80 (8th Cir.1998). The district court properly considered Jones’s financial resources and ability to meet the restitution obligation inasmuch as it recognized his negative net worth, stated its desire that he be able to have at least a little money while incarcerated, and ordered him to pay only a fraction of his earnings while in prison and $50 per month following his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(l)(B)(i)(II) (court shall consider financial resources of defendant); United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995). Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

*

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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56 F. App'x 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rufus-todd-jones-ca8-2003.

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