United States v. Rucks

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 14, 2025
• Docket: 23-2199
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-2199 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:20-cr-001-KJM v. MEMORANDUM* JULIUS RUCKS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California The Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 10, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

Julius Rucks appeals his conviction and his within-guidelines 153-month

sentence after pleading guilty to three fentanyl distribution counts in violation of 21

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. U.S.C. § 841(a) in August 2023. We review the district court’s interpretation of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) de novo, review its factual

findings for clear error, and review its application of the Guidelines to the facts for

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err when it imposed a four-level enhancement

to Rucks’s offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(13) of the Guidelines for “knowingly

misrepresent[ing] or knowingly market[ing] as another substance a mixture or

substance containing fentanyl[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(13). Rucks argues that the

government introduced no evidence that he knowingly misrepresented or marketed

as another substance a substance containing fentanyl because everyone involved in

the relevant transactions knew that the oxycodone-trademarked pills at issue here

contained fentanyl. But Rucks’s argument is plainly contradicted by the record,

which shows that Rucks (1) painstakingly manufactured the pills he sold to match

the color and trademark imprints of prescription oxycodone pills, and (2) represented

to the buyer, an undercover Drug Enforcement Agency agent, that the pills he was

selling would contain such oxycodone trademarks. Further, the evidence also

supported a finding that Rucks knew that two individuals who he dealt with in

connection with the drug transactions were middlemen purchasing drugs for further

resale to unknowing downstream purchasers. Accordingly, the district court did not

2 abuse its discretion by considering this evidence and applying a four-level

§ 2D1.1(b)(13) enhancement to Rucks’s sentence.

2. Nor did the district court err when it applied a two-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), finding that Rucks failed to carry his burden to show that it

was “clearly improbable” that the three handguns that the police recovered when

searching Rucks’s apartment were connected with the underlying offense based on

“the proximity to a substantial controlled substances manufacturing operation[.]”

United States v. Ferryman, 444 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he burden is

on the defendant to prove that it was ‘clearly improbable’ that he possessed a firearm

in connection with the offense.”); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11. The

handguns here were kept in the same two-bedroom apartment as numerous drug-

manufacturing paraphernalia and counterfeit oxycodone pills. We have repeatedly

held “that the fact that a firearm was unloaded does not make it ‘clearly improbable

that the weapon was connected to’ the drug offense.” United States v. Gomez, 6 F.4th

992, 1009 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d 712,

716 (9th Cir. 1998)). And because Rucks admitted to having the key to the safe

where the handguns were recovered, it is evident that the handguns could be readily

loaded and operated by him in connection with the narcotics-distribution offense.

United States v. Heldberg, 907 F.2d 91, 93–94 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States

v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “offense” in this

3 context refers to “the entire course of criminal conduct,” not just the crime of

conviction). Nor could Rucks, as a convicted felon, assert any lawful purpose for

possessing them.

AFFIRMED.