UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
TIMOTHY ROWBOTTOM, Case No. 24-cr-211 (TNM)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The Government brought several misdemeanor charges against Timothy Rowbottom,
claiming he participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol. To expedite its disclosure of
potentially discoverable materials, the Government now seeks a protective order limiting the use,
dissemination, and reproduction of sensitive information. Rowbottom opposes the order, saying
the Government failed to show good cause. But the Court finds that the Government has shown
good cause, so it will grant the Government’s motion and issue its proposed protective order.
I.
The Government charged Rowbottom with four misdemeanors as a result of his alleged
conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Information at 1–3, 1 ECF No. 12. During
its investigation of the attack, the Government obtained and continues to obtain “voluminous
amounts of information and evidence relating to both charged and uncharged individuals.”
Gov’t Mot. for Protective Order (“Gov’t Mot.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 14. More than 8.14 million files
relating to the Capitol attack are available to January 6 defendants. Id. ¶ 11.
Given the volume and nature of these materials, the Government believes they contain
sensitive information. Id. ¶ 4. For instance, the Government anticipates its productions may
1 The Court’s page citations refer to the pagination automatically generated by CM/ECF. contain “personal identity information,” information on “confidential sources,” medical records,
law-enforcement methods, “security information,” and “tax information.” Gov’t Proposed
Protective Order Governing Discovery (“Protective Order”) at 1–2, ECF No. 14-1.
If any such information appears in its productions, the protective order would allow the
Government to mark those materials as “Sensitive” or “Highly Sensitive.” Id. at 2. These
designations would, in turn, limit how Rowbottom and his legal team could use, disseminate, or
reproduce the information. See id. at 2–4. The Government says this system gives it the “ability
to provide voluminous discoverable materials expeditiously, while adequately protecting the
United States’ legitimate interests.” Gov’t Mot. ¶ 9.
Rowbottom disagrees. He claims the protective order is unjustified because the
Government failed to support its request with good cause. See Def.’s Opp’n at 2–5, ECF No. 18.
The Government’s motion is ripe.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Government is required “to produce,
upon the defendant’s request, any documents and data that are material to preparing the defense.”
United States v. Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–
(G)). Under this rule, “the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or
inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). In other words, the Court
may issue a protective order upon a showing of good cause. See id.
Three factors bear on the presence of good cause: “whether (1) disclosure of the
materials in question would pose a hazard to others; (2) the defendant would be prejudiced by a
protective order; and (3) the public’s interest in disclosure outweighs the possible harm.” Dixon,
355 F. Supp. 3d at 4. “[O]nce a showing of good cause has been made, the court has relatively
2 unconstrained discretion to fashion an appropriate protective order.” United States v. Johnson,
314 F. Supp. 3d 248, 251 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 185
(1969) (“[T]he trial court can and should” issue protective orders “where appropriate.”).
Because the Government is the party seeking a protective order, it bears the burden of
justifying its request with good cause. United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir.
2015). Its justification must be “particularized” and “specific,” bearing in mind that “the level of
particularity required depends on the nature and type of protective order at issue.” Dixon, 355 F.
Supp. 3d at 4 (cleaned up).
III.
The Government has amply justified its request for a protective order.
First, the unfettered “disclosure of the materials in question would pose a hazard to
others.” Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 4. The discovery materials in this case are vast; Rowbottom
would have access to over 8.14 million documents and 32,000 videos. Gov’t Mot. ¶ 11. And
some of these materials include sensitive “information such as tips, witness statements, and the
results of searches performed upon other individuals’ devices and accounts.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 4
(emphasis added), ECF No. 19. Disclosing this information without any protective measures
could jeopardize potential witnesses, publicize personally identifiable information, and divulge
details about security at the U.S. Capitol. Accord United States v. McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d
132, 138–40 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding “hazard to others” absent protective order nearly identical to
the one proposed here).
Rowbottom does not quarrel with this conclusion. Instead, he faults the protective order
for being overbroad and for failing to “identify materials specific to this case.” Def.’s Opp’n at
4. True, the Government’s proposed order paints with a broad brush. But it is fashioned to
3 facilitate the efficient flow of discovery for one the largest prosecutions “in American history,
both in terms of the number of defendants prosecuted and the nature and volume of the
evidence.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 6.
