United States v. Roy Rhymer, III

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-4035
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4035 Doc: 24 Filed: 02/24/2026 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROY ALANZO RHYMER, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William J. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:19-cr-00427-WO-1)

Submitted: February 3, 2026 Decided: February 24, 2026

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Graham T. Green, Craig M. Principe, GREEN PRINCIPE PLLC, Winston- Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall S. Galyon, Acting United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4035 Doc: 24 Filed: 02/24/2026 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Roy Alanzo Rhymer, III, appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his

supervised release and sentencing him to seven months’ imprisonment followed by two

years of supervised release. ∗ Rhymer contends that the district court erred in finding that

he violated the supervised release conditions requiring him to work 30 hours per week and

prohibiting access to firearms and ammunition. Rhymer also asserts that his revocation

sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.

A court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(3). We review a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion and

its factual findings underlying the revocation for clear error. United States v. Padgett, 788

F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015).

The amended revocation petition alleged that Rhymer violated eight conditions of

supervised release. Rhymer pleaded guilty to six violations but argued that he worked at

least 30 hours per week and that he did not have constructive possession of firearms and

ammunition. The district court heard extensive argument from Rhymer, heard testimony

of witnesses, and thoroughly weighed the evidence regarding Rhymer’s employer’s

verification of employment and his access to a firearm and ammunition. Ultimately, the

∗ Although Rhymer has been released from incarceration, his appeal is not moot because he is currently serving his two-year term of supervised release. See United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that defendant’s appeal of term of incarceration is not rendered moot by his release when he is still serving supervised release term).

2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4035 Doc: 24 Filed: 02/24/2026 Pg: 3 of 5

court found that Rhymer was not working full time after he moved to Salisbury, North

Carolina, because he ceased to provide paystubs verifying his employment and failed to

provide any type of confirmation of his work for that period. The court also considered

Rhymer’s GPS location from his ankle monitor, which indicated that Rhymer was not

driving trucking routes during the period in question. As for Rhymer’s access to the firearm

and ammunition, after considering the evidence from the search of his apartment and

hearing undisputed testimony regarding fabricated stories Rhymer told to the probation

office, the court found that Rhymer knew about the firearm found in the apartment. We

discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s revocation of supervised release.

Further, “[a] district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon

revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir.

2020). Accordingly, we “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. “To determine whether a revocation

sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess whether it is procedurally or substantively

unreasonable, under a deferential appellate posture.” United States v. Walton, 145 F.4th

476, 486 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, No. 25-6271,

2026 WL 79708 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or

substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is

plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.”

Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4035 Doc: 24 Filed: 02/24/2026 Pg: 4 of 5

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Walton,

145 F.4th at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence within the policy

statement range is presumed reasonable, though the sentencing court retains broad

discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Padgett, 788

F.3d at 373 (citation modified).

Here, Rhymer challenges the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors in

fashioning his sentence. At the continued hearing, the district court weighed the

circumstances and Rhymer’s arguments in detail. The court noted how Rhymer started his

supervised release positively, with records showing that he was working full time and

benefitting from his partner’s influence. The court noted, however, that Rhymer

subsequently violated curfew 15 times in six months, including instances where he lied or

other lied on his behalf. This downward trajectory extended to work, where Rhymer failed

to cooperate with the probation office in providing records. The court explained that the

conduct represented a Grade C violation and that Rhymer additionally committed a new

offense by constructively possessing ammunition that was in an unlocked cabinet in his

apartment. After finding that Rhymer initially did positive things under supervision before

the move to Salisbury, the court found that imposing a sentence at the high end of the policy

statement range would not account for this growth; accordingly, it sentenced Rhymer to

the low end of the range. We conclude that the court offered a clear explanation for

imposing a seven-month sentence. Rhymer also has not rebutted the presumption that his

sentence within his policy statement range is substantively reasonable. Because we

4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4035 Doc: 24 Filed: 02/24/2026 Pg: 5 of 5

conclude that Rhymer’s sentence is reasonable, we need not consider whether the sentence

is plainly unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED