United States v. Roy Cox

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-4582
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4582

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ROY COX, a/k/a Florida,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (7:23−cr−00113−M−KS−1)

Argued: December 12, 2025 Decided: January 21, 2026

Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

ARGUED: Jennifer Claire Leisten, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jake Pugh, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel P. Bubar, Acting United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4582 Doc: 54 Filed: 01/21/2026 Pg: 2 of 10

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Roy Cox challenges his sentence on the grounds that the

district court miscalculated the underlying Guidelines range when it applied a career-

offender enhancement. The government does not defend this miscalculation, and we hold

that the district court indeed erred in applying the enhancement. However, this error was

entirely harmless. The district court explicitly indicated that it would have imposed the

same sentence regardless of Cox’s status as a career offender. And we deem the sentence

substantively reasonable given the district court’s careful consideration of the relevant

§ 3553(a) factors. To reverse and remand would be an impermissible intrusion into the

district court’s primary role in criminal sentencing. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51–52 (2007). We therefore affirm.

I.

In May 2023, Cox sold cocaine base, colloquially known as “crack” or “crack

cocaine,” a Schedule II controlled substance, on three occasions to a confidential informant

working with local law enforcement. The amount sold totaled 65.85 grams. On June 4,

2023, officers applied for and executed an arrest warrant after discovering that Cox had

failed to register as a sex offender, a mandatory consequence of one of his prior

convictions. During the arrest, officers found 470.65 grams of cocaine, 811 grams of

marijuana, and 9.9 grams of crack cocaine. J.A. 112–13.

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Cox was later indicted on three counts of distributing cocaine base and one count of

possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. J.A. 9–10. On March 27, 2024, Cox pled

guilty to all four counts without a plea agreement. J.A. 22, 29–31.

After the guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation

Report (“PSR”), which detailed five of Cox’s prior convictions: (1) a 2005 conviction for

lewd or lascivious battery; (2) a 2009 conviction for trafficking in cocaine; (3) a 2014

conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or sell; (4) a 2014 conviction for

failure to register as a sex offender; and (5) a 2022 conviction for possession of 20 grams

or less of marijuana. J.A. 114–15.

The probation officer determined that the 2009 and 2014 convictions constituted

controlled substances offenses which rendered Cox a “career offender” under the

Guidelines. J.A. 113–15, 121. Relevant to this appeal, the 2009 conviction was for a

violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1), which penalizes “[a]ny person who knowingly

sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in

actual or constructive possession of” between 28 grams and 150 kilograms of cocaine or

cocaine mixtures.

The career-offender determination impacted both Cox’s criminal history

categorization and offense level under the guidelines. His criminal history category was

elevated from Category V to Category VI, and his offense level was elevated from 26 to

32. J.A. 115, 120–21; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Because Cox accepted responsibility,

however, the probation officer decreased the offense level by three to 29. Based on this

total offense level and the criminal history category of VI, the PSR recommended a

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Guidelines range of 151–188 months’ imprisonment. J.A. 121. Absent the career-offender

enhancement, the Guidelines range would have been 84–105 months. J.A. 126.

At sentencing, the defense contended that the probation officer had miscalculated

the Guidelines on the erroneous basis that Cox was a career offender. It claimed that

because Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1) criminalized purchase and possession, the state law

was not a “categorical fit” for a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. Thus,

Cox lacked the two predicate convictions necessary to qualify as a career offender. J.A.

50–53; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(3). It therefore requested a sentence of 104 months

imprisonment. J.A. 65. However, it caveated, “if the Court is concerned that a sentence

between 84 and 105 months is inappropriate, the Court could sentence him in criminal

history category VI, which would be 92 to 115 [months].” J.A. 79. The government sought

a sentence of 151 months. J.A. 77.

The district court reached a “compromise” position, sentencing Cox instead to 120

months. J.A. 87. The court accepted the career-offender enhancement but explained that

I’m going to vary downward, or in the alternative, upward, and land at 120 months. . . . In the event that I am wrong [about the career-offender enhancement], I believe the 84 to 105 understates the likelihood of recidivism, given this defender’s [sic] personal history, and that the career offender guideline is intended to capture the increased likelihood of recidivism, and I would vary upward to the 120 to capture that.

Id. In so ruling, the district court discussed Cox’s prior convictions and repeat offenses but

also considered mitigating factors, including the death of his child and marital issues. These

difficulties constituted at least part of the basis for the downward variance. J.A. 86, 89–90.

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II.

A.

We review a district court’s sentencing determinations “whether inside, just outside,

or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. But before we can proceed to analyze the substance of a

sentence, we “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural

error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Id. at

51.

Here, there can be little doubt that the probation officer and the district court erred

in their Guidelines calculations. When determining whether a predicate conviction

qualifies as a controlled substances offense for purposes of a career-offender enhancement,

we employ the categorical approach. This analysis requires that the “least culpable conduct

criminalized by the state statute” fall within the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled

substances offense.” United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th 215, 229 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438, 441 (4th Cir.

2022)). We find no such match here. Nor does the government argue otherwise. See Resp.

Br. at 9–10; Oral Arg. at 23:56.

Indeed, the Guidelines define “a controlled substances offense” as one involving the

“manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or

the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export,

distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)(1). The Florida law that Cox violated,

however, additionally criminalizes activities such as “possession” regardless of intent and

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“purchase[.]” Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1). Moreover, we have held that intent cannot be

imputed when a defendant possesses a quantity of cocaine that could also be attributable

to personal use. United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2001). While

there is no brightline rule for personal-use quantities, we held in Brandon that 35 grams of

cocaine fell under this category. Id. The Florida law, however, targets quantities of 28

grams or higher, and therefore, by its very terms, penalizes possession and purchase of

personal-use quantities. Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1). In this light, the least culpable

conduct present in the Florida statute renders the law a categorical mismatch for the

“controlled substance offense” definition at issue here. And thus Cox did not commit the

two predicate offenses necessary for the career-offender enhancement.

B.

Not all errors are created equal, however, and a Guidelines miscalculation is not

always reversible error. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been clear that the Guidelines are

purely advisory in nature. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–60 (2005).

District courts may deviate from the Guidelines as they deem necessary to advance notions

of justice and public safety. Such significant discretion in sentencing comports with district

courts’ specialized expertise in this field and their intimacy with the facts surrounding each

individual criminal defendant. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51–52. Therefore, we will not remand

where (1) the same sentence is inevitable regardless of any Guidelines miscalculation and

(2) the original sentence is substantively reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-

Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382–83 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d

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119, 124 (4th Cir. 2011). Such a scenario is the most fertile ground for harmless-error

analysis and is the exact one we now confront.

The district court left no room for doubt as to what it would do upon any remand.

See J.A. 87–88 (“So no matter who intends to appeal, I am varying out of the

guideline . . . .”). Chief Judge Myers specifically declared that even if he incorrectly

applied the career-offender enhancement, he would vary “in the alternative, upward” from

Cox’s proposed guideline range “and land at 120 months.” J.A. 87. We take the district

court’s word at face value on this matter. See United States v. Shatley, 448 F.3d 264, 268

(4th Cir. 2006).

Thus, the only remaining question is whether the 120-month sentence is

substantively reasonable. We hold that it is. While the district court was wrong to consider

the 2009 conviction for the purposes of a career-offender enhancement, it could surely

consider all of Cox’s convictions when determining the likelihood of recidivism under

§ 3553(a). Indeed, it is the role of the district court to consider “the history and

characteristics” of an individual defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And for the purposes

of an upward variance, the legal fiction of the categorical approach evaporates, and

hypothetical “least culpable conduct” becomes irrelevant. The district court looks instead

to the defendant’s actual pattern of behavior, and, for this purpose, the line between

possession and purchase on the one hand and distribution on the other blurs. The district

court therefore appropriately considered the reality of Cox’s circumstances: Cox was

convicted in 2009 of “trafficking in cocaine,” and in 2014 of “possession of cocaine with

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an intent to deliver or sell,” and he presently pled guilty to charges of distribution. J.A. 9–

10, 115, 197 (citation modified).

The district court further determined that Cox had revolved in and out of the courts

and prison without much change to his behavior, and that a 104-month sentence thus

underestimated the risk of his future return to crime. See J.A. 90 (“[Y]ou sold cocaine, you

got arrested. You did it again, you got arrested. And now you’re back out there with half a

kilogram between the crack and the powder.”). This is fully consistent with the district

court’s mandate to “promote respect for the law,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct,” and “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).

The district court undertook this § 3553(a) analysis cautiously. The variance was

only 15.4% higher than the defense’s requested sentence of 104 months, and only 4.3%

higher than the upper bound of the defense’s alternative sentence recommendation, which

ranged from 92 to 115 months. Questioning this variance would serve only to pick

needlessly at the district court’s well-reasoned judgment. Indeed, in terms of sheer

percentages, the trial court’s variance pales in comparison to those we have upheld in other

cases. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2017) (upholding

as substantively reasonable an upward variance of 67%); Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 124

(upholding as substantively reasonable an upward variance of 260%).

The variance here is the product of the district court’s careful and explicit

consideration of mitigating factors, including Cox’s familial hardships. See J.A. 89 (“I

understand the kinds of stresses that you’re talking about with the loss of your child and

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the loss of your marriage. I appreciate the difficulty that that could place one in.”). Where

the district court has considered the totality of Cox’s circumstances, and has arrived at the

most justified of variances, we are hard-pressed to find the sentence anything but

reasonable. See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 383 (indicating that the case for substantive

reasonableness is all the greater when the district court “carefully consider[s] each of the

defendant’s arguments” during its § 3553(a) analysis.).

It is inappropriate for an appellate court to second-guess such a rational

determination. See Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501 (2022) (“As a general

matter, ‘it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the

sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.’” (quoting Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983))). Taking the measure of the man is ultimately the

district court’s responsibility in sentencing. And this responsibility incorporates the

decision of whether a variance is necessary in any given case. In Gall, the Supreme Court

explained that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their

import under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence,

makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not

conveyed by the record.” 552 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted). Appellate courts should not

commandeer this role with unnecessary remands and rulings that detract from the district

court’s expertise and familiarity with individual criminal defendants. Indeed, harmless-

error inquiry is essential to the maintenance of trial-court primacy in sentencing.

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Given the district court’s awareness of Cox’s criminal history and its clear

statements of intent in this case, we will not delay the preordained outcome. The error here

was harmless, and we readily affirm.

AFFIRMED