Given this context, the proposed order is sufficiently “particularized” and “specific.”
Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 4; McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (“The nature of the showing of
particularity . . . depends upon the nature or type of protective order at issue.” (cleaned up)). It
only applies to ten specific categories of protected information, none of which draw any
objection from Rowbottom. See Protective Order at 1. The Government has promised to
designate materials sparingly and only where necessary. See id. at 2 (“The Government agrees
to make every effort to provide discovery in a manner that will allow for most discovery to be
produced without such designations.” (emphasis added)). And if disputes arise, the Government
“will agree to redaction” as an alternative when it will “resolve the basis for which a sensitivity
designation was applied.” Id. at 4. The Government’s proposed order “is therefore not
impermissibly broad or unspecific.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 139.
Second, the proposed order will not prejudice Rowbottom. See Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at
4. For starters, Rowbottom does not advance any allegations of prejudice. In his view, the Court
should consider prejudice only after the movant has shown good cause.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
TIMOTHY ROWBOTTOM, Case No. 24-cr-211 (TNM)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The Government brought several misdemeanor charges against Timothy Rowbottom,
claiming he participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol. To expedite its disclosure of
potentially discoverable materials, the Government now seeks a protective order limiting the use,
dissemination, and reproduction of sensitive information. Rowbottom opposes the order, saying
the Government failed to show good cause. But the Court finds that the Government has shown
good cause, so it will grant the Government’s motion and issue its proposed protective order.
I.
The Government charged Rowbottom with four misdemeanors as a result of his alleged
conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Information at 1–3, 1 ECF No. 12. During
its investigation of the attack, the Government obtained and continues to obtain “voluminous
amounts of information and evidence relating to both charged and uncharged individuals.”
Gov’t Mot. for Protective Order (“Gov’t Mot.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 14. More than 8.14 million files
relating to the Capitol attack are available to January 6 defendants. Id. ¶ 11.
Given the volume and nature of these materials, the Government believes they contain
sensitive information. Id. ¶ 4. For instance, the Government anticipates its productions may
1 The Court’s page citations refer to the pagination automatically generated by CM/ECF. contain “personal identity information,” information on “confidential sources,” medical records,
law-enforcement methods, “security information,” and “tax information.” Gov’t Proposed
Protective Order Governing Discovery (“Protective Order”) at 1–2, ECF No. 14-1.
If any such information appears in its productions, the protective order would allow the
Government to mark those materials as “Sensitive” or “Highly Sensitive.” Id. at 2. These
designations would, in turn, limit how Rowbottom and his legal team could use, disseminate, or
reproduce the information. See id. at 2–4. The Government says this system gives it the “ability
to provide voluminous discoverable materials expeditiously, while adequately protecting the
United States’ legitimate interests.” Gov’t Mot. ¶ 9.
Rowbottom disagrees. He claims the protective order is unjustified because the
Government failed to support its request with good cause. See Def.’s Opp’n at 2–5, ECF No. 18.
The Government’s motion is ripe.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Government is required “to produce,
upon the defendant’s request, any documents and data that are material to preparing the defense.”
United States v. Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–
(G)). Under this rule, “the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or
inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). In other words, the Court
may issue a protective order upon a showing of good cause. See id.
Three factors bear on the presence of good cause: “whether (1) disclosure of the
materials in question would pose a hazard to others; (2) the defendant would be prejudiced by a
protective order; and (3) the public’s interest in disclosure outweighs the possible harm.” Dixon,
355 F. Supp. 3d at 4. “[O]nce a showing of good cause has been made, the court has relatively
2 unconstrained discretion to fashion an appropriate protective order.” United States v. Johnson,
314 F. Supp. 3d 248, 251 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 185
(1969) (“[T]he trial court can and should” issue protective orders “where appropriate.”).
Because the Government is the party seeking a protective order, it bears the burden of
justifying its request with good cause. United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir.
2015). Its justification must be “particularized” and “specific,” bearing in mind that “the level of
particularity required depends on the nature and type of protective order at issue.” Dixon, 355 F.
Supp. 3d at 4 (cleaned up).
III.
The Government has amply justified its request for a protective order.
First, the unfettered “disclosure of the materials in question would pose a hazard to
others.” Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 4. The discovery materials in this case are vast; Rowbottom
would have access to over 8.14 million documents and 32,000 videos. Gov’t Mot. ¶ 11. And
some of these materials include sensitive “information such as tips, witness statements, and the
results of searches performed upon other individuals’ devices and accounts.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 4
(emphasis added), ECF No. 19. Disclosing this information without any protective measures
could jeopardize potential witnesses, publicize personally identifiable information, and divulge
details about security at the U.S. Capitol. Accord United States v. McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d
132, 138–40 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding “hazard to others” absent protective order nearly identical to
the one proposed here).
Rowbottom does not quarrel with this conclusion. Instead, he faults the protective order
for being overbroad and for failing to “identify materials specific to this case.” Def.’s Opp’n at
4. True, the Government’s proposed order paints with a broad brush. But it is fashioned to
3 facilitate the efficient flow of discovery for one the largest prosecutions “in American history,
both in terms of the number of defendants prosecuted and the nature and volume of the
evidence.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 6.
Given this context, the proposed order is sufficiently “particularized” and “specific.”
Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 4; McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (“The nature of the showing of
particularity . . . depends upon the nature or type of protective order at issue.” (cleaned up)). It
only applies to ten specific categories of protected information, none of which draw any
objection from Rowbottom. See Protective Order at 1. The Government has promised to
designate materials sparingly and only where necessary. See id. at 2 (“The Government agrees
to make every effort to provide discovery in a manner that will allow for most discovery to be
produced without such designations.” (emphasis added)). And if disputes arise, the Government
“will agree to redaction” as an alternative when it will “resolve the basis for which a sensitivity
designation was applied.” Id. at 4. The Government’s proposed order “is therefore not
impermissibly broad or unspecific.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 139.
Second, the proposed order will not prejudice Rowbottom. See Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at
4. For starters, Rowbottom does not advance any allegations of prejudice. In his view, the Court
should consider prejudice only after the movant has shown good cause. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5.
That is incorrect as a legal matter. See Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (stating courts consider
prejudice “[i]n determining whether good cause exists”). And as a factual matter, the proposed
order gives Rowbottom and his “legal defense team”—which includes “defense counsel” and
“any attorneys, investigators, paralegals, support staff, and expert witnesses who are advising or
assisting defense counsel,” Protective Order at 2—access to the protected information to
formulate his defense. McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 140. If that allowance still proves too
4 burdensome, Rowbottom may object to a designation or seek modification of the order. See id.;
Protective Order at 4–5.
Rejecting the proposed order would prejudice both the Government and Rowbottom.
Recall that global discovery in this case consists of more than 8.14 million files. See Gov’t Mot.
¶ 11. The video files alone “would take more than a year to view if played continuously.” Id.
Requiring the Government to review and redact every file before production would severely
strain the Government’s resources and slow Rowbottom’s access to materials he needs to prepare
his defense. That process would be flatly “inconsistent with rules requiring efficient and
expeditious discovery.” Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
Third, “any public interest in the materials covered under the protective order will not be
harmed by its issuance.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142. The order excludes information
that has, or will become, part of the public record. See Protective Order at 5. And the public has
very little, if any, interest in the sensitive information covered by the proposed order.
Rowbottom does not claim otherwise. In sum, issuing the order will simply guard sensitive
information from publication “without due consideration of the relevant privacy interests
beforehand.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142.
One final point: Good cause backs the Government’s request in this case, as it has in
countless others. Neither the Government, nor the Court, are aware of any court rejecting the
protective order proposed here—and there have been over 1,300 January 6 cases charged in this
District. See Gov’t Mot. ¶ 12 (collecting cases); McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142–43 (same).
5 IV.
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Government’s [14] Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
2024.06.24 10:21:29 -04'00' Dated: June 24, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.