United States v. Rosario

51 F. Supp. 2d 900, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9085, 1999 WL 402514
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJune 10, 1999
Docket97 CR 510
StatusPublished

This text of 51 F. Supp. 2d 900 (United States v. Rosario) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rosario, 51 F. Supp. 2d 900, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9085, 1999 WL 402514 (N.D. Ill. 1999).

Opinion

*902 MEMORANDUM OPINION ON SENTENCING ISSUES

BUCKLO, District Judge.

In September, 1997, the 20 defendants 1 involved in this case were indicted, charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (more commonly known as “crack” or “crack cocaine”), a Schedule II Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The conspiracy was alleged to have taken place at the Lathrop Homes, a public housing project in Chicago. The conspiracy, as alleged, consisted in using force or the threat of force to keep anyone other than the defendants, members of the “Project Kings,” a subgroup of the Latin Kings street gang, from selling drugs at the La-throp Homes; having “Nation Days” in which all of the members of the conspiracy participated in selling crack cocaine and in which the proceeds went to the gang as a whole; holding meetings at which Nation Days and firearms, among other things, were discussed; and selling crack cocaine on an individual basis on non-Nation Days at the Lathrop Homes. Five of the defendants, including one who became a principal witness in the case, were charged with using persons under 18 years of age, in connection with the conspiracy. The remaining counts of the 34 count indictment charged various individuals with particular sales of crack cocaine. Twelve of the defendants pled guilty to various charges pursuant to plea agreements before trial. Eight defendants went to trial. Most of the defendants were found guilty as charged in the indictment. However, Sandy Garvin was found not guilty of the conspiracy charge. Abraham Hernandez was found not guilty of specific sales. Sentencing of these defendants has been delayed by various reasons. 2

While I have resolved most of the sentencing issues raised by various motions on the record and in written rulings, this memorandum discusses certain of those issues that substantially affect various sentences.

The most serious question raised in terms of sentencing is the amount of crack that should be attributed to each defendant. Three questions are raised with respect to this issue: (1) Should Sandy Gar-vin, who was acquitted of the conspiracy charge, nevertheless be sentenced just as if he had been found guilty of conspiracy? (2) What amounts of crack did the government prove, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, were sold pursuant to the conspiracy? (3) Should crack that was sold pursuant to the conspiracy be attributed to defendants who were incarcerated during the time the crack was sold?

I. Sandy Garvin

The government seeks to include the drugs attributable to the conspiracy to Sandy Garvin on the ground that even if the jury did not find the evidence sufficient to convict him of the conspiracy, there is at least a preponderance of the evidence to show that he is guilty of participation in *903 the conspiracy. The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing court may consider conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted if it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 683, 638, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997). It did not hold that this was required but I have at any rate considered the evidence and argument in support of inclusion in this case.

The government’s argument appears in part to dispute the jury’s verdict. Having heard the evidence (and read the transcript of the trial as well), it is clear to me that the evidence at trial would not support a verdict of guilty as to Mr. Garvin’s participation in the charged conspiracy. In support of its argument that Mr. Gar-vin should be held responsible for all the crack cocaine sold by the conspiracy, despite this acquittal, the government makes two points. First, it argues, the evidence shows that Mr. Garvin was a member of the Latin Kings during the time the conspiracy operated. But at trial, and since, except in conjunction with this motion, the government has expressly disavowed any argument that membership in a gang, even the Latin Kings, is itself a criminal offense. Furthermore, the evidence at trial referred to by the government in its response to Mr. Garvin’s objection to inclusion of the conspiracy’s drugs in his sentence computation is testimony by Juan Hernandez, the government’s principal witness, that Mr. Garvin was “an old king ... he’d been there a long time. So we just let him do what he wanted to.” (Tr. 741) The government refers to another witness — a gang member who pled guilty — who testified that Mr. Garvin had been seen “throwing up the crown” (i.e., giving gang signals) when the witness was a child. (Tr. 2276) Neither of these references support the claim that Mr. Garvih should be held responsible for all drugs sold by the conspiracy, nor are they evidence that Mr. Garvin was a.member of the conspiracy. The government’s second argument is that Mr. Garvin got a benefit of the conspiracy, in being allowed to join a Nation Day funded trip to the Wisconsin Dells. As will be discussed further below, there was not a lot of evidence about the way. money from the conspiracy was spent. Apparently, however, the conspirators, together with others who were not charged with the conspiracy, did go on one trip to the Wisconsin Dells. But since the government agrees that others who went on that trip (outside the charged conspirators) were not members of the conspiracy, the fact that Mr. Garvin also went on the Wisconsin Dells trip does not support its argument that Mr. Garvin was a member of the conspiracy.

Against this evidence is the evidence that connected other members of the conspiracy. The heart of the conspiracy as proved at trial were the Nation Days on which the members worked together’ to sell crack with the proceeds going to the Project Kings’ treasury. There were also' meetings (in gang talk, called “demos”), at which Nation Days, guns, membership, discipline, and juveniles, among other things, were discussed. There was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Garvin attended a single one of these meetings (required, as the government says, for all other members of the gang 3 ), or participated in any Nation Day. The evidence with respect to Mr. Garvin was that as an “old retired king” (Tr. 2276), his attempts to sell crack to support his drug habit were tolerated by the conspirators. The jury returned the only verdict that it could have in light of the evidence. I conclude that neither is Mr. Garvin’s participation in the conspiracy supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 4

*904 Mr. Garvin was found guilty of four individual sales of crack. While he argues that he should not be held responsible for those sales because the evidence shows only that he assisted in the sales in return for a small amount of crack, I conclude that the verdicts are supported by the evidence. Thus, adding together the amounts of sale (they were all to undercover police), he is responsible for .47 grams of crack cocaine.

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Related

United States v. Puig-Infante
19 F.3d 929 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Watts
519 U.S. 148 (Supreme Court, 1997)
United States v. Manu Patel
879 F.2d 292 (Seventh Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Michael Henderson and Leroy Nolan
58 F.3d 1145 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
51 F. Supp. 2d 900, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9085, 1999 WL 402514, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rosario-ilnd-1999.