United States v. Rowell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 24-1136
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

KEION ROWELL, a/k/a Keion J. Rowell, a/k/a Knutzo,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Lynch, and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Syrie D. Fried, with whom Good Schneider Cormier Fried & Brooks were on brief, for appellant.

Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, with whom Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellees.

February 18, 2026 PER CURIAM. Following the district court's denial of

his motion to suppress evidence, a jury convicted Appellant Keion

Rowell ("Rowell") of sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c). The district court sentenced

Rowell to 180 months' imprisonment, followed by five years of

supervised release.

On appeal, Rowell challenges the district court's denial

of his motion to suppress. He also presents a claim of structural

error in the temporary sealing of the courtroom during voir dire,

even though he failed to object below. Next, he argues the

district court erroneously admitted statements without proper

foundation under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). And finally,

he argues that the district court erred under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 24(c)(3) in allowing alternate jurors at the

close of trial into the deliberation room before being removed and

not inquiring into whether they actually participated and

influenced deliberations. We reject each of Rowell's arguments,

addressing them below seriatim.

I.

A. Motion to Suppress

Rowell contends that the police violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by entering the apartment where he was staying

with the minor without a warrant. Thus, he argues that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

- 2 - body-worn camera video and audio recordings of the police encounter

with the occupants of the apartment, as well as the observations

made by the police as a result of the entry and the fruits of the

"search" that followed. We review the district court's factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United

States v. Giambro, 126 F.4th 46, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2025). Because

Rowell renewed his motion to suppress at trial, we consider both

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and at trial.

United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 22 n.13 (1st Cir.

2021).

The facts in the light most favorable to the district

court's ruling, see Giambro, 126 F.4th at 53-54, evince the

following. On January 18, 2021, the minor's father filed a missing

person's report with the Belmont Police Department, stating that

the minor was "endangered." On January 21, 2021, the Belmont

Police Department obtained information that revealed that the

minor's Snapchat account was accessed from an IP address associated

with the apartment Rowell was staying at. Based on this

information, the Boston Police Department dispatched several

officers to that location. The officers first spoke through a

window with an occupant of the apartment, who told them they would

not be allowed inside. A tenant from a different unit in the

building then admitted the officers into the building's common

vestibule. The officers proceeded to the apartment associated

- 3 - with the router ping, opened the unlocked door, and stepped a short

distance inside -- one officer about five feet into the apartment

and another barely over the threshold -- before asking the

occupants for permission to search for the missing minor, which

was not granted. During this conversation, Rowell walked out of

a bedroom holding a cell phone. This was captured on one of the

officers' body-worn cameras.

In denying the suppression motion, the district court

found that the police officers held an objectively reasonable basis

for believing that the minor, who had been reported missing, was

present in the apartment and needed immediate aid. See Case v.

Montana, No. 24-624, 2026 WL 96690, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026).

All of the actions taken by the officers were justified as

reasonable responses to information they had received indicating

an emergency existed. Rowell argues that law enforcement solely

relied on the information regarding the minor's access to her

Snapchat account from the IP address associated with the apartment

and that this alone did not create an objectively reasonable basis

for the officers to believe the minor was inside the apartment.

This argument, however, is belied by the record evidence. Law

enforcement officers knew that the minor had been missing for days

and that the father thought she was in physical danger. They also

knew that her social media account had recently connected to the

IP address in the apartment. Thus, law enforcement officers had

- 4 - an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that an emergency

existed, and that the place they sought to search was reasonably

linked to the perceived emergency. Giambro, 126 F.4th at 54-55;

see also Case, 2026 WL 96690, at *5 (noting that courts must

"assess the reasonableness of [an emergency-aid] entry on its own

terms"). Moreover, the entry was limited to briefly stepping

inside the apartment and asking the occupants about the missing

minor. Because the district court's findings are supported by the

record, they are not clearly erroneous. See id.

B. Voir Dire

Rowell next contends that the district court committed

structural error by closing the courtroom to allow potential jurors

to discuss possible disqualifying biases. During jury selection,

the district court inquired of potential jurors whether they or a

close friend or relative had been the victim of or had been accused

of sexual abuse. The court also asked them whether there was

anything about the facts or parties that could make it difficult

for them to be fair and impartial. Three potential jurors came

forward and were individually questioned by the district court.

In these instances, the district court individually asked them

whether they preferred to answer questions regarding their ability

to sit as impartial factfinders in a private manner, to which all

responded in the affirmative.

- 5 - Before continuing to question the first of these

potential jurors, Juror 16, the court asked defense counsel if he

"object[ed] . . . to [the court] sealing the courtroom,"

explaining that it was doing so "[j]ust for the purposes of the

inquiry of [Juror 16]." Defense counsel stated "[w]e don't object

to that," after which the courtroom was sealed for about a minute

and then reopened. Later, without any objection from defense

counsel, the district court sealed the courtroom again for two

discussions of approximately three minutes each with Jurors 20 and

42.

Rowell contends that the jurors' interest in expressing

their concerns confidentially "did not outweigh [his] interest in

and right to a public trial" and that "[o]ther avenues were open

to the trial judge." He did not, however, raise these issues

below, even after inquiry on the matter by the trial judge. This

argument is therefore waived. See United States v. Acosta-Colón,

741 F.3d 179, 187 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that defendant waived

challenge to exclusion issue where, during a sidebar on the matter,

other defense counsel raised objections but his attorney "said

nothing"); United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.

2012) (holding that a Sixth Amendment public trial claim can be

waived).

- 6 - C. Admission of Evidence

Rowell contends that certain text messages contained

hearsay and, because they were not properly attributable to him

under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), they were inadmissible.

This challenge was preserved and thus subject to review for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Castillo, 158 F.4th 257, 272 (1st

Cir. 2025) (citing Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 29).

The messages in question were obtained from the forensic

examination of a phone recovered from the minor, which she later

testified belonged to Rowell. At trial, the district court allowed

the prosecution to present the messages, but gave the jury a

limiting instruction. The court stated that the header information

in the messages -- the recipient, sender, and subject -- would be

admitted for their truth. Their authorship, however, was disputed,

so the jury would have to decide whether Rowell was the author of

a particular message. During direct examination, the minor

identified whether she or Rowell had been the author of particular

entries. Further, Rowell was able to cross-examine the minor about

the texts and his purported authorship. We find no evidentiary

error amounting to an abuse of discretion in the admission of these

messages. See United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th

Cir. 2005) (header information automatically generated by a

computer not hearsay because "there was neither a 'statement' nor

a 'declarant' involved." (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801)); United

- 7 - States v. Alicea Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

beeper charts, as these were introduced to prove that a

co-conspirator had received them, and whether defendant sent them

was a separate matter for the jury to decide).

Rowell next challenges the admission of ClassifiedAds

and Lyft emails, arguing that they were inadmissible because they

were introduced only for their supposed effect on him even though,

in his view, his "state of mind had no relevance to any issue in

the case." We review this preserved evidentiary objection for

abuse of discretion. See Castillo, 158 F.4th at 272 (citing

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 29). As for the ClassifiedAds argument,

these were not admitted pursuant to the limiting instruction Rowell

describes, so this claim lacks merit. As for the Lyft messages,

these were "offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted

but merely to show context," and thus do not constitute hearsay.

United States v. Pena, 24 F.4th 46, 61 (1st Cir. 2022); see also

United States v. Cruz-Diaz, 550 F.3d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 2008)

(noting a statement offered for the limited purpose of showing

what effect the statement had on the listener is not hearsay). We

therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting these emails.

Rowell finally contends that the government failed to

observe the district court's limiting instructions during closing

- 8 - argument. He identifies three passages, but only one drew a

contemporaneous objection and only that passage was arguably

improper under the court's ruling. Because Rowell timely objected,

we review de novo whether the challenged remark was improper.

United States v. Ramos-Baez, 86 F.4th 28, 64 (1st Cir. 2023). Even

assuming the remark was improper, as the government appears to

concede, this court will order a new trial only if the statement

in the context of the trial "so poisoned the well that the trial's

outcome was likely affected," considering "(1) the severity of the

misconduct, including whether it was isolated and/or deliberate;

(2) whether curative instructions were given; and (3) the strength

of the evidence against the defendant." Id. (quoting United States

v. González-Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 19 (1st Cir. 2015)). The challenged

remark was brief and not repeated, and the district court promptly

gave a curative instruction that the court then repeated a second

time. Rowell did not object. We thus see no error that may have

affected the trial outcome.

D. Alternate Jurors

Rowell argues that the district court erred under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(3) in sending alternate

jurors into the jury room and not inquiring into whether they

actually participated and influenced deliberations. We need not

reach this argument because Rowell waived it. See Acosta-Colón,

741 F.3d at 187.

- 9 - After giving its final instructions, the district court

excused the jury to the jury room to begin deliberations. About

eighteen minutes later, the court recalled the parties and

explained that, by mistake, the two alternates had gone into the

jury room with the other jurors. The court stated that it had

already removed the alternates and that they were "in the hallway

separately." The court then consulted with counsel and proposed

to instruct the jurors that, if deliberations had begun, they must

disregard anything the alternates said and begin deliberations

anew. Defense counsel responded "[t]hat's fine," and also

suggested language narrowing the restart instruction to the event

jurors had actually discussed the case with the alternates. The

court adopted that suggestion. The court then instructed the jury

that if it had commenced deliberations, it must "disregard anything

that the alternates said" and "restart [its] deliberations anew

from the beginning." There was no objection, and just over 30

minutes later the jury returned a guilty verdict.

Rowell now faults the district court for not conducting

an inquiry into whether the alternates actually participated and

influenced deliberations. But he did not request any such inquiry.

Even if Rowell had preserved the issue, his argument plainly fails.

Rule 24(c)(3) requires the district court to "ensure that a

retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until

that alternate replaces a juror or is discharged," and, if

- 10 - substitution occurs after deliberations begin, to instruct the

jury to begin deliberations anew. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3). But

a violation of Rule 24 is not reversible per se; the question is

whether the defendant can show prejudice. See United States v.

Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1285 (1st Cir. 1996). Rowell identifies

no basis to conclude that the brief presence of the alternates

affected the verdict.

II. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

- 11 -