United States v. Rudge

474 F. Supp. 360, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10776
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedJuly 26, 1979
DocketCrim. 79-82
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 474 F. Supp. 360 (United States v. Rudge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rudge, 474 F. Supp. 360, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10776 (S.D. Iowa 1979).

Opinion

RULINGS ON MOTIONS AND JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

VIETOR, District Judge.

On July 5, 1979, the undersigned Judge heard oral arguments of counsel in respect to defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment. Subject to the ruling on the motion to dismiss, Count 3 was tried before the Court sitting without a jury on July 9, 1979, a jury trial having been waived pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(a). All of the evidence was stipulated. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the face of the indictment. An automobile title certificate is a security within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 907-08 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court is not satisfied that the charging language of Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 is legally insufficient. The motion to dismiss those counts is overruled.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence was stipulated and the Court finds the facts to be as reflected by the stipulated evidence and as reflected in the exhibits introduced.

RULING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

Defendant is charged with violating the portion of section 2314 making it a felony offense for one, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, to transport in interstate commerce any falsely made or forged security, knowing the same to have been falsely made or forged. The legal issue to which the motion for judgment of acquittal is addressed is whether under the undisputed facts the automobile title certificate was falsely made or forged.

The factual essence of this case giving rise to the legal issue is that defendant caused an odometer mileage statement to be presented to the Polk County Treasurer falsely representing the “true mileage” of the used motor vehicle to be substantially lower than it actually was, resulting in the Treasurer issuing a new certificate of title (the transported security) bearing on its face as “mileage” the false figure.

*362 The pertinent portions of Iowa Code § 321.71 provide:

1. For the purposes of this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them:
# # * # * *
b. “True mileage” is the actual mileage the motor vehicle has been driven.
* * * # * *
7. As to motor vehicles of a model year subsequent to the model year 1968 which were equipped with an odometer by the manufacturer, no certificate of title shall be issued unless an odometer statement which is in compliance with federal law and regulations has been made by the transferor of such vehicle and is furnished with the application for certificate of title. The new certificate of title shall record on the face thereof the odometer reading and if the odometer reading is not the true mileage or the true mileage is unknown, then the word “unknown” shall be recorded.

The Government admits that the title certificate was not forged, but contends that it was “falsely made." Page 3, lines 7-8, Government’s trial brief, filed July 16, 1979.

“As a general rule, penal statutes must be strictly construed. See, e. g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 304, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957).” United States v. Freeman, 473 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1973).

The certificate is a genuine certificate of title for the motor vehicle. The false information it contains concerning the mileage of the motor vehicle does not impair its genuineness as the certificate of title for the motor vehicle. The certificate will serve its primary legal purposes of proof of ownership of the motor vehicle (Iowa Code § 321.45(2)(a)(d)), and means of transferring ownership of the motor vehicle (Iowa Code § 321.45). The Government’s contention that the certificate of title is not authentic because the Treasurer lacked authority to issue the certificate because Iowa Code § 321.71(7) provides that “no certificate of title shall be issued unless an odometer statement which is in compliance with federal law and regulation has been made by the transferor of such vehicle and is furnished with the application for certificate of title” is without merit. This provision of law is obviously directory, and does not operate to render the issued certificate a nullity if the odometer statement is false. To hold otherwise would add serious legal insult to the injury suffered by a good faith purchaser by depriving him of ownership of the vehicle, thus parlaying the odometer fraud into a title fraud. Such is not the intent of the statute.

It is the Court’s conclusion that the title certificate was not “falsely made.” What occurred was the creation of a genuine security instrument that contained a false statement of fact. Such a security instrument is not “falsely made” within the meaning of section 2314. A “falsely made” instrument is one that is not genuine. United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1977); Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir. 1954); Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825, 828-29 (8th Cir. 1942).

Defendant’s conduct may constitute other federal and state offenses, but it does not constitute the offense charged.

Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal is sustained, and judgment of acquittal of the offense charged in Count 3 is hereby entered.

APPENDIX

Meg Nichols if called would testify as follows. That she is a secretary in the Corporation Division of the Secretary of State’s Office for the State of Iowa with offices at State Capitol in Des Moines, Iowa. That her office is responsible for the care, custody, and control of all the Articles of Incorporation filed therein. That upon searching her records, she finds a corporation named Crossroads Motors Limited with the Articles of Incorporation filed on March 26, 1974, showing the registered agent of the corporation as Charles H. Rudge, Jr., *363 with a local address of 3506 Valdez Drive, Des Moines, Iowa.

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Bluebook (online)
474 F. Supp. 360, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rudge-iasd-1979.